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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to investigate the influence of earnings news on stock liquidity and the 
relationship between information asymmetry cost component and Post Earnings 
Announcement Drift in different equity markets. The scope of this research includes 1821 
firms from three leading countries in capital trading, the United States, United Kingdom, 
and France.  The first part of empirical work, the univariate panel analysis, shows that 
price reaction, volume response and liquidity effect are profound during short term event 
window length and reduce over time when the news ceases, The second part, a 
multivariate regression analysis which uses  Generalised Method of Movement to capture 
both the problems of a likely presence of endogeneity between the explanatory variables 
and cross-stock heterogeneity,shows that the impact of earnings announcement on stock 
liquidity can split in two directions. The immediate effect is the shock after the news, 
causing stock liquidity to decrease immediately by lifting the illiquidity function upward. 
After the event, from the new increased position of illiquidity function, stock liquidity 
improves   over time due to the trading volume increases and shifts the slope of illiquidity 
function downward. The overall effects at a point of time will be the total impact of the 
two side effects. And as shown in the results, the overall impact on the US and UK 
markets are that stock liquidity decreases and that on Euronext Paris the stock liquidity 
increases. Given that in accounting there are two types of systems of which common law 
system includes the US, UK and others, and code law system includes France and the 
rest, the above results could suggest the difference between the two systems is that the 
information asymmetry component dominates the bid-ask spread in common law 
countries as in the US and UK markets while the cost of trading dominates the bid-ask 
spreads in code law countries such as France. Finally, it is shown that there are several 
determinants of the PEAD, of which stock liquidity is one. Earnings news changes the 
stock liquidity, and therefore stock liquidity plays a role in the market response. When 
earnings news is released, it initially creates a gap between the informed traders and the 
uninformed traders, increasing the bid ask spread. Over time, this information gap 
decreases, however in the meantime more information on the market increases trading 
volume and reduces trading cost, leading to another part of the bid ask spread decreasing 
or stock liquidity improving. After decomposing bid ask spread into information 
asymmetry cost and cost of trading components, the final part of empirical analysis   
shows that information asymmetry cost component provides a partial explanation for 
PEAD in the London Stock Exchange and Euronext Paris.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Post Earnings Announcements Drift (hereafter PEAD) is the tendency for a stock‟s 
cumulative abnormal return to drift in the direction of an earnings surprise for the time 
following an earnings announcement. PEAD existence challenges both Capital Asset 
Pricing Models and Efficient Market Hypothesis, as under the assumptions of these 
theories PEAD cannot occur. In an efficient market, stock prices reflect all available 
and relevant information, hence adjust immediately to earnings news rather than 
continue to drift in the direction of earnings surprises up to several months after 
earnings news.  In Capital Asset Pricing Models (hereafter CAPM), stock prices 
follow a random walk in a predictable manner while the PEAD is drifted apart from 
CAPM models. Since first recognised by Ball R. and Brown in 1968, PEAD existence 
has been confirmed for the last four decades by a large number of academic authors. 
Analysts‟ under-reaction to earnings surprises, biased information processing, 
deficiency of CAPM and trading risk may all contribute to the reason for PEAD. 
Although, there has not existed a full explanation as to why, the debate is still going 
on and the reason for PEAD remains hidden. 
During the earlier period, most studies believe that under reaction is the main cause 
for PEAD. Analysts under-react, and investors who are advised by analysts were said 
to be not confident about the information, therefore they gradually adjust stock prices 
even after earnings announcements. This argument is consistent with studies from 
Jones and Litzenberger (1970), Bernard and Thomas (1989), Albarbanell and Bernard 
(1992), Freeman and Tse (1989), Bhushan (1994). 
Information biased processing is another form of under reaction. In other words it is 
the market‟s inefficiency in processing earnings information. Some people in the past 
believed that PEAD effect is due to a methodological limitation or measurement error. 
Lee (1992) provides evidence on the conjecture between the PEAD and the extent to 
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which sophisticated investors can limit the mispricing. Even in a recent study, Asthana 
Sharad (2003) proves that PEAD declined with the growth of information technology. 
On the other hand, other studies point out that PEAD in fact occurs due to the 
deficient CAPM regardless of investors‟ behaviour. This argument is consistent in 
Ball (1978), Foster, Olsen, and Shelvin (1984). According to Ball (1978), the two-
parameter model when applied to a portfolio of common stocks, mis-specify the 
process of generating securities yield. He stated that CAPM omits one or more 
variables. Later on, in Foster et al (1984), their tests results are consistent with CAPM 
mis-specify and reject the possibility of an interference of information market or time 
period explanation. 
Most previous studies in literature assume that liquidity risk is constant during the 
period of earnings announcement. However, this is now being questioned. Bhushan is 
the first to indirectly link the stock liquidity and the PEAD by suggesting a transaction 
cost explanation for PEAD. Over the last several years, examination on the PEAD 
developed a new direction for empirical analysis, questioning the impact of liquidity 
risk on the PEAD. Following Bhushan and Mendenhall (2004), Hou and Moskowitz 
(2005) and Brav and Heaton (2006), however, none of them study directly the 
relationship between PEAD and transaction cost. To the best of my knowledge, only 
several papers study in detail the relationship between PEAD and stock liquidity; they 
are: Sadka (2006), Batalio and Mendenhall (2007), Ng, Rusticus and Verdi (2008) and 
Chordia et al (2009). Among these papers, Sadka (2006) uses price impact to proxy 
liquidity and decompose it into fixed and variable price effects; Chordia et al (2009) 
related Amihud illiquidity ratio and standardised zero trading volume day with the 
PEAD, Batalio and Mendenhall (2007) study the implication of quote bid ask spread, 
finally, Ng et al (2008) study the implication of transaction cost (bid ask spread and 
commission) to the PEAD. The major drawback from Chordia et al (2009) is that they 
exclude illiquid stocks lower than $5 and requiring stocks with at least 10 day trading 
each month. This is problematic because it is very well-known that infrequently traded 
stocks drive liquidity premium, which creates bias in results.  The major drawback 
from Batalio et al (2007) and Ng et al (2008) is that they use bid ask spread or bid ask 
spread and commission as direct estimates of transaction costs, ignoring the 
information factor of earnings announcement. In fact, none of those studies use data 
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other than US data; none of those studies include an information based factor, and 
they mainly focus on the transaction cost rather than liquidity itself. 
Liquidity effect in fact is a type of risk misspecification. The higher the liquidity the 
lower is the risk. Using different measurements of liquidity these studies developed a 
theory that liquidity could be an explanation of PEAD. However, very few studies 
directly point out which liquidity factor plays the main role. In addition, different 
measurements of liquidity were used, providing inconclusive conclusions.  
In sum, there have been too many studies into the cause of PEAD, but very little focus 
on the relationship between PEAD and liquidity. Amongst these, not much has been 
solved at a general satisfaction of all concerned. 
In this thesis I want to address another issue: the use of bid ask spread to proxy stock 
liquidity then explore the relationship between stock liquidity and the PEAD. 
Moreover, I also want to study in particular the influence of information asymmetry 
cost component of bid ask spread on the impact of the event. Lastly, this thesis makes 
a cross -country comparison and a comparison between two different accounting 
systems; code law system where the earnings information is released 3 to 4 weeks 
before earnings announcement day through different channels, and common law 
system, where the earnings information is released only on the earnings announcement 
day. 
The starting point of my thesis is motivated by Kim and Verrecchia (1994) suggestion 
of a theoretical model that information asymmetry increases around earnings 
announcement due to the superior information between informed traders over the 
market makers. This suggestion has led me to believe that there is a relationship 
between bid ask spread, especially the information asymmetry component in spread 
and the PEAD, it motivates me to further explore the issue by a new route. In 
empirical tests on the London Stock Exchanges, the US Stock Exchanges and Paris 
Bourse, my thesis provides another view on the way to measure liquidity and 
information component that could drive the movement of prices: Bid Ask Spread, by 
three different measures.   
The scope of this research includes 1821 firms from three leading countries in capital 
trading, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. In the UK, this research 
includes most of the firms listed on the London Stock Exchange, which are 99 large 
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firms by market capitalisation in FTSE100, 233 medium firms in FTSE250, 310 small 
firms in FTSE Small Cap, and 913 small firms in alternative investment market index 
FTSE AIM ALL SHARES, given a final sample of 1555 firms across the UK. In the 
United States, this research includes the 30 largest and most widely held public 
companies over the country in the DJIA; 96 largest domestic and international non-
financial securities listed on the NASDAQ Stock Market in NASDAQ100, which 
reflects companies across the major industry groups including computer 
hardware/software, telecommunications, retail/wholesale trade and biotechnology; and 
100 leading U.S. stocks with exchange-listed options in the S&P100, which are 
selected for sector balance and represent about 57% of the market capitalisation of the 
S&P 500 and almost 45% of the market capitalisation of the U.S. equity markets, 
given a final sample of 226 firms across the U.S. markets. Finally, in France, this 
thesis covers the 40 largest and most liquid stocks trading on the Paris Bourse (now 
the Euronext Paris) in the CAC40. 
In the empirical analysis part of this thesis, chapter IV and V explore the impact of 
earnings announcement on stock market liquidity. Consistent with previous literature, 
the initial part of chapter IV reports significant positive (negative) price reactions after 
earnings announcement across all exchanges, corresponding to good (or bad) news. 
The results from trading volume effect analysis also show that trading volume 
increases dramatically during the event for all examined indices. The results from the 
latter part of chapter IV show that stock liquidity, which is measured by three different 
terms-quote bid ask spread, relative bid ask spread, and effective bid ask spread, 
decreases due to the impact of earnings announcements in the US and UK markets, 
but increases due to earnings announcements on the Euronext Paris. Given that in 
accounting there are two types of countries of which common law system includes the 
US, UK and others, and code law system includes France and the rest; the above result 
could suggest the difference between code law and common law systems is that the 
information asymmetry component dominates the bid-ask spread in common law 
countries as in the US and UK markets while the cost of trading dominates the bid-ask 
spreads in code law countries such as France. 
Another point to note from the results in chapter IV is that: although stock liquidity 
decreased (or increased) in the US and UK stock markets (or Euronext Paris) 
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compared to the pre earnings announcement period, in the post earnings 
announcement period stock liquidity increased over time in both types of countries.  
The multi-variate analysis in chapter V provides some more insights to the above 
issues. More variables were added to explain the changes in stock market liquidity 
using Generalised Method of Movement, which can capture the problems of likely 
presence of endogeneity between the explanatory variables and cross-stock 
heterogeneity. Trading volume, stock price, and stock volatility which are proxied by 
moving standard deviation of stock return, are all found to account for the explanation 
of stock liquidity variation around earnings announcements. The impact of earnings 
announcement on stock liquidity can split in two directions. The immediate effect is 
the shock after the news, causing stock liquidity to decrease immediately by lifting the 
illiquidity function upward. After the event, from the initial increased position of 
illiquidity function, stock liquidity improves over time due to the trading volume 
increases, shifting the slope of illiquidity function downward. The overall effect at a 
point of time will be the total impact of the two side effects. And as shown in chapter 
IV, the overall impact on the US and the UK markets is that stock liquidity decreases 
and on the Euronext Paris the stock liquidity increases. 
Chapter VI investigates the source of the change in stock liquildity associated with 
post earnings announcement drift. It aims to examine the effects of total bid ask 
spread, which proxied for stock liquidity, and particularly the information asymmetry 
component cost on the post earnings announcements drift to work out the influence of 
news. Moreover, this chapter performs bid ask spread decomposition into information 
asymmetry cost and cost of trading components and investigates the relationship 
between information asymmetry component of Bid-Ask Spread and Post earnings 
announcement drift. The results from this chapter prove that information asymmetry 
components are significantly related to post earnings announcement drift for firms in 
the London Stock Exchange and Euronext Paris. 
The results however are not significantly related to the response in the US markets, 
partly because of the noise in the unexpected earnings measurement on the event in 
this market. While news on the London Stock Exchange are released at market open, 
in the US, a number of companies release earnings news at market open while others 
release the earnings news at market close. 
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In concluding, chapter VII summarises the findings and remarks. Earnings news 
changes the stock liquidity, and therefore stock liquidity plays a role in the market 
response. When earnings news is released, it initially creates a gap between informed 
traders and uninformed traders, increasing the bid ask spread and reduces stock 
liquidity. Over time, this information gap decreases, however in the meantime more 
information on the market also increases trading volume and reduces trading cost, 
leading to another part of the bid ask spread decreasing or stock liquidity improving.  
After decomposing bid ask spread into information asymmetry cost and cost of trading 
components, the empirical analysis   shows that information asymmetry cost 
component provides a partial explanation for PEAD in the London Stock Exchange 
and Euronext Paris.  
A further study is suggested for the US market that has a more specific time for the 
earnings news released on the day. 
Summary findings and contributions from thesis: 
A- Contributions 
1) The first contribution of this thesis is to include large, medium, and small firms 
in the UK. My sample covers all of the stocks that have data available and 
traded in the London Stock Exchange main Market and FTSE AIM All 
Shares
1
. This is interesting because this thesis examines not only the highly 
liquid stocks but also the less liquid and illiquid stocks. Among those papers 
study the impacts of earnings announcement on stock liquidity (proxied by bid 
ask spread), Gregoriou (OBES, Forthcoming, 2009) and Acker et al (2002) 
investigate only large /medium companies (FTSE100 and FTSE 250) in 
London Stock Exchange. Krinsky and Lee (1996) study on an old data set in 
NYSE with stock price of at least $3 on average during the sample period. 
Even though, those papers have not linked bid ask spread with PEAD.  Two 
papers that studied the direct relationship between PEAD and bid ask spread 
are: Batalio and Mendenhall (2007) and Ng et al (2008). Both use NYSE and 
AMEX data and focus on the change in transaction cost, proxied by bid ask 
spread or bid ask spread and comission, as a possible cause of PEAD but 
                                                 
1
 A sub-market of the London Stock Exchange, allowing smaller companies to float shares with a more 
flexible regulatory system than is applicable to the Main Market. 
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ignore the liquidity dimension. Moreover, these two papers have not pointed 
out the specific component in bid ask spread which associated with the change 
in the PEAD. 
2) This research is the first study covering the CAC40 in France, a market that 
employs the code law system
2
. This allows a comparison of two different 
accounting systems which are code law and common law, where in the code 
law countries the earnings information is released 3 to 4 weeks before the 
formal earnings announcement date, through different channels and where in 
the common law countries the earnings information is released just on the 
earnings announcement day itself. 
3) Finally, earnings announcements creates the gap between informed and 
uninformed traders, therefore one of its impacts is to increase the bid ask 
spread. The most important aspect of this thesis is the innovation as it analyses 
not only the influence of earnings news on stock liquidity, but also investigates 
the determinant of information asymmetry factor of earnings announcement to 
the PEAD. 
B- Findings 
1) Consistent with previous studies, this research on different markets with a 
relatively large sample reports that positive (negative) price reactions are 
significant after earnings announcements across all exchanges corresponding 
to good (bad) news firms. I used the standard event methodology with the use 
of market adjusted model following Brown and Warner (1985) which is  
subsequently used by many previous researches on event studies (see Hedge 
and McDermott (2003), Denis et al, (2003), Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2006).  
Within a 181 trading day period around the date of earnings announcement, 
other points to notice are: i) in most of the cases, the impact of good news last 
longer while the impact of bad news end quickly, the exception being the 100 
high tech firms on the US (NASDAQ100),   ii) In France, a code law country, 
there is evidence of pre-earnings announcement reaction for the positive news 
firms while no pre-earnings announcement reaction for negative news. The 
price reactions end quicker than in common law markets. iii) Overall reaction 
reaches its peak on the announcement day, whether it is in the common law 
                                                 
2
 Voetmann, T. (2001) studies the impact of earnings announcement on stock liquidity in Copenhagen 
stock exchange, however, this is a working paper and has not been published yet. 
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country where earnings information is kept secret until the announcement is 
made, or it is the code law country where information is conveyed and 
circulated to the markets through multiple channels up to 3 to 4 weeks before 
official announcement date. 
2) To extend the uni-variate analysis, trading volume effects analysis of earnings 
announcement show that trading volume increases dramatically during the 
event for all the examined indices. The strongest reaction happens on day 0 in 
the UK market while on day 1 for some indices in the US market.  Note that in 
the UK all of the news is released in the morning of the announcement date, 
whilst in the US market many firms tend to release the earnings news after 
market close. In the long term, trading volume effects show that investors tend 
to follow large and liquid stocks. This reflects the situation of “herding”. When 
there is news, investors react, they trade more with both liquid and illiquid 
stocks; when the news ends, there are fewer investors who follow less liquid or 
illiquid stocks. 
3) Applying the information cost liquidity hypothesis, the results show that in the 
US and UK markets, stock liquidity (which is measured by three different 
terms-quote bid ask spread, relative bid ask spread, and effective bid ask 
spread), decreases due to the impact of earnings announcements but in the 
Euronext Paris  it increases due to earnings announcements. Given that in 
accounting there are two types of systems of which common law includes the 
US, UK and others, and code law includes France and the rest; the above result 
could suggest the difference between the two systems is that the information 
asymmetry component dominates the bid-ask spread in the common law 
system as in the US and UK markets while cost of trading dominates the bid-
ask spreads in code law countries as in France. Another point to consider is, 
even though stock liquidity decreases in the US and UK and increases in 
Euronext Paris initially after earnings announcement, it increases over time in 
both systems during the post earnings announcement period.  
4) To control for all factors such as stock price, trading volume and volatility, my 
multi-variate analysis provides some more insights on the above issues. All of 
the variables in the univariate analysis in chapter V are incorporated in one 
model to explain the change in stock market liquidity using Generalized 
Method of Movement that can overcome the problems of endogeneity and 
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cross-stock heterogeneity. The results show that, trading volume, stock price 
and stock volatility, (which is proxied by moving standard deviation of stock 
return), all account for the explanation of stock liquidity. In addition, the stock 
liquidity initially suffers a permanent shock after the news is released, the 
impact being a downside after which it increases over time by the interaction 
of trading volume changes. In particular, the impact of earnings announcement 
on stock liquidity could split in two opposite effects. The immediate effect is 
the shock after the news, causes the stock liquidity to decrease immediately by 
lifting the illiquidity (bid-ask spread) function upward. After the event, from 
the initial increased position of illiquidity function, stock liquidity improves 
over time   due to the trading volume increase,  shifting the slope of illiquidity 
function (bid ask spread) downward. The overall effects at a point of time will 
be the total impacts of two side effects. And as shown in chapter IV, the 
overall impact on the US and the UK markets is stock liquidity decrease and 
on the Euronext Paris is stock liquidity increase. 
5) Finally, I have proved that information asymmetry components are 
significantly related to PEAD for firms in London Stock Exchange and 
Euronext Paris. The information asymmetry cost however is not significantly 
related to the market response in the US markets, part of the reason might be 
due to the noise in the unexpected earnings measurement on the event in this 
market. While news on London Stock Exchange are released at market 
opening, in the US, a number of companies release earnings news at market 
open while other companies release the earnings news at market close. 
Who can be potential beneficiaries?  
There are four categories of potential beneficiaries from this research: 
 Any the researcher who study behavioural finance and microstructure of 
financial markets can be a beneficiary. The outcome of this research provides 
an incentive so that they can explore and further develope their studies into the 
relationship between bid ask spread and PEAD. 
 Any financial analyst involves in market microstructure and stock performace 
analysis can be a beneficiary. This research provides more empirical and 
theoretical insight into the formulation and development of their earnings and 
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pricing models. They can account the bid ask spread and information 
asymmetry as factors that can affect stock price and returns behaviours. In 
addition, from my research, analysts will be able to determine the difference in 
the pattern of returns /market liquidity behaviour between small and large 
companies; they can anticipate the above impact being different between large 
and small sized companies. 
 Any investor or student who wants to gain a better understanding and to 
further enhance their expertise in this subject matter can do so from this 
research. 
 International accounting bodies can also be beneficiaries from this research for 
their institutional interests. Contribute to existing literature; this research 
demonstrates that PEAD means information disclosure is inadequate. In other 
words, markets do not fully understand information when information is 
released. PEAD means that markets need long time to digest disclosures. In 
such situation, there are two questions to be raised: (i) Are accounting numbers 
such as earnings information really meaningful? (ii) Is the current method of 
disclosures appropriate? Perhaps we need a standard format for narrative 
disclosure. Further understanding about the above three issues can help the 
International Accounting bodies to setup more appropriate accounting 
standards. 
The layout of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter II discusses a literature 
review on PEAD, the explanations for it, and the relationship between PEAD and 
stock liquidity, particularly with stock liquidity measured by bid ask spread and why I 
use bid ask spread to proxy stock liquidity. Chapter III performs a general task to 
describe the sample coverage, data selection process, variables and methodology 
approach used in this study. Chapter IV conducts different uni-variate analysis that 
includes price response impact, trading volume effect on stock liquidity and 
application of information cost liquidity hypothesis. Chapter V incorporates the 
different impacts of earnings announcement in the previous chapter in a multi-variate 
analysis to explore the impact of earnings announcements on the stock market 
liquidity. Chapter VI explores the determinants of the market response to earnings 
announcements, of which stock liquidity is the focus. Furthermore, this chapter 
performs bid ask spread decomposition into information asymmetry and cost of 
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trading components, it also  investigates the relationship between information 
asymmetry component of Bid-Ask Spread and Post earnings announcement drift. In 
conclusion, Chapter VII summarises the findings and put forwards recommendations 
for further research. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW OF PEAD AND THE 
EXPLANATIONS FOR IT 
 
The persistence of PEAD involves numerous studies since it was first reported by Ball 
and Brown (1968). The main focus of available literature on earnings announcement 
has been on the response of investors to new earnings information. In the market 
efficiency hypothesis, the available information at the time t should be reflected in 
stock prices immediately. The investor‟s expectation of tomorrow prices is today‟s 
price plus a small risk premium, because they cannot forecast the direction of the 
market. However PEAD is an anomaly that is inconsistent with market proficiency. 
PEAD were reported from market efficiency tests, where it looks like, after 
controlling for risk, it was still possible to earn an abnormally high return. Stocks with 
high earning surprise have high abnormal return and more surprisingly, stocks with 
positive surprise continue to grow while stocks with negative surprise continue to 
decline. What can an investor do to trade on PEAD? He can exploit this phenomenon 
by buying stock with highest earning surprise and short stocks with lowest negative 
surprise to maximise the drift. This explains the question of the role of PEAD and why 
PEAD is important to investors as well as researchers. The remaining questions for 
researchers are: What is the importance of the appropriate benchmark model? What 
are the effects in the short term and long term and what do the effects look like? What 
are the reasons behind all these? 
The purpose of this chapter is to review and discuss the literature on the Post Earnings 
Announcements Drift and the link with my thesis. It provides the general perception 
of PEAD and reviews the documented evidence of this phenomenon based on 
different benchmark models and methodologies. It also summarises and classifies the 
possible explanations for PEAD. On top of that, I want to raise the possibility of using 
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liquidity risk by bid ask spread, to explain the PEAD, so the relevant liquidity 
measures and the associated studies will be discussed and criticized. 
The outlay of this chapter is organized as follows: The following section provides the 
definition of PEAD. Section 2.2 to 2.4 reviews related theories, the methodology to 
explore the PEAD and the reported evidence of PEAD in the literature. All the 
possible explanations for PEAD are summarized in Section 2.5, of which subsection 
2.5.2 discusses the literature with respect to liquidity risk. Section 2.6 summarises the 
possible measurements of stock liquidity, shortcomings and advantages of each 
measurement and why this thesis chooses bid ask spread to proxy for stock liquidity. 
Section 2.7 discusses the literature of stock liquidity in relation to earnings 
announcement and PEAD. Finally, Section 2.8 gives a brief summary. 
2. 1. Definition of PEAD 
The efficient market hypothesis states that price should contain all the information 
available to the market. Once new information is available, it will be totally reflected 
in the adjustment of price. But studies show the fact that after earnings announcement, 
abnormal returns of good news firms continues to drift up in positive direction 
meanwhile abnormal returns of bad news firms continue to drift in the opposite 
direction. Initially the prices react to information on a large scale, but this reaction 
does not complete after the news, it continues to drift dependent on the direction of the 
news in months after.  
The survival of this phenomenon has been confirmed for the last four decades since 
the work of Ball and Brown (1968), and is named Post Earnings Announcement Drift. 
This phenomenon has not only been confirmed in the US  for  many years following 
Ball and Brown, but also in the UK in the studies by Hew, Skerratt, Strong and 
Walker (1996); Liu and Strong (2003), in the emerging Finnish stock market by Booth 
et al (1997),  Hannu J. Schadewitz; Antti J. Kanto; Hannu A. Kahra; Dallas R. Blevins 
(2005)  …. So far there have been quite a lot of attempts to solve the question of what 
causes the Post Earnings Announcement Drift. The possible explanations are 
analysts‟/investors under-reactions to earnings surprises, information biased 
processing, deficient asset pricing model, and misspecification of risk still remain 
controversial and unclear. 
2.2. Measures of Earnings Surprise and detect PEAD in the literature 
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Three main measures of earnings surprise have been proposed in the literature to 
quantify new information in earnings and measure the PEAD. Some researchers use a 
single method while the others use all of the three methods to detect the PEAD and the 
explanations for it. 
2.2.1 Earning-based measure: Standardized Unexpected Earnings 
This measurement uses standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) to measure earning 
surprise. SUE is calculated as unexpected earnings divided by standard deviation of 
the unexpected earnings pre earnings announcement period. 
𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  
𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝜎(𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 )
=
𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑒𝑖𝑡 ]
𝜎(𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑒𝑖𝑡])
                                                       (2.2.1.1) 
Where  
SUEit = quarter t standardised unexpected earnings of stock i 
𝑒𝑖𝑡  = quarter t actual earnings per share reported by the firm i 
𝐸[𝑒𝑖𝑡] = quarter t expected value of 𝑒𝑖𝑡  
𝜎(𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑒𝑖𝑡 ]) = quarter t standard deviation of unexpected earnings 
This methodology is used by Bidwell (1979), Bernard and Thomas (1989), (1990); 
and Chan et al (1996). Base on the way it is calculated, SUE is earnings surprise over 
an extended period. However, the shortcoming of this measure is that SUE involves 
uni-variate time series earnings forecasting models, which may neglect other variables 
that could be meaningful in the explanation process.   
Three influential models used to calculate 𝐸[𝑒𝑖𝑡 ] are Brown and Rozeff uni-variate 
time series model of quarterly accounting earnings per share, Foster‟s (1977) first 
order autoregressive earning expectation model, and the naïve random walk model. 
i) the naïve random walk model 
The naïve seasonal random walk model is simple as follows 
𝐸 𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡−4                (2.2.1.2) 
Where 
𝐸 𝑒𝑖𝑡  is expected earnings of stock i at quarter t 
𝛿 is the drift term 
𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡−4 is actual earnings at quarter t-4 
 
ii) Foster‟s (1977) first order autoregressive earning expectation model 
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𝐸 𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡−4 + 𝜑 𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡−5                                     (2.2.1.3) 
Notation is the same as above model.  
𝜑 𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑒𝑖,𝑡−5  is the first –order autoregressive term that account for the 
positive but decaying autocorrelations in seasonally-differenced earnings 
iii) Brown-Rozeff (1979) univariate time series model of quarterly accounting 
earnings per share.  
The Brown-Rozeff    earnings expectation from this model is expressed as follows 
𝐸 𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛿 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡−4 +  𝜑 𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑒𝑖,𝑡−5 +  𝜃𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡−4                     (2.2.1.4) 
𝜃𝜀𝑖,𝑡−4 is a seasonal moving average term at the four lag to account for the observed 
negative correlation in year to year seasonally-differenced earnings. 
As mentioned above, univariate time series model might omit other important 
information. A number of studies, including Brown & Rozeff (1978), Collins & 
Hopwood (1980), Imhoff & Pare´ (1982), Brown, Griffin, Hagerman & Zmijewski 
(1987) and O‟Brien (1988), have compared the quality of forecasts based on time 
series models with that of the analyst forecasts. The evidence generally suggests the 
superiority of analyst forecasts because analysts are good at incorporating a variety of 
input in their forecasts. 
2.2.2. Analyst forecast based measure: Analyst Forecast Error and Earnings 
Forecast Revision 
Brown et al (1997) supports the direct use of analyst forecasts of earnings to measure 
earnings surprise. Due to the analysts‟ ability to use information and timing in their 
forecasts, they are able to revise their forecast and reflect up to date information in a 
timely manner. 
Analysts forecast earnings based measure of earnings surprise uses analyst forecast 
error. It is computed as the difference between the actual earnings and forecast of 
reported earnings. Forecast error is usually scaled by security price for cross-sectional 
comparability purpose. 
𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 =
𝑒𝑖𝑡 −  𝐹[𝑒𝑖𝑡]
𝑃𝑖𝑡
                                                                                   (2.2.2.1) 
Where, 
 𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡  is forecast error 
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𝑒𝑖𝑡  is actual reported earnings for stock i at time t. 
 𝐹[𝑒𝑖𝑡] is the forecast of reported earnings for stock i at time t. 
 𝑃𝑖𝑡  is stock i price at time t. 
According to PEAD theory, the future abnormal returns should be positively 
correlated with the most recent earnings forecast error. This methodology is typically 
used by Freeman and Tse (1989). 
An alternative analyst forecast based measure of earnings surprise is forecast revision, 
which is calculated as the change in analyst earnings forecasts divided by stock price. 
The insight is if there is a greater change in analyst earnings forecasts then there is a 
greater earnings surprise. 
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 =
 𝐹[𝑒𝑖,𝑡] − 𝐹[𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1]
𝑃𝑖𝑡
                                                                   (2.2.2.2) 
Where, 
 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  is earnings forecast revision 
𝐹[𝑒𝑖𝑡 ] is the forecast of reported earnings for stock i at time t. 
𝐹[𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡−1] is the forecast of reported earnings for stock i at time t-1. 
 𝑃𝑖𝑡  is stock i price at time t 
According to PEAD theory, REV should be positively associated with future 
abnormal return. This methodology is typically used by Mendenhall (1991). 
There is also a slightly different measure of REV by Chan, Jegadeesh and Timan 
(1996), which is a six month moving average of past changes in earning forecast by 
analysts. By using this moving average of past changes in earnings forecasts by 
analysts, information is assumed to be released gradually over time. 
The shortcoming of this measure is that, there is a potential of bias while using analyst 
forecasts due to lags in publication of analysts‟ forecasts. (see O‟Brien (1988); 
Abarnbanell and Bernard (1992). 
2.2.3. Price-based measure: Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Buy Hold 
Abnormal Return 
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Supporters of this measure are Beaver et al (1980); Beaver et al (1987), Chan et al 
(1996), and Bernard and Thomas and Wahlen (1997)… 
In this method the calculation of surprise involves the abnormal return, which is the 
difference between individual stock return and market stock return. Abnormal stock 
return can be calculated either by a market adjusted model, market model, CAPM, 
multi factor model, or Matched-firms returns. Among these models the first two 
models are most commonly used.  
i) In the market adjusted return model, defined by Brown and Warner (1985).  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡                                                                    (2.2.3.1) 
Where, 
 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  is abnormal return of stock i at time t 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡  is single stock return at time t 
 𝑅𝑚  is market stock return at time t 
The use of market adjusted return seems doubtful because it does not adjust for basic 
CAPM β risk. However, Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) found that the simple mean 
returns model often yields results similar to those of the more sophisticated models, 
because the variance of abnormal returns is not reduced much by choosing a more 
sophisticated model. 
ii) In the market model, abnormal return is calculated: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝛼𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑅𝑚𝑡                                                                           (2.2.3.2) 
Where  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  is abnormal return of stock i at time t 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡  is single stock return at time t 
𝑅𝑚  is market stock return at time t 
 𝛼𝑖𝑡  is constant. 
 β is systematic risk. 
This model assumes the risk free interest rate included in α is constant, whereas 
market returns are assumed to change. 
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iii) The basic CAPM model: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓 − 𝛼𝑖 − 𝛽(𝑅𝑚𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓)                                                   (2.2.3.3) 
Where 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  is abnormal return of stock i at time t 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡  is single stock return at time t 
𝑅𝑚  is market stock return at time t 
𝛼𝑖𝑡  is constant. 
β is systematic risk. 
 𝑅𝑓  is the risk free rate. 
iv) The multi factor models, such as Fama-French 3 factor model, Carhart 4 
factor model or APT model: 
  𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝛼𝑖 −  𝛽𝑗𝐹𝑗                                                                   (2.2.3.4) 
Where 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  is abnormal return of stock i at time t 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡  is single stock return at time t 
 𝛼𝑖𝑡  is constant. 
 𝛽𝑗  is risk associated with each individual factor 𝐹𝑗  
v) Matched-firms returns/sort 
This methodology assumes that there are factors that affect returns. All returns will be 
sorted into lets say 10 deciles by size and then each decile continues being sorted by 
other factor e.g. book-to-market value. The expected return for each group will then 
be computed and used as “normal return” for that group. The deviation of a stock 
return from “normal return” of the group it belongs to, will be the abnormal return. 
This method is problematic because the results change when sorted by different 
characteristics; therefore the level of accuracy is low. 
In addition to different ways to calculate abnormal returns, there are two ways to test 
the non-normal distribution in order to find out the influence of news by time: 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) and Buy and Hold Abnormal returns (BHAR). 
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CAR is cumulative abnormal returns, which is the sum of the differences between the 
expected return on a stock and the actual return that comes from the release of news to 
the market, calculated by following formula 
CAR
i
t, t+k = Σk ARi, t+k                                                            (2.2.3.5) 
Where 
 ARi, t+k  is the abnormal returns on stock i on the day t+k 
CAR
i
t, t+k is the cumulative abnormal returns on stock i over the period t to t+k 
Following the main stream of literatures, we assume that if there is no influence of 
earnings news CAR will follow normal distribution.  
CAR
i
t, t+k ~ N (0, σ2i, t+k)                                                         (2.2.3.6) 
 
Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (“BHARs”) measure the difference between the 
compounded actual return and the compound predicted return. BHAR is calculated by 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  =   [1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡 ]
𝑡
𝑡=0 −  [1 + 𝑅𝑚𝑡 ]
𝑡
𝑡=0                           (2.2.3.7) 
Where: 
Rit is the time t arithmetic return (including dividends) on security i 
Rmt is the time t arithmetic return on the market weighted index 
Similarly, following the law of large number of studies we assumed BHAR will 
follow normal distribution if there is no influence of news. 
BHARit ~ N (0, σ2i,t)                                                     (2.2.3.8) 
When there are N firms in the category, we use average across the number of firms. 
The t test for normality will be used to detect the drifts. 
            (2.2.3.9) 
            (2.2.3.10) 
 
In a not so long event window length using CAR or BHAR is almost similar. For long 
horizons, BHAR seems conceptually better. BHAR tend to be right skewed (bounded 
from below!). 
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Amongst the three measures of PEAD, the price based method focuses on price 
reaction to the earnings news and suggests that the surprise is well reflected directly 
by the change of daily price around the event. This price-based method is therefore 
widely and commonly used especially with the first two measures of abnormal 
returns: market adjusted model and market model. For this reason, this thesis 
demonstrates and uses the price based measure, CAR for the market adjusted model 
first established by Brown and Wanner (1985), and consequently used frequently by 
other researchers  such as Beneish and Gardner (1995); Gregoriou (2006) among 
others ,  due to its accuracy, and popularity. 
2.3. Evidence of PEAD 
Using different methodologies which were listed in the previous parts, most of 
empirical analysis over the last 4 decades, against the market efficient hypothesis, 
proves that PEAD exists everywhere both in the developed and the emerging markets. 
Securities with positive earnings surprises will drift further than normative predicted 
prices, and securities with negative earnings surprises will drift below the predicted 
prices.  
Ball and Brown, (1968) first reported that estimated cumulative abnormal returns 
continue to drift up after every quarterly earnings announcement for good news firms 
and down for bad news firms. The return residuals for earnings surprises portfolio 
persisted for as long as two months after the announcement. Their sample includes 
261 firms in the nine fiscal years 1957 to 1965. The sample does not include young 
firms or that have failed, those firms that do not report on December 31 and those not 
represented on Compustat, the CRSP tapes and Wall street Journal. Their method is to 
construct two alternative models of what the market expects income to be and then 
investigate the market‟s reaction when its expectations prove false. They investigate 
net income and earnings per share using time series regression model and earnings per 
share using a naïve model. The distribution of the residuals then shows the behaviours 
of the drift. 
The subsequent study by Jones and Litzenberger (1970) on two groups from 
Compustat, one group of 510 companies for the period 1962-1965, and the second of 
618 companies for the period 1964-1967 shows drift for positive surprises but not for 
negative surprises; by Latane, Joy and Jones (1977) test on 975 standardised 
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unexpected earnings shows drifts for both positive and negative surprises. Foster 
(1977) test using time series model for 96 firms during the period 1946-1974 show 
drifts for day -20 to day +20. 
In fact there are numerous studies that demonstrate evidence of PEAD since its first 
discovery. Ball (1978) reviews the PEAD studies in the ten years following Ball and 
Brown. Ball‟s review includes not only evidence of PEAD but also explanations for 
the cause of PEAD as systematic experimental error, market imperfections and private 
costs of information processing, and failure of the two-parameter model. While most 
of the early studies on the PEAD suffered from limitations such as a small sampling 
size, sample selection bias and risk measurement error, the latter research on the 
PEAD shows continuous improvement in data selection process and research 
methodologies. 
The extensive and detailed documentation of the PEAD in the following period are 
from: Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin (1984); Bernard and Thomas (1989), (1990); 
Albarbanell and Bernard (1992); Ball (1992); Bhushan (1994); Hew, Skerratt, Strong, 
and Walker (1996); Chan et al (1996); Rangan and Sloan (1998), Brown and Han 
(2000). More recently are Mendenhall (2004); Battalio and Mendenhall (2007). Most 
of these studies provide evidence against EMH because market fails in reflecting 
earnings news into stock prices while trying to explore the reasons behind PEAD 
phenomenon. 
Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin (1984) use a sample of more than 56000 observations from 
2,053 companies‟ quarterly data over the period from 1974-1981 on Compustat. They 
report that earnings are partially anticipated but if there is a positive (negative) 
surprise, then there is a positive (negative) drift of up to 13 weeks after earnings 
announcement. Drifts are persistent phenomenon over the study period with no 
concentration in any specific period. Consistent to common findings in previous 
literature, this paper intensively documented that the drift is negatively related to firm 
size variable and positively related to the sign and magnitude of earnings-surprise 
variable.  The sign and magnitude of earnings forecast error independently explains 
81% the variation in PEAD, and firm size independently explains 61% the variation in 
PEAD. This test‟s result based on the two earnings based models one scaled by the 
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absolute value of earnings and the other scaled by the standard deviation of the 
forecast error. Their price based models and do not show drifts. 
Bernard and Thosmas (1989) study 84792 firms‟ quarter data for NYSE/AMEX 
during the period 1974-1986 and 15475 firm quarter data for OTC stocks on 
NASDAQ system during the period 1974-1985. Their research provides intensive 
evidence of the PEAD. They reported that most drifts occur during the first 3 months 
subsequent to the earnings announcement and there is little evidence that drift exists 
beyond 180 trading days. In addition they also find the magnitude of the drift is 
positively related to the magnitude of the unexpected earnings and the absolute value 
of the drift is inversely related to the firm size. The methodology that Bernard and 
Thomas (1989) use is earnings based model to forecast standardised unexpected 
earnings. 
In their following study Bernard and Thomas (1990) use 96087 announcements for 
2697 firms from 1974-1986, and found PEAD exists for the four quarters following 
earnings announcement. A large proportion of drift happened within 5 days around 
earnings announcement. In this study they focus on explanation to the reason of 
PEAD. They investigate the hypothesis that price fails to reflect the extent to which 
the time series behaviour of earnings deviates from a naïve expectation. Their 
conclusion is that market price adjusts slowly to earnings information. Again in this 
study they use earnings based measure. Firms are assigned to one of 10 portfolios 
based on standardised unexpected earnings. 
Following Bernard and Thomas (1989), Freeman and Tse (1989) worked on a sample 
of 1054 firm‟s quarterly data during the period 1984-1988. Their explanation for the 
existence of PEAD in their report said “as investors obtain post announcement 
information, they revise their initial estimates of persistence by reassessing the 
implications of past earnings for future earnings. As a result, post announcement 
security returns and continue to be influenced by previously announced earnings” 
(page 50). 
Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) examined 178 firms for up to 44 quarters over the 
period 1976-1986. They formed portfolio of quintiles based on the magnitude of 
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analysts‟ earnings forecast errors, and calculated cumulative abnormal (sized adjusted) 
returns up to and including the fourth subsequent announcement and found drifts. 
Up to the early 1990s, the anomaly had been remarkably over time. In addition it was 
not explained by either the size or the book/market factor
3
. Finally, although there 
were a lot of speculations, including the fact that people used such a naïve forecasting 
model, nobody knew what was going on in this phenomenon. A survey of the 
literature up to the early 1990s is provided by Ball (1992). He characterized "the 'drift' 
in abnormal returns after quarterly earnings announcements" as being one of the two 
principal versions of the earnings-price anomaly. He then concluded there are two 
classes of explanation for earnings-price anomalies: the first one being the market 
truly is inefficient, and the other one being the market is efficient but the 
measurements were incorrect
4
.  
Bhuhsan (1994) undertook the study of 2,642 firms with 85,056 quarterly 
announcements on NYSE/AMEX covering the period 1974-86. Bhushan‟s findings 
confirm the relationship between the firm sizes and drift which was reported 
previously. It is interesting that he concluded that the different abilities to process 
information among investor in relation to transaction cost cause the PEAD. His 
methodology is earnings based measure. 
Hew, Skerratt, Strong, and Walker (1996) examined UK companies‟ data in a 
comprehensive study. Their samples include 1442 final announcements from 1989 to 
1992. Their results are qualitatively similar to the findings from previous US studies. 
They do not find high degree of drift on the day following the event day as in the US, 
but they do find that drifts continue for a considerable long period after earnings 
announcement (page 292). 
Evidence of PEAD can be seen not only in the US or UK market data, but also in 
emerging market. Booth, Kallunki, and Martikainen (1996) provide another evidence 
of PEAD in   Helsinki (Finland) Stock Exchange. Their sample include all 31 Finish 
firms listed during the period 1989-1993 This market also has evidence of PEAD for 
both positive news and negative earnings surprise. Their study used various methods. 
                                                 
3
 (see French and Fama 1993) 
4
 Page 321 
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In the same year, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) confirmed that drifts in 
future returns over six to twelve months are predictable from previous returns and 
previous earnings news. Their sample includes all primary stock listed on NYSE, 
AMEX, and the NASDAQ from 1977-1993. Chan et al use all of the three measures 
of drifts mention above: SUE, CAR and REV. In the multivariate analysis after 
allowance for other variables: firm size, price momentum, market risk, and book to 
market factor they still found drifts. 
Recently, studies on the PEAD have become more and more complex, from different 
angles and intuitively. Mendenhall (2002) study sample consists of 107589 firm-
quarter observations from 4910 firms giving the conclusion that drift exists, but 
independent from historical persistence. In the following study in 2004, Mendenhall 
test result is consistent with Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002), found the strong 
relationship between the PEAD and the risk faced by the arbitrageurs. Liu, Strong and 
Xu (2003) provide another test for the existence of PEAD in the UK by a sample of 
835 stock and 13,848 half year earnings figures over the period 1988-1998. Their 
conclusion is that whatever the measure of earnings surprises used there is evidence of 
PEAD in the UK; however, the different measures will give different drift effects. 
Asthana Sharad (2003) use the research design controls for firms size, magnitude, and 
sign of the forecast error, investor sophistication and value relevance/information 
content of earnings on 27260 quarter observations for 1613 firms. He found that drift 
declines significantly with the growth of information technology revolution and 
explain that the information technology reduces the trading friction and improves the 
market information efficiency. Schadewitz, Kanto, Hahra and Blevins (2005) provide 
evidence of PEAD in Helsinky (Finland) market again, during the period 1985-1993 
for 41 days surrounding an interim announcement. They examined the different 
categories of investors around earnings announcements to provide additional evidence 
on the relationship between PEAD and investors‟ sotisphication in limiting the mis-
pricing. They found that PEAD exists and is affected by the extent to which investors 
can limit the mis-pricing. 
2.4. Explanations for PEAD 
Though, there is not a generally satisfactory explanation, the existing explanations of 
PEAD fall in two main categories: 1) Underreaction which includes three sub-
25 
 
categories: analyst underreaction, investor underreaction, and biased information 
processing; 2) Misspecification, which includes CAPM beta misspecification and 
trading (liquidity) risk. 
2.4.1 Under-reaction to earnings surprises? 
This is the most frequent explanation of PEAD in the previous stages of the literature. 
The norm under-reaction means that stock price does not reflect equilibrium in price. 
People, including analysts and investors who are advised by analysts, underreact; 
therefore they have to catch up later by trading. They need time to assess and adjust to 
information through trading and that impacts prices. The reasons for underreaction 
include analyst under-reaction, investor underreaction and biased information 
processing. All three factors lead to the market‟s inability to respond rapidly and 
completely to the publicly available earnings information. 
2.4.1.1 Analyst under reaction 
There are many papers in literature that indicate analysts‟ earnings forecasts are not 
efficient enough: Lys et al (1990), Abarbanell (1991); Mendenhall (1991); Abarbanell 
(1992), Ali et al (1992). Schipper (1991) also has a review of works on analyst 
forecast. 
A significant piece of work is from Albarbanell and Bernard (1992), who carried out a 
test whether analysts over/under reaction to earning information as an explanation of 
PEAD. They tested if forecast errors can be explained by previous years earning 
change. The result shows that there is a positive relationship between the forecast 
errors and previous earnings change. The interpretation is that analysts are cautious 
and do not believe that rise in earnings will continue. If earnings are rising, the 
forecast is smaller than the actual earnings at time t. In fact, analyst under-react to the 
prior year‟s earning change. Their test suggested that analysts produce forecasts that 
are less naïve than simple seasonal random walks; however it still fails to recognize 
the full extent to which earning deviate from that process. At least one aspect of the 
anomalous post earnings announcement drift cannot be attributed to the behaviour of 
analysts. 
2.4.1.2. Investor underreaction 
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Investors are the main market players and are affected by analysts‟ forecast. Investors‟ 
overdependence on analysts can be a reason of PEAD. In a review article, Lev and 
Ohlson (1982) describe PEAD as unwavering belief in market efficiency. Bernard and 
Thomas (1989) support hypothesis that market adjusts slowly to earnings information 
because it fails to recognize the full implication of current earnings on future earnings. 
Their study rejected the possibility that PEAD can be explained as the risk 
compensation of the risk factor for the investors. Their test for misspecification of 
CAPM holds true only under a number of conditions. They also look at the transaction 
cost; however, still many questions are unclear.  Their results are in fact consistent 
with the statement that the market fails to recognize the full implications of current 
earning to future earnings.  
Bernard and Thomas (1990) follow Rendleman et al (1987) findings, and others such 
as Wiggin (1991), Bartov (1992), Rangan and Sloan (1998) also support this 
hypothesis. 
However, not all the studies agree with this explanation. Hirshleigfer et al (2003), 
among others, found that investors are not a reason of PEAD. They study how 
individual investors trade in response to extreme quarterly earnings surprises and on 
the relationship between individual investor trades and subsequent abnormal returns 
and found no evidence that either individuals or any sub categories of individuals in 
their sample causes the PEAD. 
2.4.1.3  Biased information processing 
An alternative explanation of PEAD is a source of biases in investor assessment of 
series correlations, a source of biases in sample selection or any other information 
processing such as biased research model designs, abnormal returns measurement. For 
example: Ball (1992), Bushan (1994), Rangan and Sloan (1998), Jacob, Lys and 
Sabino (2000). 
In another review paper, Ball (1992) talked about two explanations for PEAD: (i) 
either the market truly is inefficient, or (ii) the market is efficient but measurements 
are incorrect,  he mentions other factors in previous studies that could have bias such 
as errors in estimating rates of returns, errors in measuring normal (expected) returns, 
size as a proxy for expected returns, quarterly earnings information, annual report 
information, transactions costs, liquidity and trading-mechanism effects, overstated t-
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statistics, earnings variables proxy for expected returns, substantial information 
production costs or market inefficiency, and inefficient markets all can contribute to 
the PEAD. 
Bhushan (1994) also points out that transaction costs, in conjunction with differing 
abilities among investors to process information, can result in drift. Rangan and Sloan 
(1998) criticize that Bernard and Thomas findings of PEAD could be due to research 
designs biases. Jacob et al (2000) also mention that Bernard and Thomas (1990) 
results may be due to the models used.  
2.4.2 Misspecification of risk  
Literature has not measured risk properly, while drifts look at future performance and 
is always risk adjusted. Misspecification of risk includes beta risk measurement and 
liquidity or trading risk for example in Shin (2006), liquidity risk is a special case of 
misspecification, trading risk, while Fama(1998) and Kothari (2001) and many other 
papers are about beta measurement risk. 
2.4.2.1. Beta risk measurement or deficient CAPM 
Misspecification of asset pricing models explanation caused a lot of attention from 
researchers since early stage. Ball (1978) and Foster, Olsen and Shevlin (1984) studies 
are consistent with CAPM mis-specified, and rejected the possibility of an 
interference of an information market or time period explanation. Fama (1998) also 
found that most long term return anomalies tend to disappear with reasonable changes 
in technique or when alternative approaches are used to measure them. Recently, Liu, 
Strong and Xu (2003) who examined PEAD in the UK also found that different 
measures give different drift effects.  
In addition, in the CAPM, beta is the only thing which values the market. This could 
be the limitation of the academic ability in quantifying risk that affects asset pricing 
process. Chordia (2009) and other previous researchers such as Ball (1992), Kothari 
(2001), Bhushan (1994), Battalio and Mendenhall (2007) suggest that PEAD could be 
nothing more than risk premium measured inaccuratly or failed identify. 
2.4.2.2. Liquidity risk and a new explanation for PEAD – stock liquidity  
Most studies of PEAD assume that risk is constant during the period of earning 
announcements. However, this has been questioned by a few researchers.  
28 
 
Kim and Verrecchia 1994 suggest a model in which disclosures create increasing 
information asymmetry, decreasing stock liquidity thus increasing bid ask spread, and 
increasing trading volume. As earning announcements increases the information flows 
into the market, it creates different judgements about firm‟s performance and gives 
opportunities for the traders who are capable of informed judgements, to exploit their 
ability to process public information. This increases the ability of rising information 
asymmetry. This in turn, creates the situation where the investors have to increase bid 
ask spread to protect themselves from informed investors. Despite the increase in bid 
ask spread, the information flows to the market leading to an increase in trading 
volume around earning announcements. 
The idea that earning announcements changes risk leading to price drift was 
continuing raised by Shin (2006). Shin suggests a theoretical model of disclosures 
which has several advantages in terms of tractability in a dynamic context, and 
outlines the theoretical features of the model such as a leverage effect, and the 
volatility feedback hypothesis. Shin introduces uncertainty concerning the rate of 
information flow to the firm in the model, and illustrated that the model is capable of 
generating short-run momentum and long-run reversals. Shin suggest “Following 
unexpected good news, there would be an upwards revision in perceived risk, and 
following the news below prior expectation, there would be a downward revision in 
perceived risk. With risk adverse investors, these shifts in risk would be priced so as to 
produce higher expected future returns following unexpectedly good news and lower 
expected future returns following unexpectedly bad news.”  Firms that have had a 
positive surprise in earnings have more volatile subsequent earnings than firms that 
have had a negative surprise in earning. Shin‟s paper, however, is a theoretical paper. 
As discussed by Kanodia (2006) it is lacking firm size factor in it and “in Shin‟s 
model, stock prices move only in response to public disclosures by the manager. Yet 
empirically, observed drifts occur even in the absence of additional public 
disclosures”. 
In addition to the above two theoretical papers, there are very few empirical papers 
studying liquidity risk as an explanation of PEAD, though it can be seen that the 
number is  increasing. Bushan is the first to show indirectly that there is a link 
between liquidity and PEAD, i.e. the magnitude of PEAD is directly related to the 
costs of trading. Since Bushan, to the best of my knowledge, Sadka (2006) and Ng et 
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al (2008) are the only two to investigate thoroughly the importance of liquidity, i.e. 
transaction cost which proxied by bid ask spread or bid ask spread and commission, in 
explanation to the reason of PEAD. There are very less number of studies with regard 
to the importance of liquidity factor in relation with PEAD.  Meanwhile liquidity is a 
multi dimensional concept, allowing different studies to employ different liquidity 
measures.  The reasons of PEAD and the link between PEAD and liquidity therefore 
are still unclear and very confusing. The following parts of the chapter will review the 
literature of the linkage between PEAD and stock liquidity. 
2.5. New explanation for PEAD: Stock Liquidity and measures of stock liquidity 
As discussed above, liquidity effect in fact is a type of risk misspecification which 
could be the cause of PEAD. This part will focus on the multi-dimensional 
characteristics of stock liquidity, through different measurements in literature. 
Stock liquidity by definition is the ability to trade the stock rapidly with little price 
impacts. It is an important characteristic without which the investors cannot trade. 
Highly liquid stocks will attract more investors than low liquid stocks. A growing 
number of researches show that there is an inverse relation between stock liquidity and 
returns. See Amihud and Mendenson (1986) Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), 
Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998) Easley, Hvidjaker, and O‟Hara (2002) 
among others. This develops a possibility that PEAD and liquidity have some 
determinant relationship. 
Stock liquidity is a multi dimensional factor; one could value this characteristic from 
different angles. There is less agreement on the measures of liquidity. Existing 
literatures have used different measures of liquidity, of which the followings are the 
important ones. 
Trading volume and standardised trading volume 
Trading volume in fact is a popular measure of liquidity; see Brennan et al (1998) 
among others. Stock with high liquidity will be traded at high volume and stock with 
low liquidity will be traded at low volume. However, there is a potential problem in 
using trading volume as it does not take into account the differences in the number of 
shares outstanding and number of shareholders. 
For the above reasons, another measure of liquidity is standardised trading volume, 
which is the ratio of trading volume divided by the number of share outstanding. 
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Amihud et al (1986) mentioned that stock liquidity is correlated with trading 
frequency so we can observe the trading frequency and use it to proxy liquidity. See 
Datar et al (1998) Chordia et al (2001); Hedge and Mc Dermott (2003), Gregoriou 
(2008) among researchers they use standardised trading volume to proxy for stock 
liquidity. 
Firm size 
Though the firm size is not directly related to liquidity according to the liquidity 
definition the firm size is correlated to other factors such as trading volume, number of 
shareholders, stock price continuity, and the number of market makers. See Garbade, 
(1982); Stoll (1985) and Kluger et al (1997). 
Price impacts 
Price impact is the price response to the large orders. The trading literature measures 
price impact using the transaction prices. This formal liquidity measure even though 
widely used, is only available for large trade so I cannot use it in this framework (see 
Kraus and Stoll (1972). In addition, its adequacy as a liquidity measure is still 
questioned, see Matei Demetrescu (2006); Stange et al (2008). 
Effective commission rate 
Effective commission rate is also being used to proxy for market liquidity in other 
research, for example in Jinliang Li et al (2003). This measurement however is 
subjectedly dependent on individual trader, thus cannot be used commonly.  
Proportion of zero-return trading days 
This measure of liquidity in fact is an inverse measure.  It requires time series of daily 
returns. See Bekaert (2003) for more details. This measure however suffers from 
serious limitations because of its inability to capture liquidity entirely. 
Standardised turnover-adjusted zero-volume day 
This measure is recently constructed by Liu (2006) and it takes into account many 
factors such as trading quantity, trading cost and especially trading speed – the 
continuity of trading and potential delay in executing an order. 
𝐿𝑀𝑖𝑥 = 𝑍𝑉𝑖𝑥 +
1
𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑥
 
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟
∗
21𝑥
𝑁𝑖
                                                           (2.5.1) 
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Where, 
𝐿𝑀𝑖𝑥  is the stock i‟s standardised turnover-adjusted zero-volume days over the 
period x month,  
x= 1,6,12 
𝑍𝑉𝑖𝑥  is the stock i‟s number of zero-volume trading days over prior x month, 
𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑥  is the stock i‟s turnover the prior x-month, calculated as the sum of daily 
turnover the prior x month where daily turnover is the ratio of the number of 
shares traded on a given day to the number of shares outstanding at the end of 
that day. 
21 is standard number of trading day in a month, 
𝑁𝑖  is the total number of trades per day, in the market over the prior x month, 
Deflator is arbitrarily chosen to ensure that the ratio 0<  
1
𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑥
 
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟
< 1 for all 
sample stocks. It is equal to 11,000 where x=6,12 and equal 480000 where x = 
1. 
This measure uses the pure number of zero trading days over the prior x month to 
identify the least liquid stock and rely on the turnover to indicate the most liquid stock 
among frequently traded stocks classified by the pure number of zero-volume trading 
days. This measure however contains a potential problem as it excludes the less 
frequently traded stocks. 
Amihud illiquidity ratio 
This is the average of the ratio of daily absolute return to the daily volume in dollars; 
developed by Amihud et al (2002) following the Kyle (1985) model.  
𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 =
1
𝐷𝑖𝑡
 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑑  
𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡𝑑
𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑡=1
                                                                                        (2.5.2) 
Where, 
 𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡  is the stock i‟s illiquidity ratio, 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑑  is the absolute value of daily return 
 𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡𝑑 is the daily dollar volume (in millions) on day d month t for stock i 
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 𝐷𝑖𝑡  is the number of valid days in month t for stock i 
Amihud illiquidity ratio is designed to capture the cost of trade. The cost of trade in 
fact is already captured in bid-ask spreads which is mention in the next section bellow.  
Moreover, an advantage of Amihud illiquidity ratio is to account for the cross 
sectional variation within the sample.  In this thesis, my samples are split into different 
indices, already taking into account the cross sectional variation. It becomes 
unnecessary to use Amihud ratio in such a framework. Lastly, if stock trading volume 
is zero on a particular day its Amihud illiquidity ratio cannot be calculated, so it 
excludes the effect of trading absence. 
Bid ask spread 
In organized stock exchanges, liquidity is maintained by the market makers, the 
people who are conferred the right by the stock exchange authority, to set up different 
price level of buy and sell. The market makers create the market to trade the stocks by 
buying at bid price and selling at a higher ask price. The difference between bid price 
and ask price, the bid-ask spreads, is the source for market makers to compensate their 
ability and costs to provide the market for traders. Due to the above nature, size of the 
bid-ask spreads have been frequently used to measure liquidity of stocks. Higher the 
liquidity of the stock smaller is the bid-ask spreads. It is obvious that higher the bid 
ask spread, higher the risk and lower the bid ask spread lower the risk. By looking at 
impacts of earnings announcements on the bid ask spread around the news, one could 
see how bid-ask spreads can measure liquidity risk around public disclosures. 
Given the advantages and disadvantages of the above measures of stock liquidity, (i.e. 
Trading volume does not take into account the differences in the number of shares 
outstanding and number of shareholders; the firm size is not directly related to 
liquidity according to liquidity definition; Price impact is only available for large 
trades) this thesis chose bid ask spread as the main measure of stock liquidity: 
2.6. Bid ask spread and the PEAD 
2.6.1. Bid ask spread measures 
Bid-ask spreads are measured in three different terms; “the quoted bid-ask spreads”, 
which is the difference between the ask price quoted by a dealer and the bid price 
quoted by a dealer at a point of time; “the relative bid-ask spreads”, defined as the ask 
price minus the bid price, divided by the mid-price, which is the average of the bid 
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and ask prices; and “the effective bid-ask spreads”, which is computed as twice the 
absolute value of the difference between a transaction price and the mid-price in effect 
at the time of the trade. Some key studies such as Amihud and Mendelson (1986), 
Grossman and Miller (1988), and Vijh (1990) use quoted bid-ask spreads to proxy 
stock liquidity;  Ofeck and Recharson (2003) use relative bid-ask spreads; meanwhile, 
effective bid-ask spreads is included to proxy for liquidity by Heflin and Shaw (2000), 
Hedge and McDermott (2003) and Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2006), Gregoriou (2010).  
Formerly, in literature, relative spread was commomnly used. However, as Roll 
(1984) first pointed out, this proxy was problematic due to the fact that the actual 
trading occurs mostly within the bid ask bounced. For a more accurate measure of that 
reason, Lee et al (1993), Heflin and Shaw (2000), Hedge and McDermott (2003) and 
Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2006), and Gregoriou (2010) included effective spread to 
proxy for liquidity in their research. Unfortunately, both measures by relative bid-ask 
spreads or effective bid-ask spreads included mid price. This causes other problems 
such as in case of the mid-price change, bid ask spreads will also change. To minimize 
shortcomings of the above two methods, I have also included quote bid-ask spread in 
this study.  
2.6.2. Bid ask spread decomposition 
Historically, there have been three main theoretical models of decomposing bid-ask 
spreads: 1) The trade indicator regression models pioneered by Glosten and Harris 
(1988); 2) The time series co-variance models pioneered by Stoll (1989); 3) The 
combination of the above two models first applied by Huang and Stoll (1997). Other 
models were built on and extended from these two (see Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay 
(1997) for more details. 
Spreads was first decomposed in permanent and transitory components using trade 
indicator regression form by Glosten and Harris (1988). Permanent component is due 
to the inventory costs and transitory component is due to information asymmetry 
costs. Their test results prove that significant fractions of NYSE common stock spread 
are due to information asymmetry. Researchers also using trade indicator regression 
model are Mahavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997). They decompose spreads with 
adverse selection and order-processing components; inventory holding cost is assumed 
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to be zero. They conclude that adverse information cost increases through the day of 
information shock, while the order-processing components cost decrease. 
Stoll (1989) pioneers a model of time series behaviour of spread and specifies the 
relationship between the quoted spread and realized spread.  Based on that, he 
establishes a relationship between a quoted spread and the co-variance estimate of the 
spread that depends on two parameters, the probability of a price reversal and the 
amount of a price reversal. By using data from the NASDAQ on quoted spread and 
transaction prices, he infers these two parameters, from which he could calculate the 
relative proportions of three spread components: order processing cost, inventory 
holding cost, and information asymmetry cost for data set from October, November 
and December 1984. Following Stoll, some other authors use series co-variance as 
George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991). However, George, Kaul and Nimalendran 
(1991) model assume a zero inventory cost.  
Huang and Stoll (1997) in “The components of the Bid-ask spreads” found that 
existing bid ask models, which includes trade indicator regression model and series 
co-variance models, did not decompose spread fully. They made two extension tests to 
the trade indicator regression model to separate the effects on order processing and 
inventory costs. Their study also shows that spread components vary depending on the 
size of a trade. 
There are studies later on that are unambiguous in isolating the three cost components 
of bid-ask spreads, and therefore consistent with the work of Stoll and Huang and 
Stoll, such as Menyah, and Paudyal (2000). However, there are also studies that do not 
give results that can be interpreted as in the above three components, for example 
Winne and Majors (2007) among others support the hypothesis of no inventory 
holding costs in order-driven markets.  
In another direction, empirical studies also show that bid-ask spreads are related to 
some of the characteristics of securities such as stock price, trading volume, volatility 
of return, number of market dealers, the risk of stock and other factors, for example, 
Atkins and Dyl (1997) and more recently  Gregoriou, Ioannidis and Skerratt (2005). 
Gregoriou et al (2005) tests the model with the multi variate linear relationship 
between Spread and 4 independent variables: Variance of Forecast, Variance of 
Returns, stock Market Value, Volume of stock trading to explain spread.  Information 
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asymmetry in this study is proxied by Variance of forecasts. From the tests, authors 
found that not only volatility of returns but also disagreement among analysts were 
significant. Volatility captures information uncertainty about current period to the end 
of the year: It reflects economy wide aspects of uncertainty. Disagreement related to 
firm specific issues, for example poor results add to volatility. Poor performance 
causes delay in reporting the year end results and cause additional information 
asymmetry between market maker and market investors. For the statistical 
significance of the Variance of Forecast  in the presence of the other variables that are 
regularly included in modelling spread, their explanation is that disagreement among 
analysts affects the behaviour of market makers, and those market makers act to 
protect themselves from informed traders by increasing spreads. Market makers 
cannot recognize types of traders they are dealing with, some have information 
advantages, others do not. As thus, market makers protect themselves from those 
informed traders by increasing the spread. The study toward the direction that bid ask 
spread related to characteristics of securities such as stock price, trading volume, 
volatility of return, number of market dealer, the risk of stock and other factors is still 
being developed. Though these multi-variate models of bid ask spread in study such as 
Gregoriou et al (2005) do not decompose spread into three different cost components 
the role of adverse selected information component is emphasized. 
At current time, in terms of costs, the existing market microstructure theories imply 
that bid ask spread must cover three costs faced by a dealer: The order processing 
costs, inventory holding costs and adverse information cost. The third component is 
sometimes known as information asymmetry cost. The inventory holding cost is the 
fee associated with risk of holding inventory of the stock, which is first argued by 
Demsetz (1968) and Tinic (1972). The order processing cost, conceptualized by 
Benston and Hagerman (1974) and Stoll (1978), is the actual cost charged by the 
market makers to process the order which includes labour, communication, clearing 
and record keepings. Finally, the information asymmetry or adverse information cost 
is established by Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and 
recently by Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and Madhavan et al (1997). 
2.6.3 How is bid ask spread an explanation for PEAD? 
2.6.3.1. Earnings announcements and bid-ask spreads 
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There have been less number of studies on the subject of market liquidity impacts of 
earnings announcements with liquidity measured by bid ask spread. Kim and 
Verrecchia (1994) suggest a theoretical model that information disadvantage of the 
market makers increases the bid-ask spreads. Information asymmetry increases around 
earnings announcements due to information flows from public disclosures. The 
informed traders will exploit their ability to process public information. In turn, 
investors have to increase bid-ask spreads to protect themselves from informed 
traders. Increase in bid-ask spreads suggest that market liquidity decreases due to the 
event. 
Other studies of the behaviour of the bid-ask spreads around earnings announcements 
in NYSE are Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and Krinsky, and Lee (1996). These 
studies use intraday data. The first paper‟s finding is that order processing cost does 
not account much for the change in bid-ask spreads, while information asymmetry 
dominates this change. Krinsky and Lee‟s finding is that the total bid-ask spreads 
might not change significantly because information asymmetry increases while order 
processing cost and inventory holding cost decrease. 
In a working paper, Voetman (2000-2006) uses Stoll‟s methodology to provide 
evidence from Copenhagen Stock Exchange that quote bid-ask spreads does not 
change significantly because of earnings announcements even though information 
asymmetry increases. His findings also show that positive earnings have less 
uncertainty than negative earnings. This is a study on a code law country using daily 
data. 
Acker et al (2002) provides evidence from London Stock Exchange using daily data 
over the period from 1986-1994. Due to earnings announcements bid ask spreads fall 
and trading volumes and returns volatility rise. 
Recently, Gregoriou (2008) investigated the impact of earnings announcements on the 
components of bid-ask spreads on the London Stock Exchange using intraday data. 
Information asymmetry cost has been found to dominate the change in the bid-ask 
spreads, resulting in bid-ask spreads to decrease.  
Above studies stay only at the point to explore the impact of earnings announcement 
on stock liquidity; they have not explored the relationship between liquidity and the 
PEAD.  
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2.6.3.2. Bid ask spread as a measure of stock liquidity in relation to PEAD 
Based on Kim and Verrechia (2001) suggestion, in explaining drift, spread has two 
potential roles: 
1. To indicate the cost of transacting. A large spread might discourage trading, 
and therefore might lead to a lag in information getting in to prices. (But this 
wouldn‟t explain the long term results) 
2. As a measure of risk. Information causes the risk of the stock to increase. 
Though still very limited, there are two directions in studies on the linkage between 
PEAD and spread as measure of stock liquidity: implication of transaction cost to 
explain PEAD and information based explanation. 
Transaction cost (proxied by spread) 
Bhushan (1994) is the first researcher who indirectly examined the relationship 
between liquidity and the PEAD, by relating transaction cost and the PEAD. He 
redefines Bernard and Thomas (1990) model with a transaction cost framework. 
However, he uses annual trading volume in money to proxy for the inverse of indirect 
cost of trading, and stock price to proxy for direct cost of trading. Stocks with high 
transaction cost have lower volume of trading and vice versa.  His work shows that 
stocks with high transaction costs drifted more. Especially after control for transaction 
cost, firm size and analysts play no role in explanation of PEAD.  However in this 
study, there is an absence of the direct link between liquidity and PEAD. 
Brown (1997) indicates that PEAD is not evident throughout so it challenges 
transaction cost explanation of PEAD. In addition, Spiegel and Wang (2006) questions 
should transaction costs being proxied by previous year trading volume? Trading 
volume can indicate the degree of liquidity but it does not tell us the cost of trading so 
this methodology in fact goes around. 
Although all of the above studies were after Bhushan (1994) provided the link 
between transaction cost and PEAD, transaction cost has not been used to provide an 
explanation of PEAD, until a recent study by Ng et al (2008).  
To the best of my knowledge the only two studies directly linking the relationship 
between bid ask spread and the PEAD are Ng et al (2008) and Chordia et al (2009). 
Ng et al use bid ask spread to proxy for transaction cost. They provide evidence that 
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stocks with higher transactions cost have a smaller reaction to the earnings 
announcement, and the drift is larger for stock with high transaction cost. The results 
confirm that spread provides an explanation for the PEAD. This study uses US data 
only. In addition there is absence of information factor in the explanation. 
Chordia et al (2009) use a multiple measures on transaction cost (proportional 
effective bid-ask spreads, dynamic institutional trading costs, and the market impact 
costs) following Keim and Madhavan (1997), Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) and Chen, 
Stanzl, and Watanabe (2004) and indicates that transaction cost can possibly be an 
explanation for the PEAD. Chordia et al prove that “transaction costs account for 66% 
to100% of the potential paper profits from the long-short strategy designed to exploit 
the earnings drift”. Their research however, excluded illiquid stocks, i.e. stock with 
price lower than £5 and stocks with at least ten days of trades each month, meanwhile 
stocks with less frequently trading largely drives liquidity premium. In addition, 
Chordia et al (2009) construct one month liquidity measures in that research fail to 
capture information from stocks that have zero trading volume over the whole month. 
According to Bhushan and Chordia et al PEAD will not be exploitable after 
transaction cost. Chordia‟s analysis of transaction cost (proxied by bid-ask spreads, 
market impact costs, and institutional transactions costs) proves that most of the net 
profits disappear upon accounting for trading costs. However, previous studies 
generally rule out transaction cost as an explanation of PEAD. Moreover, Ball (1992) 
and Battalio and Mendenhall (2006) studies claim that PEAD is too large to be 
bounded by transaction cost. Mendenhall provides evidence that after transaction cost 
investor can still earn a 14% hedged portfolio return a year. 
Information based factor 
There are very few studies indirectly linking the information based factor and the 
PEAD. 
Lee and Swaminathan (2000) investigate interaction between price momentum and 
previous trading volumes to predict cross-sectional returns. They documented that 
earnings surprise is caused by higher (or lower) future earnings of low (or higher) 
volume stocks. Investor expectation affects not only stock returns but also the stock 
trading activity; therefore the information content of trading volume is related to 
market misperception of stock future earnings. 
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Chambers, Jennings and Thompson (2004) use proportion of zero return trading day in 
the past twelve months as proxy for liquidity, firm with high proportion is expected to 
have low flow of information and high resolution of uncertainty around earnings 
announcement, and vice versa. They found that returns are concentrated around 
earnings announcements for firms with low information flow than for firms with high 
information flow. However, their study has a problem of lack of news and the 
assumption of equal transaction cost across firms is not realistic. 
Sadka (2006) is another one to study indirectly the link between PEAD and liquidity. 
His studies use price impact to proxy for stock liquidity and then follow Glosten and 
Harris (1998) model, propose to decompose liquidity into two components, the fixed 
component (associated with market-wise information) and variable component 
(associated with firm specific information). Unexpected systematic (market-wide) 
variations of the variable component rather than the fixed component of liquidity are 
shown to be priced within the context of momentum and post-earnings-announcement 
drift (PEAD) portfolio returns. The variable component of price impact therefore can 
explain part of PEAD and price momentum. He finally suggests that a bench mark 
model to explore PEAD should include information based on liquidity risk factor. 
 
2.7. Summary 
In summary, PEAD has been discovered for over four decades. Since then there have 
been so many studies using different methodologies to explain the reason for it. Even 
after so many studies, not much has been solved to the general satisfaction. In 
addition, there is still silence in cross countries comparisons. This thesis will explore 
the direct relationship between PEAD and stock liquidity on the growing concerns 
from academic community. Secondly, this thesis includes a comparison of two 
different accounting systems code law and common law (see the next chapter for 
further information about code law and common law systems). Lastly, this study 
explores in particular the impact of the information component of liquidity on the 
PEAD. 
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CHAPTER III 
 DATA SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
There are two primary objectives of this chapter. The first one is to describe the data 
collection and sample construction to obtain the final sample. The second is to 
describe the methodology used in the research.  
My data sample covers three countries: the US, the UK, and France with 1821 firms 
listed in 8 indices, of which 4 indices are from London Stock Exchange and the 
alternative investment market, 3 indices from US Stock Exchanges, and 1 index from 
Paris Bourse. My samples will includes both liquid and illiquid stocks from the 
London Stock Exchange, covering two types of accounting systems, one is the 
common law system used in the US and the UK, and the other is code law based 
system used in France. There is difference between code law and common law 
accounting systems. In the common law countries, earnings information is  that stock 
information is released on the day of the event, whilst in the code law countries 
earnings information is released  to the markets much  earlier (month earlier) through 
a  variety of  channels before the official announcement date
5
. Therefore the earnings 
news in code law based countries has already been digested by the markets and is no 
longer new news. 
3.1 Companies and Indices covered 
3.1.1. London Stock Exchange 
Data was collected from DATA STREAM Advance and FTSE PDF files. 
FTSE™ 100 
The capitalisation-weighted index of the share prices of the 100 largest companies 
(based on market capitalization) traded on the London Stock Exchange
6
.  
                                                 
5
 See Ball, Korathi and Robin (2000) for more details about code law and common law accounting 
systems. 
6
 The constitution list is modified quarterly by the end of March, June, September, and December.  
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FTSE250  
The capitalisation-weighted index of the 250 companies on the London Stock 
Exchange that are quarterly selected as being the 101
st
 to 350
th
 largest companies
7
. 
FTSE Small Cap 
The capitalisation-weighted-index consists of companies outside of the 350
th
 largest 
companies in the UK on the London Stock Exchange
8
. 
FTSE AIM All-Share  
The capitalisation-weighted index consisting of all companies quoted on the 
Alternative Investment Market, a sub market of the London Stock Exchange that 
allows smaller companies to float shares with a more flexible regulatory system
9
. 
3.1.2 US Stock Exchanges 
DJIA (The Dow Jones Industry Average) 
The price-weighted index created by 30 of the largest and most widely held public 
companies in the United States. 
NASDAQ 100 
The modified capitalisation-weighted index comprises of the 100 non-financial largest 
stocks traded on the NASDAQ Stock Exchange
10
.  
S&P 100 
The capitalisation weighted index of 100 largest companies by market capitalization in 
the S&P 500. 
3.1.3 Euronext Paris 
CAC40 
The float capitalisation-weighted index comprises of the 40 largest and most liquid 
stocks trading on the Paris Bourse
11
.  
3.2. Data collection and calculation 
                                                 
7
 The constitution list is modified quarterly by the end of March, June, September, and December. 
8
 The constitution list is modified quarterly by the end of March, June, September, and December. 
9
 Weighted index is adjusted by free load factor. 
10
 Although firms with the largest market caps tend to have the largest influence on the index, its value 
is modified to keep any issues from having an "overwhelming" effect on the index results. 
While the composition of the NASDAQ-100 changes in the case of delisting, the index is only 
rebalanced once a year, in December, when NASDAQ reviews its components and makes the 
appropriate adjustments. 
11
 Float means that the weightings of each of the index's components are determined by the value of 
shares outstanding to the public. This prevents a large company that only issues a small amount of its 
shares from having a disproportionate amount of influence on the index‟s value  
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Daily stock closing prices, price indices, daily closing bid price, daily closing ask 
price, daily turnover by volume and daily price high and low were obtained from 
DATASTREAM ADVANCE for 90 days before and 90 day after the earnings 
announcements. The number of companies that have data available for each index are: 
CAC40: 40 companies; DJIA: 30 companies; FTSE100: 99 companies; FTSE250: 233 
companies; FTSE Small Cap: 310 companies; FTSE AIM All-shares: 913 companies, 
NASDAQ100: 96 companies, S&P100: 100 companies. The selection criteria, is 
similar spirit to that of Hedge and Mc Dermott (2003), my final data includes stocks 
that have: 
a) Not involved in a merger during the period of 90 days before and after 
earnings announcement 
b) Not involved in a split during the period of 90 days before and after earnings 
announcement 
c) Data available on the stock exchanges and on DATA STREAM Advance for 
90 days before and after earnings announcement. We exclude firms that do not 
have data available of at least 10 day before an earnings announcement. 
Quote bid-ask spreads, relative bid-ask spreads, effective spread are all calculated 
based on closing bid price and ask price. Quote bid ask spread is calculated as the 
difference between bid price and ask price. Relative spread is calculated as the 
difference between bid price and ask price divided by average of bid price and ask 
price (mid price). Effective spread is calculated as twice as much as absolute value of 
the difference between executed price and mid price. 
Trading volume is calculated as turnover by volume times the average of the high 
price and low price on the day. 
Pre-earnings announcement period is defined as period from day -90 to day -1. Post 
earnings announcements period is defined as period from day 0 to day +90. 
3.3. Earnings announcements dates 
In London Stock Exchange, dates of preliminary report of fourth quarter and final 
earning, results were taken from LSE‟s website through Regulatory News Services for 
2006-2007.  For companies that reported fourth quarter and annual preliminary 
earning results separately, we selected annual preliminary report dates. These dates are 
then compared to sources from companies‟ websites and also date of earliest earnings  
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announcements released to the public, through various means of media such as press 
release, conference call, Internet etc. Basically, companies are required to submit the 
earning reports before 5PM on the day before announcement day. On the next day, the 
announcement days, information will be available on the stock exchange for most 
companies at around 7AM, before the market open. The analyst conference then will 
be held in the morning
12
. 
In the United States Stock Exchanges, earnings announcements dates were earliest 
fourth quarter and annual earnings release dates, taken directly from companies‟ 
websites, for 2006-2007. These are also the dates of reporting to SEC, by regulation, 
on form 8-K, which classified as “current reports” or “report of unscheduled material 
events or corporate event”.  Foreign companies provide form 6-K of Foreign Private 
Issuer instead of the form 8-K. The releases were through the press, conference call, 
Internet etc. Usually, the press releases come first on the announcement day. The 
announcements will then be made through conference and webcast either before 
market open or after market close. 
For various reasons, there are a few companies in the US, where the filing dates are 
not on the same day as press/internet release and conference call dates. However this 
is only for a very few, and the filing dates are not too far from dates of other means of 
publication
13
. There are also some companies that do not report earning on form 8-K 
after a delaying period. Instead, they report directly on form 10K, the annual report, 
which provides a comprehensive overview of the company for the past year, on the 
same day with press release and conference call and Internet casting
14
. In such cases, I 
still took the earliest earnings announcements date to the public, which normally start 
with a press release date. 
                                                 
12
 Different companies have different way of calling their earnings announcement dates. Usually they 
call this “annual/final and fourth quarter financial results” date. Sometime they call it “earning results” 
date only. But notice that, the turnover or sale report could also be called the final results. We must take 
a look at each report to make sure that is preliminary earning reports, which included profit and loss 
account, earning information and was firstly released to the investors through conference call, web-cast, 
or press. 
In addition, some companies announced in several stock exchanges due to it registered at those markets. 
The announced date in the index‟s stock market will be chosen.  
13
 (I.e. NASDAQ 100 - AMGEN INCORPORATED in 2006.) 
14
 (i.e. NASDAQ 100 - ECHOSTAR COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION) 
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For both UK and US, companies sometimes provide a corrected/amended version of 
their announcement. If the amended version affected earning results, I took the 
amended date 
15
 as the announcement date.  
At the Paris Bourse, the earnings announcements dates are final earning results report 
dates taken from the Euronext Paris websites, and then compared to sources from 
companies‟ websites. The earliest earning release dates are selected in the same 
pattern. Press releases usually come first, followed by conference and other means of 
media. 
During the process of collecting data, I have found that companies listed in different 
stock exchanges have different ways of presenting their earnings announcements, 
however they all go through the same process: press release, filing to the stock 
exchange, investor/analyst conference calls, and webcast.   
In addition, in their preliminary earning reports, some companies release fewer details 
than others. For the United States market, one might not provide a full balance sheet 
on form 8-K like many others but only selected financial results. The full details will 
appear later on the annual 10-K. The same situation is applied to companies on the 
LSE but the companies on LSE tend to provide more comprehensive reports than in 
the US and companies in CAC40 provide the most comprehensive final results. 
However, this thesis just ignores the matter of publication level because there are not 
many companies that provide less information.  
By selecting data from the UK, France, and US in this thesis I also want to make a 
comparison between common law countries, as in the UK and US; and code law 
countries, of which France is one. In general, the role of accounting statements in the 
common law countries is to inform the stock market about the Company‟s financial 
status. When earnings announcements are made, that is actually new information. 
Conversely, in code law countries, the role of accounting statements is not to inform 
the shareholders because those people already know company financial situation 
through other internal means. The role of earnings announcements here is to announce 
what dividend the company should pay and what tax the company has to pay. I would 
                                                 
15
 NASDAQ 100 - EXPEDITORS INTERNATIONAL OF WASHINGTON INC in 2007 and some 
other companies on LSE. 
KLA-Tencor in 2006 is an example 
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therefore expect a differenct reaction to earnings announcements from the two 
different systems. 
Common law has its origin in England and hence it is found in UK and many former 
British colonies. Common law is a result of individual action in the private sector. It 
emphasizes the following legal procedure over rules
16
.  Common laws including 
accounting standards have evolved by being commonly accepted in practise. Private 
sector bodies codify generally accepted rules and make them binding on their 
members; such standards arise not in government, but in an accounting market. Thus it 
can be said that common law enforcement is private matter which involves civil 
litigation, whereas Code-law originates from collective planning in the public sector. 
Code-law enforcement is a government function, which involves administrative 
bodies undertaking criminal prosecution for code violation
17
.  The countries following 
common law accounting system have „shareholder‟ corporate governance model in 
which shareholders alone elect the governing board, while the countries following 
code law have „stakeholder‟ model for resolving information asymmetry by public and 
private communication. As a result of quicker incorporation of economic losses, 
accounting income in common-law countries is significantly timelier as compared to 
code-law countries. In code-law countries information asymmetry is more likely 
resolved by institutional features other than timely and conservative public financial 
statements. This is done mostly by major shareholders
18
.  One of the major differences 
between common-law and code-law countries are the manner in which information 
asymmetry between mangers and potential users of accounting income is resolved. As 
compared to the common-law countries there is strong political influence on 
accounting at national and firm levels, in the code-law countries. The Governments in 
these countries establish and enforce national accounting standards with representation 
from major political groups such as labour unions, banks and business associations. 
On the firm level the political influence leads to a „stakeholder‟ governance model. 
Due to this, it can be said that the accounting income is divided among different 
groups such as dividends to shareholders, taxes to governments and bonuses to 
managers and employees. The demand for accounting income under code law is 
influenced more by the payout preferences for labour, capital and government, and 
                                                 
16
 (David and Brierly, 1985, p.24; Posner, 1996) 
17
 Ray Ball, S.P Kothari, Ashok Robin, 2000, p.13-14 
18
  Ibid. 
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less by the demand for public disclosure. The groups‟ agents are represented in 
corporate governance hence the insider communication solves the information 
asymmetry between the managers and stakeholders. On the contrary in common-law 
countries the shareholders elect members of the governing board and hence payouts 
are less closely linked to current-period accounting income and public disclosure is 
more likely solution for the information asymmetry problem. The properties of 
accounting income are determines mostly in the disclosure market
19
.  
3.4. A broad view of techniques employed in the thesis 
This thesis starts with the event study method to examine stock market price‟s 
response to the earnings events and in a later part to examine short term and long-term 
impact of earnings announcements on the bid-ask spreads. This methodology was 
introduced by Brown and Warner (1985), and subsequently used by Beneish and 
Gardner (1995); Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2006); Gregoriou (2008) and many others 
event studies in literature.  
Abnormal return (AR) is calculated as difference between individual stock return and 
market index returns, and then averaged across number of firms in the sample each 
day t to form average abnormal return (AAR). Average abnormal return AAR is 
cumulated over interval of k days from day t to t + k for different event windows to 
obtain Cumulative abnormal return (CAAR). Equally weighted portfolio standard 
deviation of AAR series is calculated, and t- statistics used to test the hypothesis 
CAAR = 0. 
This research has chosen different short-term event windows as [-1, 1], [-2,2], [-3, 3], 
[-4, 4]; [-5, 5]; and long-term even windows as [-90,0]; [-80,0]; [-70,0]; ... [-10,0]; 
[0,10]; [0,20].... [0, 90]. 
This traditional market model will contain shortcomings inside if the events are 
clustered
20
. If all of our firms are exposed to earnings announcements at the same 
time, the abnormal returns for each firm will unlikely be independent due to 
contemporary correlation of return across firms. However, in my samples, different 
firms have different earnings announcement dates so abnormal returns are less likely 
to suffer from correlations. The test for correlation also supports this. 
                                                 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Brown and Warner, 1985. 
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In this thesis, good and bad news are defined by positive and negative returns over the 
short-term event window [-5, 1] for the reason that we assume that the news is leaked 
to the market a couple of days before the official announcement date. The outcome of 
the positive and negative returns will not be affected by slight changes in the short 
term window. Pre-earnings announcement period is defined as a period from day -90 
to day -1. Post earnings announcements period is defined as a period from day 0 to 
day +90. 
Stock trading volume is calculated as the number of shares traded on the day 
multiplied by the average of high and low price of that day. 
As mentioned in earlier chapters, I have used the three measures of bid ask spread 
including quote bid ask spread, relative bid ask spread and effective bid ask spread as 
direct measures of stock market liquidity. 
Daily trades and quotes from DATASTREAM Advance database are used to calculate 
relative bid ask spread and effective bid ask spread. 
𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒                                            (3.4.1) 
The relative bid ask spread is calculated as the difference between bid price and ask 
price divided by the mid price. 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 =  
𝑃𝐴 − 𝑃𝐵
𝑃𝐴 + 𝑃𝐵
2
                                                                 (3.4.2) 
The effective bid ask spread is calculated as twice as much as the absolute value of the 
difference between trading price and the mid price. 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = 2  𝑃 −
𝑃𝐴 + 𝑃𝐵
2
                                                  (3.4.3) 
As discussed in the literature chapter, the reason I used all of three measures of bid ask 
spreads is because large trades are more likely to be executed outside the quoted 
spreads, so it can be said that quoted spread and relative spread are not an accurate 
measure, as noted in Roll [1984] and many others.  In addition, relative spread and 
effective spread take into account the mid-price so it ignores price movement leading 
to mid-price change and the relative and effective spread also change. For this reason 
it is necessary to take into account the three spread measures in the analysis as well. 
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While the thesis develops, there are many different regression models employed. 
There will be empirical specification parts to explain each of the methodology and 
explanatory variables. 
3.5. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.5.1... LSE– Pre-earnings announcements descriptive statistics. 
This table presents statistics description of samples of 99 firms listed on the FTSE100, 233 firms listed 
on the FTSE 250, 310 firms listed on the FTSE Small Cap, and 913 firms listed on FTSE AIM All 
Shares in the period 90 days before earnings announcement. 
Variables Stock 
Price 
Quoted 
Spread 
Relative 
Spread 
Effective 
Spread 
Market 
value 
Trading 
Volume
21
 
Stock 
Return 
Daily 
TV per 
MV 
Unit (£) (Pence) (%) (Pence) (Millions 
£) 
(1000£) (%) (Per 
1000) 
FTSE100 
Pre EA 
 Mean  8.64  1.85  0.25  1.27  14077  80995  0.096  7.13 
 Std. Dev.  6.27  2.18  0.33  1.63  20877  120453  1.43  6.89 
 Skewness  1.45  3.82  7.53  3.82  2.94  4.14  0.43  19.33 
 Kurtosis  5.18  25.54  77.32  30.98  12.08  29.41  9.11  883.98 
Jarque-
Bera 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Post EA         
 Mean  9.16  1.84  0.23  1.26  14272  99582  0.058  8.63 
 Std. Dev.  6.57  2.31  0.30  1.70  20073  13650  1.7  7.54 
 Skewness  1.48  7.31  9.54  7.88  2.86  3.79  0.24  7.15 
 Kurtosis  5.34  145.90  156.40  201.70  11.64  25.83  20.12  113.57 
Jarque-
Bera 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
         
FTSE250         
Pre EA 
 Mean  5.38  5.25  0.96  3.15  976 6222  0.012  5.42 
 Std. Dev.  5.40  12.60  1.5  9.03  597  12261  1.7  7.77 
 Skewness  3.87  8.32  7.21  11.17  1.29  20.13 -1.33  10.82 
 Kurtosis  25.21  97.72  92.61  165.86  4.30  972.95  64.57  287.76 
Jarque-
Bera 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Post EA         
 Mean  5.78  4.97  0.86  2.94  1045  7339  0.049  6.07 
 Std. Dev.  5.58  10.53  1.31  6.77  628  12166  1.90  9.46 
 Skewness  3.26  6.57  7.23  8.45  1.25  9.03  0.11  20.85 
 Kurtosis  18.53  65.71  95.38  114.83  4.19  186.83  12.06  862.58 
Jarque-
Bera  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
(Table 3.5.1. continued on  following page) 
                                                 
21
 Stock trading volume is calculated as number of shares traded on the day multiply by the average of 
high and low price on that day. 
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Table 3.5.1. continued from preceding page 
 
Variables Stock 
Price 
Quoted 
Spread 
Relative 
Spread 
Effective 
Spread 
Market 
value 
Trading 
Volume
22
 
Stock 
Return 
Daily 
TV per 
MV 
Unit (£) (Pence) (%) (Pence) (Millions 
£) 
(1000£) (%) (Per 
1000) 
FTSE Small Cap 
Pre EA 
 Mean  3.77  11.41  3.23  4.96  192.61  596.73  0.068  2.72 
 Std. Dev.  14.85  49.33  4.56  21.54 100.62  2035.33 1.81  8.03 
 Skewness  15.42  15.08  6.84  18.62  1.51  15.91 -1.32  16.25 
 Kurtosis  253.56  274.12  99.79  481.52  7.57  438.57  55.97  461.56 
Jarque-
Bera 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Post EA         
 Mean  3.95  11.16  3.12  4.80  200.69  615.47  0.025  2.77 
 Std. Dev.  15.17  48.18  4.53  21.06  97.52  1860.20  1.86  7.90 
 Skewness  15.14  15.03  10.16  22.44  1.09  14.42 -0.121  16.56 
 Kurtosis 244.2
3 
 264.72  264.63  715.71  4.96  365.39  19.22  478.30 
Jarque-
Bera 
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
         
FTSE AIM All Shares 
Pre EA 
 Mean  0.98  4.38 8.49  0.54  56.81  219.19 -0.020  2.96 
 Std. Dev.  1.59  10.53  9.51  6.23  111.73  1657.14  3.81  10.03 
 Skewness  5.83  20.06  3.46  57.91  6.55  37.33  0.70  17.04 
 Kurtosis  60.63  1068.39  22.18  6733.29  62.89  2339.11  100.24  522.86 
Jarque-
Bera 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Post EA         
 Mean  1.01  4.23  8.32  0.43  59.30  193.78 -0.060  2.98 
 Std. Dev.  1.66  8.84  9.42  4.02  109.75  1157.63  4.26  11.59 
 Skewness  6.44  10.03  3.32  36.50  6.04  26.76 -2.76  31.07 
 Kurtosis  79.65  144.25  18.68  2357.18  54.20  1115.64  295.14  1910.6
9 
Jarque-
Bera 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
London Stock Exchanges 
Table 3.5.1 presents descriptive statistics for final samples of 99 firms listed in 
FTSE100, 233 firms listed in FTSE250, 310 firms listed in FTSE Small Cap and 913 
firms listed in FTSE AIM All Shares in pre-earnings announcements period. We 
witness that FTSE100 companies are large firms with high market liquidity because of 
the high market value and low relative bid-ask spreads. In fact, these firms account for 
                                                 
22
 Stock trading volume is calculated as number of shares traded on the day multiply by the average of 
high and low price on that day. 
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about 81% market value of the whole London stock exchange. Daily trading volume 
per market value is also evidence of high liquidity. Firms listed in FTSE250 are 
medium firms. The stocks are still of high liquidity but less if compared to FTSE100 
firms with the relative higher bid-ask spreads. In addition, the large daily trading 
volume per market value is evidence of high liquidity of stocks, but this number is 
lower than in FTSE100 firms. Firms listed in FTSE Small Cap are smaller than in the 
above two indices with lower market value. The bid-ask spreads is relatively higher 
than the above two indices, this suggests low liquidity. The daily trading volume per 
market value is lower than the above two indices but still a high number compared to 
the stock price. Stocks of these firms are illiquid. Finally, companies listed in 
FTSEAIM All Shares are small firms with low market value. The high relative bid-ask 
spread is evidence of illiquidity. In addition, the low daily trading volume per share is 
another evidence of illiquidity. 
American Stock Exchanges 
Table 3.5.2 presents descriptive statistics for final samples of 30 firms listed in DJIA, 
96 firms listed in NASDAQ100 and 100 firms listed in S&P100 in pre-earnings 
announcements period. We observe that firms in DJIA are large and the stocks are of 
high liquidity because of the high market value and low bid-ask spreads. In addition, 
high daily trading volume per market value is also evidence of high liquidity. 
Statistics also show that the NASDAQ100 are large firms with high market value in 
the US stock exchanges. The low bid-ask spread indicates high liquidity of stocks. 
Another evidence of high liquidity is daily trading volume per market value, relatively 
high compared to the stock prices. Finally, firms in the S&P100 index are also large 
firms. Low bid-ask spreads are indicators of stocks with high liquidity. Moreover, the 
daily trading volume per market value is relatively high compared to the stock prices. 
This is further evidence of high liquidity. 
Paris Bourse 
Table 3.5.3 presents descriptive statistics for final samples of 40 firms listed in 
CAC40 in pre-earnings announcements period. Some of these observations are 
interesting. High market values suggest that the CAC40 firms are large and low 
quoted bid-ask spreads shows that the stocks are liquid. Additionally, liquidity of 
firms stock is reflected by high daily trading volume per market value. 
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Table 3.5.2 The U.S. Stock Exchanges – Pre-earnings announcements descriptive statistics. 
This table presents statistics description of samples of 30 firms listed on the DJIA, 96 firms listed on the 
NASDAQ 100, 100 firms listed on the S&P100 in the period 90 days before earnings announcement. 
 Variables Stock 
Price 
Quoted 
Spread 
Relative 
Spread 
Effective 
Spread 
Market 
value 
Trading 
Volume 
Stock 
Return 
Daily 
TV per 
MV 
Unit ($US) (cents) (%) (cents) (Million
s )$ 
($1000) (%) (per 
1000) 
DJIA  
Pre EA  
 Mean  49.45  3.41  0.070  2.30  133162  607129  0.075  5.62 
 Std. Dev.  18.34  3.07  0.057  3.25  96176 582951  1.16  6.12 
 Skewness  0.55  14.36  12.67  13.02  1.32  7.33 -1.87  10.07 
 Kurtosis  2.55  440.50  377.40  334.74  4.61  135.68  26.26  185.29 
Jarque-
Bera  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Post EA         
 Mean  52.22  3.45  0.067 2.38  140793  684247  0.101  6.06 
 Std. Dev.  19.13  2.52  0.048  2.88  98981  495393  1.14  4.99 
 Skewness  0.58  3.88  8.20  9.82  1.20  2.13  0.28  4.85 
 Kurtosis  2.81  41.79  185.82  221.00  4.23  10.07  7.95  44.07 
Jarque-
Bera  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
         
NASDAQ100 
Pre EA  
 Mean  44.56  1.80  0.048  3.85  20181  274136 0.069  15.07 
 Std. Dev.  51.70  2.87  0.061  7.60  32709  505879  1.96  14.32 
 Skewness  6.61  5.18  0.56  39.51  4.17  6.77 -0.13  4.79 
 Kurtosis  54.12  95.03  11.51  2485.73  24.98  106.08  14.63  54.51 
Jarque-
Bera  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Post  EA         
 Mean  44.54  2.33  0.061  3.47  20885  285698  0.072  15.08 
 Std. Dev.  50.35  3.04  0.064  4.42  35775  545093  1.95  14.31 
 Skewness  6.47  3.59  0.61  7.65  4.43  6.10  0.15  5.88 
 Kurtosis  53.52  44.68  15.33  119.22  27.14  64.49  20.91  73.99 
Jarque-
Bera  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
         
S&P100  
Pre EA  
 Mean  54.32  3.72  0.076 2.90  73509  419912  0.091  7.22 
 Std. Dev.  49.40 3.54  0.056 5.10  74930 524184  1.238  7.96 
 Skewness  6.39  6.42  4.88  14.22  2.24  5.72 -0.45  6.23 
 Kurtosis  53.80  122.46  133.44  407.54  9.13  85.25  13.70  79.33 
Jarque-
Bera  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Post EA         
 Mean  56.78  3.90  0.077 3.11  76167  489259  0.087  8.18 
 Std. Dev.  49.89  4.12  0.162  6.94  76876  560221  1.32  7.73 
 Skewness  5.89  11.63  75.90  44.10  2.15  4.60 -0.041  4.27 
 Kurtosis  47.79  352.76  6593  2988  8.65  45.96  12.00  35.27 
Jarque-
Bera  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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Table 3.5.3. CAC40– Pre-earnings announcements descriptive statistics. 
This table presents statistics description of samples of 40 firms listed on the CAC40 in the period 90 
days before earnings announcement. 
  Stock 
Price 
Quoted 
Spread 
Relative 
Spread 
Effective 
Spread 
Market 
value 
Trading 
Volume 
Stock 
Return 
Daily 
TV per 
MV 
 (€) (Cents) (%) (Cents) (Million
s €) 
(1000€) (%) (Per 
1000) 
CAC40 
Pre EA 
 Mean  64.28  6.04  0.089  5.48  32283  126724  0.101 4.77 
 Std. Dev.  41.83  8.74  0.107  8.21 27535  121315  1.34  3.68 
 Skewness  1.45  11.11  23.36  12.87  1.68  3.05  0.16  4.43 
 Kurtosis  5.22  230.20  785.55  294.45  5.64  18.36  6.59  42.03 
Jarque-
Berra  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Post EA         
 Mean  70.02  3.98  0.058  3.63  35023  159508  0.090  5.41 
 Std. Dev.  46.37  6.37  0.056  5.97  28849  156920  1.47  3.92 
 Skewness  1.50  5.92  2.41  6.31  1.61  3.66  0.26  3.54 
 Kurtosis  5.57  60.94  11.57  71.48  5.37  28.20  6.22  28.12 
Jarque-
Berra  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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CHAPTER IV  
IMPACTS OF EARNING ANNOUNCEMENT ON STOCK 
LIQUIDITY – UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
  
 
Earnings announcement is a major event of information at public level that captures 
stock market risk because the information contained strongly affects investor‟s 
decisions. It has been observed that investors tend to trade more heavily and 
frequently around earnings announcement. As mentioned previously, stock liquidity 
refers to the ability to trade the stock quickly at any time with lowest price impact. It 
is an important characteristic that every investor looks for when trading in the market. 
Given the importance of earnings information, in this chapter I would like to explore 
the impact of earnings announcements on the stock market liquidity. This chapter has 
three objectives. First is to examine evidence of PEAD and price reaction to the 
earnings announcements on different stock exchanges. It is interesting that this is the 
first study to carry out an analysis on the London Stock Exchange as a whole, with 
comparison of other important indices from the US and French markets, and by the 
separation of the large, medium and small securities. Second objective of this thesis is 
to explore the trading volume effect in both short term and long term of earnings 
announcement. Finally I would like to apply information cost liquidity hypothesis, 
which was first established in 1970 by Van Horn. Given the possibility of an 
alternative information environment after earnings announcements, I examine whether 
there is increase/decrease in market liquidity following the announcement.  
The next layout is as follows.  Section 4.1 describes the methodology and investigates 
the stock prices response to earnings announcement. Section 4.2 explores the trading 
volume effect of earnings announcements. Section 4.3 is the application of 
information cost hypothesis around earnings announcements inorder to explore if 
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there is any possible change in liquididty due to the news. Finally, section 4.4 
concludes remarks. 
4.1. Stock Price response to the earnings announcements. 
4.1.1. Empirical design 
In this section I have split sample into good news and bad news groups. As mentioned 
in the above chapter, good news and bad news firms are defined by positive and 
negative returns respectively over the short event window period [-5, 1], for the reason 
that we assume information has been leaked to the market a couple of day before the 
event and up to day + 1 markets already have enough time to recognize the news 
direction. In fact the results will not change if we vary this window. For each group, I 
used standard event study method for a window of 181 days around earnings 
announcements date [-90; +90]. The stock price reaction to the earnings 
announcements around the event date 0 was analysed using the market adjusted model 
of abnormal returns, which is the difference between rates of return of individual stock 
and rate of return of the index due to its simplicity and popularity. This market-
adjusted model (or constant mean return model) follow Brown and Warner (1985)
23
 
and subsequent researchers for example Hedge and McDermott (2003) and Gregoriou 
(2006). In fact, Brown and Warner find that the simple mean returns model often 
yields sresults similar to those more sophisticated models because the variance of the 
abnormal returns is not reduced much by choosing a more sotisphicated model. 
    mtitit RRAR      (4.1.1.1) 
Where, 
- Rit is rate of return of stock i on day t, )1t(iitit PlnPlnR  . 
- Rmt is rate of return of the index on day t )1t(tmt PIlnPIlnR  . It is 
value weighted market return of the index. 
                                                 
23
 Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) find that the simple mean returns model often yields results similar 
to those of more sophisticated models because the variance of abnormal returns is not reduced much by 
choosing a more sophisticated model. 
For each stock i, the market adjusted model assumes that stock returns are given by 
Ri,t = E[Ri;t |Xt] + ξi,t ,   
Where 
E[Ri;t |Xt] = μ, 
E[ξi,t] = 0 and Var[ξi,t] = σξ,i
2
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The abnormal returns ARit then are averaged across the number of firms in the sample 
on each day t to form an average excess returns, AARt. 
For the purpose of testing the reaction, AARt are cumulated from day 0 through 
intervals of k days, k = 10, 20, 30, ...90, and k  = -10, -20, -30 ....-90 to test the short 
run and long run effect of earnings announcements on the stock market. We also 
cumulate 10 days around earnings announcements. 
      


k
0t
tk,t AARCAAR      (4.1.1.2) 
The variance of the sample is obtained by the following formula: 
   


90
90t
2
tt
2
AAR )AARAAR(
180
1
S    (4.1.1.3) 
Where,  
-   AAR  is the mean of average excess returns AARt for 181 trading day period. 
If there is no reaction, CAAR will follow normal contribution. 
CAARt, t+k ~ N (0, σ2t, t+k)    (4.1.1.4) 
The t statistic used to test the hypothesis CAAR equal the zero is calculated as: 
   
2
AAR
kt,t
S)1k(
CAAR
statistict

      (4.1.1.5) 
The t-statistics for all indices are presented in 8 tables in the following part. The short-
term effect around a five-day event window [-5, +5] is presented in Panel A. Long 
term effects for up to 90 days following earnings announcement is presented in Panel 
B by each 10-day interval.  The result shows significant positive stock price reactions 
to the good news earnings announcements, and significant negative stock price 
reaction to the bad news earnings announcements for all indices. Notice that good and 
bad news are defined by positive and negative returns over the short-term event 
window [-5, 1]. I assume there is leakage of information before the news. In fact we 
could vary this window but there is not much change in the result. As witnessed, 
liquidity effects occur for all indices in the short term, and persist longer in the long 
term for good news firms than for the bad news firms. This happens as we would 
expect, the reaction occur until the news has ended its effects on stock prices. All of 
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the tables and graph also show that the increases or decreases in price are permanent, 
i.e. after the change, the price does not go back down or up from the original level. 
4.1.2. Results and explanations 
4.1.2.1. FTSE100.  
The graph of cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR) from day -90 up to day +90 for 
FTSE100 is presented in figure 4.1.2.1. We can see that there is upper trend in pre-
event period for both good and bad news, this trend continues after the event, probably 
due to impact of some available market conditions. The good news
24
 reaction shows 
an upward trend while bad news
25
 downward reaction last only for a short while then 
continues its original trend. 
Meanwhile, CAAR test results for FTSE100 presented in table 4.1.2.1 indicate that 
stock returns of firms included in FTSE100 are significantly affected by the earnings 
announcements, not only after but also before the event.  
Before Event 
For good news the t-values are mostly insignificant pre earnings announcements as we 
can see from table 4.1.2.1 Panel A and Panel B probably there is no previous reaction 
before the news is released. T-statistics in the short term are 1.43 for the window 
frame [-3, -1], 0.74 for [-2,-1] and 0.23 for [-1,-1]. T-statistics for long term are 1.35 
for the window frame [-40,-1], 1.21 for [-30,-1] and 1.00 for [-20,-1].  
For the bad news t-values are totally insignificant in the short term period, as we can 
see in table 4.1.2.1 Panel A. T-statistics are -1.08 for the window frame [-5,-1], 0.13 
for [-3,-1], -0.48 for [-2,-1] and -0.80 for [-1,-1]. T-statistics for long term are 1.51 for 
the window frame [-80,-1], 0.93 for [-50,-1] and 0.39 for [-10,-1] in panel B. 
After Event 
For good news the t-values are strongly significant as we can see from table 4.1.2.1 
Panel A and Panel B. T statstics in the short term are 7.79 for the time frame [1, 0], 
6.93 for [3, 0] and is 6.23 for [4, 0]. T-statistics for long term are 4.14 for the time 
frame [10, 0], 2.14 for [40, 0] and 2.59 for [70, 0]. 
                                                 
24
 Good news are defined by positive returns over the short term event window [-5,1] 
25
 Bad news are defined by negative returns over the short term event window [-5,1] 
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Figure 4.1.2.1 FTSE 100- Aggregate price reaction after earnings announcement
26
 
 
 
 
For bad news t-values are strongly significant in the short term, as we can see in table 
4.1.2.1 Panel A. T statistics are -5.82 for the time frame [1, 0], -4.74 for [2, 0] and -
3.58 for [5, 0]. T statistics for the long term are -0.56 for the window frame [20, 0], 
0.18 for [40, 0] and 0.20 for [70, 0] in panel B. 
Overall there are positive reactions happening for the good news and negative reaction 
for bad news. The largest abnormal return occurred on the event day 0 with t statistic  
                                                 
26
 From figure 4.1.2.1 to 4.1.2.8, good and bad news are defined by positive and negative returns over 
the short-term event window [-5,1], see footnotes 20&21. 
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Table 4.1.2.1-Abnormal Returns around FTSE100 index earnings announcements 
The sample consists of 99 stocks listed on FTSE100 index. Cumulative average abnormal returns 
CAAR are computed using the market model and the standard event study methodology. The 
estimation window for computing the market model parameters is the event time interval [-90, 90]. 
CAAR is tested for significance using t-statistics. 
Panel A. Short-term Abnormal Returns 
GOOD NEWS
27
 BAD NEWS
28
 
Event day CAAR t-statistic Event day CAAR t-statistic 
[-5, -1] 0.013 2.33*** [-5, -1] -0.007 -1.08 
[-4, -1] 0.009 1.89* [-4, -1] -0.004 -0.72 
[-3, -1] 0.006 1.43 [-3, -1] 0.001 0.13 
[-2, -1] 0.003 0.74 [-2, -1] -0.002 -0.48 
[-1, -1] 0.001 0.23 [-1, -1] -0.002 -0.80 
[0, 0] 0.024 9.98*** [0, 0] -0.021 -7.35*** 
[1, 0] 0.027 7.79*** [1, 0] -0.023 -5.82*** 
[2, 0] 0.033 7.88*** [2, 0] -0.023 -4.74*** 
[3, 0] 0.034 6.93*** [3, 0] -0.024 -4.19*** 
[4, 0] 0.034 6.23*** [4, 0] -0.025 -3.91*** 
[5, 0] 0.031 5.18*** [5, 0] -0.025 -3.58*** 
Panel B. Long-term Abnormal Returns 
GOOD NEWS BAD NEWS 
Event day CAAR t-statistic Event day CAAR t-statistic 
[-90, -1] 0.051 2.23** [-90, -1] 0.047 1.77* 
[-80, -1] 0.055 2.50*** [-80, -1] 0.038 1.51 
[-70, -1] 0.037 1.81* [-70, -1] 0.033 1.40 
[-60, -1] 0.038 1.99** [-60, -1] 0.025 1.16 
[-50, -1] 0.034 1.96** [-50, -1] 0.019 0.93 
[-40, -1] 0.021 1.35 [-40, -1] 0.014 0.77 
[-30, -1] 0.016 1.21 [-30, -1] 0.016 1.03 
[-20, -1] 0.011 1.00 [-20, -1] 0.004 0.29 
[-10, -1] 0.015 1.91* [-10, -1] 0.003 0.39 
[10, 0] 0.033 4.14*** [10, 0] -0.029 -3.06*** 
[20, 0] 0.030 2.73*** [20, 0] -0.007 -0.56 
[30, 0] 0.033 2.46*** [30, 0] -0.003 -0.21 
[40, 0] 0.033 2.14** [40, 0] 0.003 0.18 
[50, 0] 0.046 2.64*** [50, 0] 0.000 -0.02 
[60, 0] 0.045 2.36*** [60, 0] 0.003 0.13 
[70, 0] 0.053 2.59*** [70, 0] 0.005 0.20 
[80, 0] 0.051 2.34*** [80, 0] 0.003 0.12 
[90, 0] 0.054 2.33*** [90, 0] -0.006 -0.24 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
for the good news firms equal 9.98, and for bad news firms is -7.35. Moreover, there 
is evidence of abnormal return persisting over the long term, especially for good news  
                                                 
27
 From table 4.1.2.1 to 4.1.2.8, good news are defined by positive returns over the short-term event 
window [-5,1], see footnotes 20 
28
 From table 4.1.2.1 to 4.1.2.8, bad  news are defined by negative returns over the short-term event 
window [-5,1], see footnotes 21 
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firms. However, bad news reaction ends more quickly. The reaction is considerably 
more expressive on the good news firms and stock prices continue to react while bad 
news stock prices go back to equilibrium in a shorter time frame.  Since there is 
significant price response to the earnings news, there is possibility of change in 
liquidity due to the announcement. 
4.1.2.2 FTSE250.  
The graph of cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR) from day -90 up to day +90 for 
FTSE250 is presented in figure 4.1.2.2 the good news reaction shows an upward trend 
while bad news reaction shows a downward trend. The prices increase (and decrease) 
after the earnings announcement is permanent in the studied event time frame. After 
the event shock, stock returns continue the original trend without getting back to the 
previous levels. 
Test result for FTSE250 in table 4.1.2.2 indicates that stock returns of the firms 
included in the index are significantly affected by the earnings announcements. There 
is significant change before and after the event date. 
Before Event 
For good news the t-values are mostly significant in pre earnings announcements as 
we can see from table 4.1.2.2 Panel A and Panel B. The t-statistics in the short term 
before the event are strongly significant. T-statistics in the short term are 1.78 for the 
window frame [-1, -1], 2.53 for [-2,-1] and 2.43 for [-3,-1]. As we can see from the 
table the t-statistics in the long term are mostly significant. T-statistics for long term 
are 2.47 for the time frame [-10,-1], 1.85 for [-30,-1] and 1.51 for [-50,-1]. For the bad 
news t-values are totally insignificant in the short term period, as we can see in table 
4.1.21.2 Panel A. T-statistics are -2.23 for the window frame [-2,-1], -3.00 for [-3,-1] 
and -03.05 for [-4,-1]. T-statistics for bad news for long term before the announcement 
are 0.22 for [-20,-1], 0.66 for [-30,-1] and 0.29 for [-50,-1] in panel B. 
After Event 
For good news the t-values are strongly significant as we can see from table 4.1.2.2 
Panel A and Panel B. The t-statistics for good news in the short term are mostly 
significant. T statstics in the short term are 9.28 for the time frame [1, 0], 8.07 for [3, 
0] and is 7.26 for [4, 0]. As we can see from table 4.1.2.2 Panel B, the t-statistics are 
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mostly significant. T-statistics for long term are 5.37 for the time frame [10, 0], 2.91 
for [40, 0] and 1.94 for the time frame [70, 0]. 
For bad news after the event t-values are strongly significant in the short term, as we 
can see in table 4.1.2.1 Panel A. T statistics in the short term are -7.46 for the time 
frame [1, 0], -5.68 for [2, 0] and -2.77 for [5, 0]. The t-statistics in the long term are 
totally insignificant. T statistics for bad news in the the long term are -1.08 for the 
time frame [20, 0], -0.36 for the time frame [40, 0] and -0.44 for the time frame [50, 0] 
in panel B. 
Figure 4.1.2.2 FTSE 250- Aggregate Price reaction after earnings announcement 
 
 
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
C
A
A
R
Day t
Cummulative abnormal return for the good news
-0.03
-0.025
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
C
A
A
R
Day t
Cumulative Abnormal return for the bad news
61 
 
FTSE 250 includes medium sized companies and the stock is less liquid as compared 
to FTSE 100. For this reason it is understood that the reaction is less. Compared to 
FTSE 100, there is lot of evidence that prices react in pre-announcement period for 
FTSE 250. There is no reaction for bad news in the long term.  
Table 4.1.2.2-Aggregate Abnormal Returns around FTSE250 index earnings announcements 
The sample consists of 233 stocks listed on FTSE250 index with data available. Cumulative average 
abnormal returns CAAR are computed using the market model and the standard event study 
methodology. The estimation window for computing the market model parameters is the event time 
interval [-90, 90]. CAAR is tested for significance using t-statistics. 
Panel A. Short-term Abnormal Returns 
GOOD NEWS BAD NEWS 
Event day CAAR t-statistic Event day CAAR t-statistic 
[-5, -1] 0.015 3.34*** [-5, -1] -0.013 -2.90*** 
[-4, -1] 0.013 3.09*** [-4, -1] -0.012 -3.05*** 
[-3, -1] 0.009 2.43*** [-3, -1] -0.011 -3.00*** 
[-2, -1] 0.007 2.53*** [-2, -1] -0.006 -2.23** 
[-1, -1] 0.004 1.78* [-1, -1] -0.003 -1.35 
[0, 0] 0.020 9.77*** [0, 0] -0.015 -7.23*** 
[1, 0] 0.027 9.28*** [1, 0] -0.022 -7.46*** 
[2, 0] 0.028 8.02*** [2, 0] -0.020 -5.68*** 
[3, 0] 0.033 8.07*** [3, 0] -0.015 -3.60*** 
[4, 0] 0.033 7.26*** [4, 0] -0.014 -3.02*** 
[5, 0] 0.035 6.95*** [5, 0] -0.014 -2.77*** 
Panel B. Long-term Abnormal Returns 
GOOD NEWS BAD NEWS 
Event day CAAR t-statistic Event day CAAR t-statistic 
[-89, -1] 0.015 0.78 [-89, -1] -0.006 -0.30 
[-80, -1] 0.012 0.65 [-80, -1] 0.002 0.10 
[-70, -1] 0.012 0.70 [-70, -1] 0.006 0.35 
[-60, -1] 0.016 1.02 [-60, -1] 0.003 0.21 
[-50, -1] 0.022 1.51 [-50, -1] 0.004 0.29 
[-40, -1] 0.023 1.77* [-40, -1] 0.001 0.11 
[-30, -1] 0.021 1.85* [-30, -1] 0.007 0.66 
[-20, -1] 0.020 2.16** [-20, -1] 0.002 0.22 
[-10, -1] 0.016 2.47*** [-10, -1] -0.004 -0.65 
[10, 0] 0.036 5.37*** [10, 0] -0.011 -1.56 
[20, 0] 0.037 3.93*** [20, 0] -0.010 -1.08 
[30, 0] 0.040 3.49*** [30, 0] -0.009 -0.77 
[40, 0] 0.038 2.91*** [40, 0] -0.005 -0.36 
[50, 0] 0.037 2.53*** [50, 0] -0.006 -0.44 
[60, 0] 0.033 2.05** [60, 0] -0.005 -0.34 
[70, 0] 0.033 1.94* [70, 0] -0.005 -0.29 
[80, 0] 0.037 2.02** [80, 0] -0.010 -0.56 
[90, 0] 0.042 2.16** [90, 0] -0.005 -0.28 
 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
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Overall there are positive reactions happening for the good news and negative reaction 
for bad news. The largest abnormal returns happen on day 0 with t statistic equal to 
9.77 for good news firms and on day 1 with t statistic is -7.46 for bad news firms. For 
long term, stock prices continue to change after earnings announcements until the end 
of 90 day for good news firms. There is no reaction for bad news firms in the long 
term as the bad news ends quickly. Possibly there is a liquidity effect caused by 
earnings announcements for the good news company in the long term. 
4.1.2.3 FTSE Small Cap 
Figure 4.1.2.3 shows the price reaction to the earnings announcements for stocks in 
the FTSE Small Cap. Cumulative abnormal returns for good news stocks have an 
upward trend while a downward trend for bad news firms. The graph also shows that 
for this index of less liquid stocks, cumulative abnormal returns drift further than 
compared to the other two above indices. This is consistent with what literature 
documented. 
Test result for the FTSE Small Cap indicates that stock returns of firms included in the 
index are significantly affected by the earnings announcements; there is significant 
change before and after the event date.  
Before Event 
For good news the t-values are totally significant in the short term in pre earnings 
announcements as we can see from table 4.1.2.3 Panel A. T-statistics in the short term 
are 2.91 for the window frame [-4, -1], 2.69 for [-2,-1] and 2.02 for [-1,-1]. For the t-
statistics in the long term there is no significant change in the stock returns. T-
statistics for long term are 0.77 for the window frame [-40,-1], 0.98 for [-30,-1] and 
1.47 for [-20,-1].  
For the bad news t-values are totally significant in the short term period, as we can see 
in table 4.1.2.3 Panel A. T-statistics are -3.33 for the window frame [-5,-1], -2.57 for 
[-3,-1], -2.19 for [-2,-1] and -0.66 for [-1,-1]. The t-statistics in the long term for bad 
news show no significant changes in the stock returns. T-statistics for long term are 
0.75 for the window frame [-80,-1], 1.28 for [-50,-1] and -0.62 for [-10,-1] 
After Event 
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For good news the t-values are strongly significant as we can see from table 4.1.2.3 
Panel A and Panel B. The t-statistics in the short term after the announcement are 
mostly significant. T statstics in the short term are 9.64 for the time frame [1, 0], 8.02 
for [3, 0] and is 7.49 for [4, 0]. The t-statistics after the announcement are strongly 
significant. T-statistics for long term are 5.05 for the time frame [10, 0], 2.99 for [40, 
0] and 1.88 for [70, 0]. 
Figure 4.1.2.3. FTSE Small Cap- Aggregate Price reaction after earnings announcement 
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For bad news t-values are strongly significant in the short term, as we can see in table 
4.1.2.3 Panel A. T statistics in the short term are -5.37 for the time frame [1, 0], -4.23  
Table 4.1.2.3- Aggregate Abnormal Returns around FTSE Small Cap index earnings 
announcements 
The sample consists of 310 stocks listed on FTSE Small Cap index with data available. Cumulative 
average abnormal returns CAAR are computed using the market model and the standard event study 
methodology. The estimation window for computing the market model parameters is the event time 
interval [-90, 90]. CAAR is tested for significance using t-statistics. 
Panel A. Short-term Abnormal Returns 
GOOD NEWS BAD NEWS 
Event day CAAR t-statistic Event day CAAR t-statistic 
[-5, -1] 0.017 3.34*** [-5, -1] -0.014 -3.33*** 
[-4, -1] 0.013 2.91*** [-4, -1] -0.010 -2.78*** 
[-3, -1] 0.010 2.49*** [-3, -1] -0.008 -2.57*** 
[-2, -1] 0.009 2.69*** [-2, -1] -0.006 -2.19** 
[-1, -1] 0.005 2.02** [-1, -1] -0.001 -0.66 
[0, 0] 0.023 10.18*** [0, 0] -0.009 -4.79*** 
[1, 0] 0.031 9.64*** [1, 0] -0.014 -5.37*** 
[2, 0] 0.034 8.84*** [2, 0] -0.014 -4.23*** 
[3, 0] 0.036 8.02*** [3, 0] -0.012 -3.34*** 
[4, 0] 0.037 7.49*** [4, 0] -0.014 -3.34*** 
[5, 0] 0.037 6.68*** [5, 0] -0.011 -2.49*** 
 
Panel B. Long-term Abnormal Returns 
GOOD NEWS BAD NEWS 
Event day CAAR t-statistic Event day CAAR t-statistic 
[-90, -1] -0.004 -0.17 [-90, -1] 0.013 0.72 
[-80, -1] 0.000 0.01 [-80, -1] 0.012 0.75 
[-70, -1] 0.005 0.27 [-70, -1] 0.018 1.18 
[-60, -1] 0.012 0.67 [-60, -1] 0.017 1.19 
[-50, -1] 0.008 0.51 [-50, -1] 0.017 1.28 
[-40, -1] 0.011 0.77 [-40, -1] 0.007 0.61 
[-30, -1] 0.012 0.98 [-30, -1] 0.010 0.97 
[-20, -1] 0.015 1.47 [-20, -1] 0.009 1.06 
[-10, -1] 0.016 2.21** [-10, -1] -0.004 -0.62 
[10, 0] 0.037 5.05*** [10, 0] -0.008 -1.36 
[20, 0] 0.035 3.44*** [20, 0] -0.008 -0.98 
[30, 0] 0.039 3.16*** [30, 0] -0.010 -0.97 
[40, 0] 0.043 2.99*** [40, 0] -0.016 -1.38 
[50, 0] 0.044 2.77*** [50, 0] -0.015 -1.14 
[60, 0] 0.039 2.25** [60, 0] -0.025 -1.77* 
[70, 0] 0.035 1.88* [70, 0] -0.028 -1.81* 
[80, 0] 0.041 2.03** [80, 0] -0.036 -2.16** 
[90, 0] 0.046 2.13** [90, 0] -0.042 -2.40** 
 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
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for [2, 0] and -2.49 for [5, 0]. The t-statistics for bad news in the long term show no 
significant changes except in the end of the study period. T statistics for the long term 
are -0.98 for [20, 0], -1.38 for [40, 0] and -1.81 for [70, 0]. 
Similar to FTSE 250, for FTSE Small Cap there is reaction in the pre-announcement 
period for both good and bad news in the short term. There is no significant change in 
the long term for bad news. The reactions are significant for both the news in the short 
term. In the long term pre and post event there is no reaction for the bad news. 
Overall there are positive reactions happening for the good news and negative reaction 
for bad news. The largest average abnormal return is on the event day 0 for good news 
firms and on day 1 for bad news firms with t statistic is 10.18 and -5.37 in the short 
term respectively.  For long term, stock prices continue to drift after earnings 
announcements up to 90 days post announcement for good news firms; however there 
is no significanct evidence of price reaction for the bad news firms after 5 days. There 
is possibility of change in liquidity due to the announcement, especially with good 
news firms. 
4.1.2.4. FTSE AIM All Shares 
In the Figure 4.1.2.4, cumulative abnormal returns for good news firms show an 
upward trend and a downward trend for bad news firms. However bad news firm‟s 
reaction does not last for a longer time. 
Test results for the FTSE AIM All Shares in table 4.1.2.4 indicate that there is 
evidence of market price changes around earnings announcements 
Before Event 
For good news the t-values are totally significant in the short term in pre earnings 
announcements as we can see from table 4.1.2.4 Panel A. T-statistics in the short term 
are 4.05 for the window frame [-4, -1], 3.08 for [-2,-1] and 2.68 for [-1,-1]. The t-
statistics in the long term before the event are mostly significant as we can see from 
the Panel B.  T-statistics for long term before the event are 1.54 for the window frame 
[-40,-1], 1.89 for [-30,-1] and 2.03 for [-20,-1].  
For the bad news t-values are mostly significant in the short term period, as we can see 
in table 4.1.2.4 Panel A. T-statistics are -3.64 for the window frame [-5,-1], -2.65 for 
[-3,-1] and -1.71 for [-2,-1]. The t-statistics in the long term for bad news show no 
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significant changes in the stock return. T-statistics for long term are 0.54 for the 
window frame [-80,-1], 0.36 for [-50,-1] and -1.18 for [-10,-1] in panel B. 
After Event 
For good news the t-values are strongly significant as we can see from table 4.1.2.3 
Panel A and Panel B. The t-statistics in the short term after the announcement are  
Figure 4.1.2.4. FTSEAIM All Shares- Aggregate Price reaction after earnings announcement 
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Table 4.1.2.4- Aggregate Abnormal Returns around FTSEAIM All Shares index earnings 
announcements 
The sample consists of 913 stocks listed on FTSE AIM All Shares index with data available. 
Cumulative average abnormal returns CAAR are computed using the market model and the standard 
event study methodology. The estimation window for computing the market model parameters is the 
event time interval [-90, 90]. CAAR is tested for significance using t-statistics. 
Panel A. Short-term Abnormal Returns 
GOOD NEWS BAD NEWS 
Event day CAAR t-statistic Event day CAAR t-statistic 
[-5, -1] 0.034 4.48*** [-5, -1] -0.031 -3.64*** 
[-4, -1] 0.028 4.05*** [-4, -1] -0.026 -3.42*** 
[-3, -1] 0.021 3.54*** [-3, -1] -0.018 -2.65*** 
[-2, -1] 0.015 3.08*** [-2, -1] -0.009 -1.71* 
[-1, -1] 0.009 2.68*** [-1, -1] -0.005 -1.29 
[0, 0] 0.034 10.08*** [0, 0] -0.031 -8.18*** 
[1, 0] 0.053 10.93*** [1, 0] -0.044 -8.11*** 
[2, 0] 0.057 9.67*** [2, 0] -0.047 -7.05*** 
[3, 0] 0.059 8.60*** [3, 0] -0.047 -6.17*** 
[4, 0] 0.061 7.97*** [4, 0] -0.046 -5.35*** 
[5, 0] 0.059 7.08*** [5, 0] -0.046 -4.94*** 
 
Panel B. Long-term Abnormal Returns 
GOOD NEWS BAD NEWS 
Event day CAAR t-statistic Event day CAAR t-statistic 
[-90, -1] 0.039 1.19 [-90, -1] 0.031 0.85 
[-80, -1] 0.044 1.43 [-80, -1] 0.018 0.54 
[-70, -1] 0.041 1.44 [-70, -1] 0.017 0.53 
[-60, -1] 0.045 1.69* [-60, -1] 0.022 0.75 
[-50, -1] 0.044 1.83* [-50, -1] 0.010 0.36 
[-40, -1] 0.033 1.54 [-40, -1] 0.012 0.51 
[-30, -1] 0.035 1.89* [-30, -1] 0.013 0.61 
[-20, -1] 0.031 2.03** [-20, -1] 0.016 0.95 
[-10, -1] 0.033 3.03*** [-10, -1] -0.014 -1.18 
[10, 0] 0.062 5.45*** [10, 0] -0.044 -3.47*** 
[20, 0] 0.069 4.42*** [20, 0] -0.038 -2.16*** 
[30, 0] 0.067 3.53*** [30, 0] -0.035 -1.63 
[40, 0] 0.070 3.21*** [40, 0] -0.028 -1.14 
[50, 0] 0.073 3.00*** [50, 0] -0.014 -0.51 
[60, 0] 0.080 2.99*** [60, 0] -0.010 -0.34 
[70, 0] 0.081 2.80*** [70, 0] -0.015 -0.48 
[80, 0] 0.078 2.53*** [80, 0] -0.018 -0.52 
[90, 0] 0.084 2.58*** [90, 0] -0.008 -0.22 
 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
mostly significant. T statstics in the short term are 10.93 for the time frame [1, 0], 8.60 
for [3, 0] and is 7.97 for [4, 0]. The t-statistics after the announcement in the long term 
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are strongly significant. T-statistics for long term are 5.45 for the time frame [10, 0], 
3.21 for [40, 0] and 2.80 for [70, 0]. 
 For bad news t-values are strongly significant in the short term, as we can see in table 
4.1.2.4 Panel A. T statistics in the short term are -8.11 for the time frame [1, 0], -7.05 
for [2, 0] and -4.94 for [5, 0]. The t-statistics for bad news in the long term show 
significant changes upto twenty days after the event day. T statistics for the long term 
are -2.16 for the window frame [20, 0], -1.14 for [40, 0] and -0.48 for [70, 0]. 
After the shock of the news, cumulative abnormal returns continue the original trend, 
at the new level. Compared to other indices, for FTSE Small Cap there is reaction for 
the news in both pre and post announcement periods. 
Overall there are positive reactions happening for the good news and negative reaction 
for bad news.   The largest abnormal returns happen on day 1 and day 0 with t 
statistics equal to 10.93 and -8.18 for good news and bad news firms respectively. 
Earnings announcements does change the stock returns significantly in the long term 
for good news and this effect lasts until day 90. However, for bad news firms, the 
effects end after much shorter time frame. 
4.1.2.5 DJIA 
Figure 4.1.2.5 shows the cumulative abnormal return reaction for DJIA. Though there 
is some volatility, the good news firm has an upward trend and bad news firm has a 
downward trend.  
Test results for the DJIA in Table 4.1.2.5 indicates that stock returns of firms included 
in the DJIA are strongly affected by the earnings announcements.  
Before Event 
For good news the t-values are totally insignificant in the short term in pre earnings 
announcements as we can see from table 4.1.2.5 Panel A. T-statistics in the short term 
are 0.84 for the window frame [-4, -1], 0.41 for [-2,-1] and 0.02 for [-1,-1]. The t-
statistics in the long term before the event are totally insignificant as we can see from 
the Panel B.  T-statistics for long term before the event are -0.45 for the window frame 
[-80,-1], -0.19 for [-30,-1] and -0.25 for [-20,-1].  
For the bad news t-values are mostly insignificant in the short term period, as we can 
see in table 4.1.2.5 Panel A. T-statistics are 0.31 for the window frame [-5,-1], 0.25 for 
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[-3,-1] and -0.14 for [-2,-1]. In panel B, the t-statistics in the long term for bad news 
show no significant changes in the stock return. T-statistics for long term are 0.36 for 
the window frame [-80,-1], 0.60 for [-50,-1] and 0.27 for [-10,-1]. 
Figure 4.1.2.5.  DJIA- Aggregate Price reaction after earnings announcement 
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mostly significant. T-statistics for long term are 2.33 for the time frame [10, 0], 2.11 
for [40, 0] and 0.66 for [70, 0]. 
Table 4.1.2.5- Aggregate Abnormal Returns around DJIA index earnings announcements 
The sample consists of 40 stocks listed on DJIA index. Cumulative average abnormal returns CAAR 
are computed using the market model and the standard event study methodology. The estimation 
window for computing the market model parameters is the event time interval [-90, 90]. CAAR is 
tested for significance using t-statistics. 
Panel A. Short-term Abnormal Returns 
GOOD NEWS BAD NEWS 
Event day CAAR t-statistic Event day CAAR t-statistic 
[-5, -1] 0.006 1.03 [-5, -1] 0.002 0.31 
[-4, -1] 0.004 0.84 [-4, -1] 0.002 0.39 
[-3, -1] 0.005 1.11 [-3, -1] 0.001 0.25 
[-2, -1] 0.002 0.41 [-2, -1] -0.001 -0.14 
[-1, -1] 0.000 0.02 [-1, -1] -0.002 -0.62 
[0, 0] 0.011 4.19*** [0, 0] -0.011 -3.89*** 
[1, 0] 0.022 5.75*** [1, 0] -0.026 -6.29*** 
[2, 0] 0.021 4.47*** [2, 0] -0.024 -4.69*** 
[3, 0] 0.021 3.92*** [3, 0] -0.024 -4.06*** 
[4, 0] 0.022 3.68*** [4, 0] -0.024 -3.66*** 
[5, 0] 0.022 3.35*** [5, 0] -0.023 -3.22*** 
Panel B. Long-term Abnormal Returns 
GOOD NEWS BAD NEWS 
Event day CAAR t-statistic Event day CAAR t-statistic 
[-90, -1] -0.014 -0.54 [-90, -1] 0.014 0.49 
[-80, -1] -0.011 -0.45 [-80, -1] 0.009 0.36 
[-70, -1] -0.013 -0.58 [-70, -1] 0.010 0.42 
[-60, -1] -0.004 -0.18 [-60, -1] 0.013 0.58 
[-50, -1] 0.010 0.53 [-50, -1] 0.012 0.60 
[-40, -1] 0.002 0.09 [-40, -1] 0.006 0.32 
[-30, -1] -0.003 -0.19 [-30, -1] 0.016 0.98 
[-20, -1] -0.003 -0.25 [-20, -1] -0.003 -0.22 
[-10, -1] 0.008 1.01 [-10, -1] 0.002 0.27 
[10, 0] 0.020 2.33*** [10, 0] -0.015 -1.55 
[20, 0] 0.024 2.02** [20, 0] -0.014 -1.07 
[30, 0] 0.027 1.86* [30, 0] -0.020 -1.20 
[40, 0] 0.036 2.11** [40, 0] -0.023 -1.24 
[50, 0] 0.035 1.86* [50, 0] -0.023 -1.11 
[60, 0] 0.028 1.35 [60, 0] -0.009 -0.40 
[70, 0] 0.015 0.66 [70, 0] 0.006 0.26 
[80, 0] 0.022 0.91 [80, 0] 0.019 0.72 
[90, 0] 0.031 1.21 [90, 0] 0.005 0.19 
 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
For bad news t-values are strongly significant in the short term, as we can see in table 
4.1.2.5 Panel A. T statistics in the short term are -6.29 for the time frame [1, 0], -4.69 
for [2, 0] and -3.22 for [5, 0]. The t-statistics for bad news after the announcement 
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period show no reaction at all .T statistics for the long term are -1.07 for the window 
frame [20, 0], -1.24 for [40, 0] and 0.26 for [70, 0]. 
Overall, similarly as other previous indices, stock prices drift significantly after 
earnings announcement, as t value reject null hypothesis. Largest abnormal return 
happened on day 1 for both news with t statistic is 5.75 for good news firms and is – 
6.29 for bad news firms. There is evidence of change in liquidity in the short term for 
both types of news; however, the evidence of abnormal returns happens only for good 
news up to 50 days post earnings announcement. In addition, as expected, many firms 
in the US have earnings announcement at the end of the day after market close, and 
that is the reason why it has been observed that the reaction is most significantly on 
the day 1 instead of day 0 as in the UK. 
4.1.2.6 NASDAQ100 
Figure 4.1.2.6 shows the cumulative abnormal returns for the firms in the 
NASDAQ100. Good news stocks reaction has an upward trend while bad news stock 
reaction has a downward trend. 
Test results in table 4.1.2.6 indicate that average abnormal return significantly 
changed after the earnings announcement event in the short term event windows.  
Before Event 
For good news the t-values are totally insignificant in the short term in pre earnings 
announcements as we can see from table 4.1.2.6 Panel A. T-statistics in the short term 
are 1.36 for the window frame [-4, -1], 0.88 for [-2,-1] and 1.08 for [-1,-1]. For the t-
statistics in the long term before the event there is no significant change in stock 
return. T-statistics for long term are 1.42 for the window frame [-70,-1], 0.55 for [-40,-
1] and 1.73 for [-10,-1].  
For the bad news t-values are totally insignificant in the short term period, as we can 
see in table 4.1.2.6 Panel A. T-statistics are -0.66 for the window frame [-5,-1], -0.29 
for [-3,-1] and -0.46 for [-1,-1]. The t-statistics in the long term for bad news show no 
significant changes in the stock return. T-statistics for long term are 0.40 for the 
window frame [-80,-1], 0.32 for [-50,-1] and -0.32 for [-10,-1] 
After Event 
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For good news the t-statistics in the short term after the announcement are mostly 
significant. T statstics in the short term are 9.19 for the time frame [1, 0], 6.27 for [3, 
0] and is 5.63 for [4, 0]. The t-statistics after the announcement in the long term show 
no significant changes except for upto 20 days after the event. T-statistics for long 
term are 3.47 for the time frame [10, 0], 0.96 for [40, 0] and 1.17 for [70, 0]. 
Figure 4.1.2.6.  NASDAQ100- Aggregate Price reaction after earnings announcement 
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For bad news t-values are strongly significant in the short term, as we can see in table 
4.1.2.6 Panel A. T statistics in the short term are -8.97 for the time frame [1, 0], -7.71 
for [2, 0] and -5.80 for [5, 0]. The t-statistics for bad news in the long term show 
significant changes. T statistics for the long term are -3.47 for [20, 0], -2.64 for [40, 0] 
and -1.99 for [70, 0]. 
Table 4.1.2.6. - Aggregate Abnormal Returns around NASDAQ100 index earnings 
announcements 
The sample consists of 96 stocks listed on NASDAQ100 index with data available. Cumulative average 
abnormal returns CAAR are computed using the market model and the standard event study 
methodology. The estimation window for computing the market model parameters is the event time 
interval [-90, 90]. CAAR is tested for significance using t-statistics. 
Panel A. Short-term Abnormal Returns 
GOOD NEWS BAD NEWS 
Event day CAAR t-statistic Event day CAAR t-statistic 
[-5, -1] 0.012 1.57 [-5, -1] -0.006 -0.66 
[-4, -1] 0.009 1.36 [-4, -1] -0.006 -0.72 
[-3, -1] 0.004 0.78 [-3, -1] -0.002 -0.29 
[-2, -1] 0.004 0.88 [-2, -1] -0.005 -0.93 
[-1, -1] 0.004 1.08 [-1, -1] -0.002 -0.46 
[0, 0] 0.012 3.69*** [0, 0] -0.014 -3.65*** 
[1, 0] 0.043 9.19*** [1, 0] -0.050 -8.97*** 
[2, 0] 0.039 6.71*** [2, 0] -0.053 -7.71*** 
[3, 0] 0.042 6.27*** [3, 0] -0.055 -6.98*** 
[4, 0] 0.042 5.63*** [4, 0] -0.054 -6.13*** 
[5, 0] 0.043 5.22*** [5, 0] -0.056 -5.80*** 
Panel B. Long-term Abnormal Returns 
GOOD NEWS BAD NEWS 
Event day CAAR t-statistic Event day CAAR t-statistic 
[-90, -1] 0.041 1.28 [-90, -1] 0.019 0.50 
[-80, -1] 0.034 1.13 [-80, -1] 0.014 0.40 
[-70, -1] 0.039 1.42 [-70, -1] 0.022 0.65 
[-60, -1] 0.023 0.89 [-60, -1] 0.006 0.18 
[-50, -1] 0.023 0.97 [-50, -1] 0.009 0.32 
[-40, -1] 0.012 0.55 [-40, -1] 0.004 0.18 
[-30, -1] 0.011 0.58 [-30, -1] 0.001 0.06 
[-20, -1] 0.017 1.11 [-20, -1] 0.002 0.09 
[-10, -1] 0.018 1.73 [-10, -1] -0.004 -0.32 
[10, 0] 0.038 3.47*** [10, 0] -0.058 -4.44*** 
[20, 0] 0.033 2.16** [20, 0] -0.063 -3.47*** 
[30, 0] 0.030 1.60 [30, 0] -0.051 -2.31** 
[40, 0] 0.020 0.96 [40, 0] -0.067 -2.64*** 
[50, 0] 0.028 1.19 [50, 0] -0.071 -2.50*** 
[60, 0] 0.040 1.55 [60, 0] -0.058 -1.87* 
[70, 0] 0.033 1.17 [70, 0] -0.066 -1.99** 
[80, 0] 0.035 1.17 [80, 0] -0.062 -1.76* 
[90, 0] 0.043 1.35 [90, 0] -0.050 -1.32 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
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Overall, the largest abnormal return happens on day 1 with t statistic being 9.19 for 
good news firms and -8.97 for bad news firms. Similarly as explained above in the 
DJIA index, most of the US firms hold earnings announcement presentation at the end 
of the day after market close, therefore we expect the largest effects on day 1 unlikely  
firms in the UK, the strongest effect happens on the same day with earnings 
announcements. In the long term, there is also evidence of price response to earnings 
announcements. However, these are high tech firms so that there could be less weight 
for the good news on the earnings announcements, and more weight on the bad news 
as we can see from the significance of t value in both groups. 
4.1.2.7 S&P100 
The figure 4.1.2.7 shows that good news stock in the S&P100 has an upward reaction 
meanwhile bad news stocks have a downward reaction. 
The results in table 4.1.2.7 for the S&P 100 index indicates significant change of 
average abnormal returns due to earnings announcements.  
Before Event 
There is little evidence that for good news prices react before the event in the short 
term. T-statistics in the short term showing reactions are 2.76 for the window frame [-
5, -1] and 2.07 for [-4,-1]. The t-statistics showing no significant reaction three days 
before the event are 1.55 for the time frame [-3,-1], 0.55 for [-2,-1] and 0.48 for [-1,-
1]. The t-statistics in the long term before the event show no significant reaction 
except for ten days prior to the event day. T-statistics for long term are 0.53 for the 
window frame [-70,-1], 0.43 for [-40,-1] and 2.43 for [-10,-1].  
For the bad news t-values are totally insignificant in the short term period, as we can 
see in table 4.1.2.7 Panel A and Panel B. T-statistics is -0.33 for the window frame [-
5,-1], -0.63 for [-3,-1] and -0.58 for [-1,-1]. The t-statistics in the long term for bad 
news show no significant changes in the stock returns. T-statistics for long term are 
0.54 for the window frame [-80,-1], 0.17 for [-50,-1] and -0.20 for [-10,-1]. 
After Event 
For good news the t-statistics in the short term after the announcement are mostly 
significant for both short and long term. T statstics in the short term are 8.31 for the 
time frame [1, 0], 6.69 for [3, 0] and is 6.49 for [4, 0]. The t-statistics after the 
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announcement in the long term are strongly significant. T-statistics for long term are 
5.09 for the time frame [10, 0], 3.32 for [40, 0] and 3.14 for [70, 0]. 
For bad news t-values are strongly significant in the short term, as we can see in table 
4.1.2.7 Panel A. T statistics in the short term are -7.76 for the time frame [1, 0], -5.74 
for [2, 0] and -3.84 for [5, 0]. The t-statistics for bad news in the long term show no 
significant changes. T statistics for the long term are -1.50 for [20, 0], -0.98 for [40, 0] 
and -0.55 for [70, 0]. 
Figure 4.1.2.7.  S&P100- Aggregate Price reaction after earnings announcement 
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Overall, the largest abnormal returns happen on day 1 with t statistic for good news 
firm is 8.31 and for bad news firms is-7.76. There is significant positive abnormal 
return that persists over the long term for good news firms but for bad news firms this 
ends very quickly. 
Table 4.1.2.7- Aggregate Abnormal Returns around S&P100 index earnings announcements 
The sample consists of 100 stocks listed on S&P100 index. Cumulative average abnormal returns 
CAAR are computed using the market model and the standard event study methodology. The 
estimation window for computing the market model parameters is the event time interval [-90, 90]. 
CAAR is tested for significance using t-statistics. 
Panel A. Short-term Abnormal Returns 
GOOD NEWS BAD NEWS 
Event day CAAR t-statistic Event day CAAR t-statistic 
[-5, -1] 0.012 2.76*** [-5, -1] -0.001 -0.33 
[-4, -1] 0.008 2.07** [-4, -1] -0.001 -0.35 
[-3, -1] 0.005 1.55 [-3, -1] -0.002 -0.63 
[-2, -1] 0.002 0.55 [-2, -1] -0.002 -0.89 
[-1, -1] 0.001 0.48 [-1, -1] -0.001 -0.58 
[0, 0] 0.012 5.83*** [0, 0] -0.011 -5.54*** 
[1, 0] 0.023 8.31*** [1, 0] -0.021 -7.76*** 
[2, 0] 0.026 7.62*** [2, 0] -0.019 -5.74*** 
[3, 0] 0.028 6.96*** [3, 0] -0.022 -5.77*** 
[4, 0] 0.029 6.49*** [4, 0] -0.019 -4.38*** 
[5, 0] 0.030 6.22*** [5, 0] -0.018 -3.84*** 
 
Panel B. Long-term Abnormal Returns 
GOOD NEWS BAD NEWS 
Event day CAAR t-statistic Event day CAAR t-statistic 
[-90, -1] 0.018 0.94 [-90, -1] 0.016 0.86 
[-80, -1] 0.018 1.02 [-80, -1] 0.009 0.54 
[-70, -1] 0.009 0.53 [-70, -1] 0.005 0.34 
[-60, -1] 0.006 0.42 [-60, -1] 0.004 0.27 
[-50, -1] 0.014 0.96 [-50, -1] 0.002 0.17 
[-40, -1] 0.005 0.43 [-40, -1] 0.002 0.13 
[-30, -1] 0.008 0.70 [-30, -1] 0.009 0.89 
[-20, -1] 0.007 0.80 [-20, -1] 0.005 0.54 
[-10, -1] 0.015 2.43*** [-10, -1] -0.001 -0.20 
[10, 0] 0.033 5.09*** [10, 0] -0.016 -2.46*** 
[20, 0] 0.039 4.30*** [20, 0] -0.013 -1.50 
[30, 0] 0.045 4.05*** [30, 0] -0.012 -1.13 
[40, 0] 0.049 3.84*** [40, 0] -0.012 -0.98 
[50, 0] 0.047 3.32*** [50, 0] -0.011 -0.83 
[60, 0] 0.049 3.15*** [60, 0] -0.012 -0.81 
[70, 0] 0.052 3.14*** [70, 0] -0.009 -0.55 
[80, 0] 0.062 3.47*** [80, 0] -0.007 -0.41 
[90, 0] 0.062 3.25*** [90, 0] -0.007 -0.36 
 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
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4.1.2.8 CAC40 
Figure 4.1.2.8 shows the cumulative abnormal returns for firms in CAC40 index. 
Cumulative abnormal returns for good news firms have an upward trend while for bad 
news firms have a downward trend. 
Figure 4.1.2.8.  CAC40- Aggregate Price reaction after earnings announcement 
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Table 4.1.2.8 indicates that stock returns of firms included in CAC40 are affected by 
the earnings announcements. 
Before Event 
For good news there are significant changes in the short term and long term period. T-
statistics in the short term are 3.65 for the time frame [-5,-1], 1.96 for [-2,-1] and 1.86 
for [-1,-1]. The t-statistics in the long term before the event are mostly significant. T-
statistics for long term are 2.19 for the window frame [-70,-1], 1.90 for [-40,-1] and 
2.16 for [-10,-1].  
For the bad news t-values are totally insignificant in the short term and long term 
period, as we can see in table 4.1.2.7 Panel A and Panel B. T-statistics is -1.57 for the 
window frame [-5,-1], -0.31 for [-3,-1] and -0.68 for [-1,-1]. The t-statistics in the long 
term for bad news show no significant changes in the stock returns. T-statistics for 
long term are 0.68 for the window frame [-80,-1], -0.01 for [-50,-1] and -0.70 for [-
10,-1]. 
After Event 
For good news the t-statistics in the short term after the announcement are totally 
significant. T statstics in the short term are 4.70 for the time frame [1, 0], 4.14 for [3, 
0] and is 3.50 for [4, 0]. The t-statistics after the announcement in the long term show 
significant changes upto thirty days after the event day and later no significant 
changes. T-statistics for long term showing significant changes are 3.00 for the time 
frame [10, 0], 3.32 for [20, 0] and 2.55 for [30, 0]. The t-statistics showing no 
significant change are 1.52 for the time frame [40, 0], 0.69 for [60, 0] and 1.12 for [80, 
0]. 
For bad news t-values are strongly significant in the short term, as we can see in table 
4.1.2.8 Panel A. T statistics in the short term are -6.03 for the time frame [1, 0], -4.30 
for [2, 0] and -4.09 for [5, 0]. The t-statistics for bad news in the long term show 
significant changes upto forty days and then after that no significant changes till the 
study period. T statistics for the long term are -2.20 for the time frame [20, 0], -2.26 
fot [30, 0], -2.04 for [40, 0], -0.69 for [60, 0] and -0.41 for [70, 0]. 
Overall, in the short term, the largest abnormal returns happen on day 1 for both news 
with t statistics is 4.70 for good news firms and is -6.03 for bad news firms. In the 
long term, there is evidence of pre-announcement abnormal return for the good news  
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Table 4.1.2.8- Aggregate Abnormal Returns around CAC40 index earnings announcements 
The sample consists of 40 stocks listed on CAC40 index. Cumulative average abnormal returns CAAR 
are computed using the market model and the standard event study methodology. The estimation 
window for computing the market model parameters is the event time interval [-90, 90]. CAAR is 
tested for significance using t-statistics. 
 
Panel A. Short-term Abnormal Returns 
GOOD NEWS BAD NEWS 
Event day CAAR t-statistic Event day CAAR t-statistic 
[-5, -1] 0.020 3.65*** [-5, -1] -0.011 -1.57 
[-4, -1] 0.018 3.74*** [-4, -1] -0.008 -1.29 
[-3, -1] 0.013 3.09*** [-3, -1] -0.002 -0.31 
[-2, -1] 0.007 1.96** [-2, -1] 0.001 0.19 
[-1, -1] 0.005 1.86* [-1, -1] -0.002 -0.68 
[0, 0] 0.007 2.75*** [0, 0] -0.016 -5.10*** 
[1, 0] 0.016 4.70*** [1, 0] -0.027 -6.03*** 
[2, 0] 0.018 4.15*** [2, 0] -0.024 -4.30*** 
[3, 0] 0.020 4.14*** [3, 0] -0.029 -4.52*** 
[4, 0] 0.019 3.50*** [4, 0] -0.028 -3.91*** 
[5, 0] 0.021 3.52*** [5, 0] -0.032 -4.09*** 
 
Panel B. Long-term Abnormal Returns 
GOOD NEWS BAD NEWS 
Event day CAAR t-statistic Event day CAAR t-statistic 
[-90, -1] 0.055 2.39*** [-90, -1] 0.024 0.78 
[-80, -1] 0.054 2.46*** [-80, -1] 0.019 0.68 
[-70, -1] 0.045 2.19** [-70, -1] 0.011 0.41 
[-60, -1] 0.035 1.85* [-60, -1] 0.005 0.21 
[-50, -1] 0.032 1.86* [-50, -1] 0.000 -0.01 
[-40, -1] 0.029 1.90* [-40, -1] 0.012 0.60 
[-30, -1] 0.036 2.73*** [-30, -1] 0.007 0.43 
[-20, -1] 0.020 1.80* [-20, -1] 0.004 0.29 
[-10, -1] 0.017 2.16*** [-10, -1] -0.007 -0.70 
[10, 0] 0.024 3.00*** [10, 0] -0.036 -3.44*** 
[20, 0] 0.037 3.32*** [20, 0] -0.032 -2.20** 
[30, 0] 0.035 2.55*** [30, 0] -0.040 -2.26** 
[40, 0] 0.024 1.52 [40, 0] -0.042 -2.04** 
[50, 0] 0.016 0.89 [50, 0] -0.021 -0.93 
[60, 0] 0.013 0.69 [60, 0] -0.017 -0.69 
[70, 0] 0.009 0.43 [70, 0] -0.011 -0.41 
[80, 0] 0.025 1.12 [80, 0] -0.011 -0.37 
[90, 0] 0.033 1.43 [90, 0] -0.017 -0.57 
 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
and post earnings announcements abnormal return after 1-2 months for both types of 
news. This is a code law country, in which earnings announcements play less of a role 
as information is conveyed to the market since earlier. However when collecting data, 
I chose the earnings announcement day as the day that the news is first released 
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instead of the day that formal presentations are made. As expected, results are the 
same as above indices in the US and the UK except the fact that stock react even 
before the first piece of news were available through public channel. 
4.1.3. Summary 
In summary, the results from this part of my analysis show that, in a code law country 
such as France, the pre-earnings announcement reaction is very clear. This happened 
as we expected it to, from when the earnings news is conveyed to the markets since 
before the earnings announcement date. In the common law countries such as US and 
UK, we do see some evidence of pre-earnings announcement reaction however this 
happens very close to the announcement date, as shown in figures from 4.1.1.1- 
4.1.1.8. 
Beside that, in most cases the strongest reaction happened on the event day (0), the 
exceptions being some cases in the US with the strongest reaction happened on day 
(1). Note that in the US there are number of companies who released earnings news in 
the morning before market open and a number of companies who released earnings 
news in the afternoon after the market close. The noises in the results between day 0 
and day 1 are due to this fact. 
The strength level of reaction is still very strong in the short-term window periods, but 
reduced over time. In the long-term, we could see that good news reaction last longer 
and bad news end quicker for most indices except the NASDAQ 100.  For example in 
the London Stock Exchange, good news reactions in cases of  FTSE 100, FTSE 250, 
FTSE Small cap and FTSE AIM All Shares, are  up to the whole studied period of 90 
days post announcement; in the US, good news reactions for the DJIA are up to 50 
days, for the S&P100 up to the whole studied period of 90 days;  .As for bad news, in 
the London Stock Exchange, FTSE 100 reacts up to 10 days, FTSE 250, FTSE small 
cap react within 5 days after earnings announcement, FTSE AIM All Shares react 
after 20 days; in the US, the DJIA react within 5 days, S&P bad news react up to 10 
days. The two cases that are different are NASDAQ 100 and CAC 40. NASDAQ100 
has good news reaction lasting up to 20 days while bad news reaction lasting up to 80 
days. In France, the CAC 40 good news reacted up to 30 days and bad news react 
within 40 days. 
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In addition, the increases/decreases in price are permanent. After the change has taken 
place, prices do not go back up or down from the original level as shown graphically 
and statistically. 
Finally, there is more to discuss and with good prospects, a bright future for the good 
news, that allows the price to continue to drift up in the long time. Meanwhile on the 
psychological side, there is not much room for the investors to act with the bad news, 
hence their reactions end quickly, see Debont and Thatler (1990) among others. The 
case of the NASDAQ looks a bit different. The fact that NASDAQ contains 100 high 
tech firms could be an answer, more weight for the bad news than for the good news, 
thus it leads to longer reaction. The case of the CAC 40 in France did say the nature in 
its time to release the news; however, surprisingly, stocks still react strongly and most 
vigorously on the earnings announcement day than on any prior day. 
The situation in the French relates to the fact that France is a code law accounting 
system, where earnings news are released to the markets through different channel 
before the official earnings announcement. The uncertainty therefore has been 
digested in a longer time and since pre-earnings announcemet period. As mentioned in 
chapter III in data selection process, the event day for French market is defined not by 
the date of the official earnings announcement but the day of the first unofficial 
release of even partial news regarding the earnings of a firm. The possibility of 
partitially implies that the different reaction of the French market to the arrival of 
earnings news compared to the US and the UK markets may be a statistical artefact 
caused by the definition of event date. In the other words it might be possible that if 
the French market received full information on the event day it might well react in the 
same way as the UK and the US market. This implies not only for the cumulative 
abnormal returns behaviour in this chapter but also in the other parts. 
4.2. Trading Volume response to earnings announcements 
4.2.1. Empirical specification 
Following the methodologies used in Hedge and McDermott (2003) and Gregoriou et 
al (2006), we test the possibility of liquidity effects by analysing the impact of 
earnings announcements on the trading volume. The dummy variable panel fixed 
effects regression model which has following characteristics is employed to test for 
the presence of abnormal trading volume in the short term event window period. 
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   for i =1, n (n is number of firms included) and t = -90, 5 t is 
time trend corresponding to the period from ninety days pre event and  5 days after the 
event. 
Where, 
 LnVolumeit is the natural logarithm of trading volume for stock i at day t. 
 αi captures the variation in trade volume across all the companies in our 
indices. 
 t is the time trend that captures the changes in trading volume per day that 
 common across all companies 
 Dj  are dummy variables for each trading day in the event window [-5, +5]. 
 The coefficients of the eleven dummy variables βj capture the abnormal 
 trading volume over the event window, [-5, +5]. 
 εi is a random disturbance term with a mean of zero and a variance of σ
2
,  
 αi, γt, and βj are parameters to be estimated.  
I estimated the above model by fixed effects panel estimator using White 
heteroskedastic consistent covariance matrix. The logarithm of trading volume is 
taken in order to exclude skewness and kurtosis. The time trend is included in this 
model as literature  documented that Volume have time trend in two papers from 
Hedge and Hedge  and McDermott (2003) working on 74 additions and 27 deletions 
firms in New York Stock Exchange S&P 500, and Gregoriou (2008) working on 50 
firms join the online trading system in London Stock Exchange FTSE AIM. 
Results are presented in Panel A in 8 tables from table 4.2.2.1 to table 4.2.2.8. After 
control for linear time drifts by γt, we observe that there is a dramatic increase in 
trading volume around the earnings announcements for all indices. Looking at the 
coefficients for 11 dummies; we could see that the abnormal volume reaches its peak 
on the event day 0 or on day 1 across 8 indices. For a comparison, I add a dummy for 
day -10 in an alternative test with this model, the result has  found that coefficient on 
the peak day is many times large as much as compared to the change on the day -10. 
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In addition intercept αi is significant which also shows there is change in trading 
volume across firms. The regressions do not pass the normality test so that we cannot 
exclude the possibility of outliers caused in the data, however, when we use wild 
bootstrapping, the problem is solved (see Arghyrou and Gregoriou (2007) for more 
details)
29
. 
To analyse trading volume effects in the long term, I calculated the ratio between the 
pre and post event‟s daily trading volume per market value. I define the pre-earnings 
announcements period as the window [-90,-1], and the post earnings announcements 
period as the window [0, +90]. The standard t-statistic is used to compare sample 
means values.  The results are also reported in Panel B in table 4.2.2.1 to table 4.2.2.8. 
The high t statistics suggest that in the long term trading volume still increases 
significantly for FTSE100, FTSE250, DJIA, NASDAQ100, S&P100 and CAC40. 
However, the trading volume increases but not significantly in the long term for FTSE 
Small Cap and FTSE AIM All Shares. One of the possible explanations for this is 
“herding”. We would expect that stock traders herd more with larger stocks while less 
with small and new stocks. When there is news, traders react. In the long term, when 
the news ends, more traders tend to follow the large firms and less of them track the 
small firms.  
4.2.2 Results and explanations 
4.2.2.1 FTSE100. Trading Volume around earnings announcements. 
In the short term, the positive and significant sign of eleven dummy variables 
confirms that trading volume increases significantly around earnings announcements. 
The above table show that on day -5, the coefficient of dummy is 0.078 with a t- 
statistic of 5.62. The abnormal volume continues to increase and reaches its peak on 
the day of earnings announcements, event day 0. On this day, β0 is 0.968 and highly 
significant with a t-statistic of 63.93.  The abnormal trading volume decreases from its 
peak but continues to be positive and significant throughout the post event window. αj 
is significant showing that there are changes in trading volumes across the 40 firms in 
FTSE100. The regression equation does not pass the Normality test of residuals, 
which implies that the abnormal volume empirical estimates could be due to possible 
                                                 
29
 Arghyrou and Gregoriou (2007) 
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outliers in the data set. However, a wild bootstrapping test has corrected the critical 
values
30
.  
The coefficient of abnormal trading volume prior to earnings announcements on day -
10 is -0.09. I obtained this number by running the same model with an additional  
 
Table 4.2.2.1. FTSE100 Trading Volume response to earnings announcements 
 
Panel A. Short-term Abnormal Trading Volume around earnings announcements 
The following dummy variable panel fixed effects regression model is used to test for the presence of 
abnormal trading volume in the event period. 
5
5
ji ji i itiVolume t D   


     
for j =1,99 and t = -90, 5 
Where, 
  Volumejt is the natural logarithm of trading volume for stock j at day t. 
αj captures the variation in trade volume across all the companies in our sample. 
Di are dummy variables for each trading day in the event window [-5,+5]. 
The coefficients of the eleven dummy variables, βi captures the abnormal trading volume over 
the event window, [-5,+5]. 
 εj is a random disturbance term with a mean of zero and a variance of σ
2
,  
 NORM(2) is the p value for the Jaque-Bera normality test of residuals.  
 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
 15.13 1000*** 
 0.00248 8.57*** 
β_5 0.078 5.62*** 
β_4 0.090 6.38*** 
β_3 0.032 2.17** 
β_2 0.169 11.52*** 
β_1 0.237 15.79*** 
β0 0.968 63.93*** 
β1 0.521 33.82*** 
β2 0.288 18.08*** 
β3 0.343 21.39*** 
β4 0.310 18.83*** 
β5 0.320 19.50*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.80 
NORM(2) 80.73*** 
 
(Note: Test with D_10 give coefficient β_10= -  0.09) 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
(Table 4.2.2.1continued on the following page) 
                                                 
30
 See Arghyrou and Gregoriou (2007) for more details about this. 
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(Table 4.2.2.1continued from preceding page) 
Panel B. Long-term impact of earnings announcements on trading volume 
The sample consists of 99 stocks on FTSE100 index. Standardised trading volume is computed as daily 
trading volume divided by the firm‟s market value. Standardised trading volumes are computed for pre-
earnings announcement period [-90,-1] and the post-earnings announcement period [0,+90]. The t 
statistic is used to test the null hypothesis that the standardised trading volume is unchanged in the pre 
earnings announcement period as compared with the post earnings announcement period. 
Variable Daily Trading Volume/Market Value 
Mean (Pre-earnings announcements) 7.13 per thousand 
Mean (Post-earning announcements)  8.63 per thousand 
Median (Pre-earnings announcements) 5.70 per thousand 
Median (Post-earnings announcements)  6.91 per thousand 
Mean (Post/Pre Ratio) 1.21 
Median (Post/Pre Ratio) 1.21 
T statistic 13.69*** 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
dummy on day -10, which takes value of 1 on day -10, and value of 0 on the 
otherdays. This indicates that abnormal trading volume on the peak day increases 
approximately 10.8 times greater than trading volume and abnormal trading volume 
decreases on day -10 before the earnings announcements, after we control the linear 
time drift in volume over time. 
In the long term Post/Pre ratio of mean (median) of trading volume per market values 
for FTSE100 is1.21 (1.21), with a t statistic used to compare two means equal to 
13.69. This significant value suggests that earnings announcements result in a rise in 
trading volume in the long term overall all. 
4.2.2.2 FTSE250 Trading Volume response to earnings announcements. 
The positive and significant sign of eleven dummy variables in the table 4.2.2.2 
confirms that trading volume increases significantly around earnings announcements. 
The above table show that on day -5, the coefficient of dummy is 0.112 with a t-
statistic of 7.61. The abnormal volume continues to increase and reaches its peak on 
the day of earnings announcements, event day 0. On this day, β0 is 0.929 and highly 
significant with a t-statistic of 58.58.  The abnormal trading volume decreases from its 
peak but continues to be positive and significant throughout the post event window. αj 
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is significant showing that there are changes in trading volumes across the 233 firms 
in FTSE250. The regression equation does not pass the Normality test of residuals, 
which implies that the abnormal volume empirical estimates could be due to the 
possible outliers in the data set.  However, wild bootstrapping test has corrected the 
critical values
31
.  
Table 4.2.2.2 FTSE250 Trading Volume response to earnings announcements 
 
Panel A. Short-term Abnormal Trading Volume around earnings announcements 
The following dummy variable panel fixed effects regression model is used to test for the presence of 
abnormal trading volume in the event period. 
5
5
ji ji i itiVolume t D   


     
for j =1,233 and t = -90, 5 
Where, 
Volumejt is the natural logarithm of trading volume for stock j at day t. 
 αj captures the variation in trade volume across all the companies in our sample. 
 Di are dummy variables for each trading day in the event window [-5,+5]. 
The coefficient of the eleven dummy variables, βi captures the abnormal trading volume over 
the event window, [-5,+5]. 
 εj is a random disturbance term with a mean of zero and a variance of σ
2
,  
 NORM(2) is the p value for the Jaque-Bera normality test of residuals.  
 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
 12.35 892*** 
 0.00148 5.28*** 
β_5 0.112 7.61*** 
β_4 0.096 6.49*** 
β_3 0.094 6.12*** 
β_2 0.172 11.17*** 
β_1 0.259 16.41*** 
β0 0.929 58.58*** 
β1 0.561 34.84*** 
β2 0.446 27.23*** 
β3 0.444 26.53*** 
β4 0.425 25.18*** 
β5 0.370 21.66*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.682 
NORM(2) 10473*** 
 
(Note: Test with D_10 give coefficient β_10 = -  0.05) 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
(Table 4.2.2.2 continued on following page) 
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(Table 4.2.2.2 continued from preceding page) 
Panel B. Long-term impact of earnings announcements on trading volume 
The sample consists of 233 stocks on FTSE250 index with data available. Standardised trading volume 
is computed as daily trading volume divided by the firm‟s market value. Standardised trading volumes 
are computed for pre-earnings announcement period [-90,-1] and the post-earnings announcement 
period [0,+90]. The t statistic is used to test the null hypothesis that the standardised trading volume is 
unchanged in the pre earnings announcement period as compared with the post earnings announcement 
period. 
Variable Daily Trading Volume/Market Value 
Mean (Pre-earnings announcements) 5.43 per thousand 
Mean (Post-earning announcements) 6.07 per thousand 
Median (Pre-earnings announcements) 3.44 per thousand 
Median (Post-earnings announcements) 4.08 per thousand 
Mean (Post/Pre Ratio) 1.12 
Median (Post/Pre Ratio) 1.18 
T statistic 7.45*** 
 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
By running the same model with an additional dummy on day -10, which takes value 
of 1 on day -10, and value of 0 on the other days, we got the coefficient β-10  which is -
0.05. This indicates that abnormal trading volume on the peak day increases 
approximately 18.4 times compared to trading volume‟s change ten day before the 
earnings announcements, after we control the linear time drift in volume over time.  
In the long term Post/Pre ratio of mean (median) of trading volume per market values 
for FTSE250 is1.12 (1.18), with a t statistic used to compare two means equal to 7.45. 
This significant value suggests that earnings announcements result in a rise in trading 
volume in the long term overall all. 
4.2.2.3 FTSE SMALLCAP. Trading Volume around earnings announcements  
Similar results apply to the FTSE Small Cap. The positive and significant sign of ten 
dummy variables (except β-3) confirms that trading volume increases significantly 
around earnings announcements. The above table show that on day -5, the coefficient 
of dummy is 0.052 with a t-statistic of 2.87. The abnormal volume continues to 
increase and reaches its peak on the day of earnings announcements, event day 0. On 
this day, β0 is 0.968 and highly significant with a t-statistic of 50.43. The abnormal 
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trading volume decreases from its peak but continues to be positive and significant 
throughout the post event window. αj is significant showing that there are changes in 
trading volumes across the 310 firms in FTSE Small Cap. The regression equation 
does not pass the Normality test of residuals; this implies that the abnormal volume 
empirical estimates could be due to possible outliers in the data set. Again, wild 
bootstrapping test helps to correct the critical values, and result does not change
32
.  
Table 4.2.2.3. FTSE Small Cap Trading Volume response to earnings announcements 
Panel A. Short-term Abnormal Trading Volume around earnings announcements 
The following dummy variable panel fixed effects regression model is used to test for the presence of 
abnormal trading volume in the event period. 
5
5
ji ji i itiVolume t D   


     
for j =1,310 and t = -90, 5 
Where, 
 Volumejt is the natural logarithm of trading volume for stock j at day t. 
 αj captures the variation in trade volume across all the companies in our sample. 
 Di are dummy variables for each trading day in the event window [-5,+5]. 
The coefficient of the eleven dummy variables, βi captures the abnormal trading volume over 
the event window, [-5,+5]. 
 εj is a random disturbance term with a mean of zero and a variance of σ
2
,  
 NORM(2) is the p value for the Jaque-Bera normality test of residuals.  
 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
 9.53 590.95*** 
 5.62E-05 0.170 
β_5 0.052 2.87*** 
β_4 0.152 8.29*** 
β_3 -0.108 -5.92*** 
β_2 0.075 3.99*** 
β_1 0.137 7.29*** 
β0 0.968 50.43*** 
β1 0.602 30.63*** 
β2 0.519 26.15*** 
β3 0.344 17.10*** 
β4 0.451 22.22*** 
β5 0.318 15.56*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.412 
NORM(2) 1725*** 
(Note: Test with D_10 give coefficient β_10 = -  0.08) 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
(Table 4.2.2.3 continued on the following page) 
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Table 4.2.2.3 continued from preceding page) 
Panel B. Long-term impact of earnings announcements on trading volume 
The sample consists of 310 stocks on FTSE Small Cap index with data available. Standardised trading 
volume is computed as daily trading volume divided by the total market value of the firm. Standardised 
trading volumes are computed for pre-earnings announcement period [-90,-1] and the post-earnings 
announcement period [0,+90]. The t statistic is used to test the null hypothesis which states that the 
standardised trading volume is unchanged in the pre earnings announcement period as compared with 
the post earnings announcement period. 
Variable Daily Trading Volume/Market Value 
Mean (Pre-earnings announcements) 2.72 per thousand 
Mean (Post-earning announcements)  2.78 per thousand 
Median (Pre-earnings announcements) 0.86 per thousand 
Median (Post-earnings announcements) 0.92 per thousand 
Mean (Post/Pre Ratio) 1.02 
Median (Post/Pre Ratio) 1.07 
T statistic 0.91 (p=0.36) 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
The trading volume prior to earnings announcements on day -10 is -0.08. We got this 
number by adding an additional dummy on day -10, which takes value of 1 on day -
10, and value of 0 on other days. This indicates that abnormal trading volume 
increases approximately 12 times greater than trading volume decreases ten days 
before the earnings announcements, after we control the linear time drift in volume 
over time. 
In the long term Post/Pre ratio of mean (median) of trading volume per market values 
for the FTSE Small Cap is1.02 (1.07), with a t statistic used to compare two means 
equal to 0.91. This insignificant value suggests that earnings announcements does not 
result in a rise in trading volume in the long term overall all for the FTSE Small Cap. 
4.2.2.4 FTSEAIM ALLSHARES. Trading Volume around earnings announcements  
The positive and significant sign of eight dummy variables (except β_5, β_4, β_3) 
confirms that trading volume increases significantly around earnings announcements. 
The above table shows that on day -2, the coefficient of dummy is 0.07 with a t-
statistic of 4.73. The abnormal volume continues to increase and reaches its peak on 
the day of earnings announcements, event day 0. On this day, β0 is 1.299 and highly 
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significant with a t-statistic of 79.02. The abnormal trading volume decreases from its 
peak but continues to be positive and significant throughout the post event window. αj 
is significant showing that there are changes in trading volumes across the 912 firms 
in FTSEAIM ALLSHARES (one firm is dropped because there is not enough number 
of observations). The regression equation does not pass the Normality test of 
residuals, which implies that the abnormal volume empirical estimates could be due to  
Table 4.2.2.4. FTSE AIM All Shares Trading Volume response to earnings announcements 
 
Panel A. Short-term Abnormal Trading Volume around earnings announcements 
The following dummy variable panel fixed effects regression model is used to test for the presence of 
abnormal trading volume in the event period. 
5
5
ji ji i itiVolume t D   


     
for j =1,913 and t = -90, 5 
Where, 
Volumejt is the natural logarithm of trading volume for stock j at day t. 
 αj captures the variation in trade volume across all the companies in our sample. 
 Di are dummy variables for each trading day in the event window [-5,+5]. 
The coefficient of the eleven dummy variables, βi captures the abnormal trading volume over 
the event window, [-5,+5]. 
 εj is a random disturbance term with a mean of zero and a variance of σ
2
,  
 NORM(2) is the p value for the Jaque-Bera normality test of residuals.  
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
 7.34 464*** 
 -0.000164 -0.54 
β_5 -0.014 -0.95 
β_4 -0.079 -5.70*** 
β_3 -0.031 -2.07** 
β_2 0.070 4.73*** 
β_1 0.254 15.43*** 
β0 1.299 79.02*** 
β1 0.866 52.18*** 
β2 0.556 33.59*** 
β3 0.411 23.62*** 
β4 0.343 19.76*** 
β5 0.287 15.77*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.549 
NORM(2) 2063*** 
(Note: Test with D_10 give coefficient β_10 = -  0.08) 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
(Table 4.2.2.4 continued on following page) 
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(Table 4.2.2.4 continued from preceding page) 
Panel B. Long-term impact of earnings announcements on trading volume 
The sample consists of 913 stocks on FTSE AIM All Shares index with data available. Standardised 
trading volume is computed as daily trading volume divided by the market value of the firm. 
Standardised trading volumes are computed for pre-earnings announcement period [-90,-1] and the 
post-earnings announcement period [0,+90]. The t statistic is used to test the null hypothesis which 
sates that the standardised trading volume is unchanged in the pre earnings announcement period as 
compared with the post earnings announcement period. 
 
Variable Daily Trading Volume/Market value 
Mean (Pre-earnings announcements) 2.96 per thousand 
Mean (Post-earning announcements) 2.98 per thousand 
Median (Pre-earnings announcements) 0.71 per thousand 
Median (Post-earnings announcements) 0.70 per thousand 
Mean (Post/Pre Ratio) 1.01 
Median (Post/Pre Ratio) 0.99 
T statistic 0.36 (p=0.71) 
 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
possible outliers in the data set. Again, this thesis uses wild bootstrapping test to 
correct the critical values, and the result does not change.
33
  
The coefficient of change in trading volume prior to earnings announcements on day -
10 is -0.08 after adding an addition dummy on day -10, which takes value of 1 on day 
-10, and value of 0 on the other days. This indicates that abnormal trading volume 
increases approximately 16.23 times greater than trading volume decreases ten days 
before the earnings announcements, after we control the linear time drift in volume 
over time.  
In the long term Post/Pre ratio of mean (median) of trading volume per market values 
for FTSE AIM All Shares is1.01 (0.99), with a t statistic used to compare two means 
equal to 0.99. This insignificant value suggests that earnings announcements does not 
result in a rise in trading volume in the long term overall all for the FTSE AIM All 
Shares. 
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4.2.2.5 DJIA. Trading Volume around earnings announcements  
The positive and significant sign of eleven dummy variables confirm that trading 
volume increases significantly around earnings announcements. The above table 
shows that on day -5, the coefficient of dummy is 0.102 with a t-statistic of 5.87. The 
abnormal volume continues to increase and reaches its peak on the day of earnings 
announcements, event day 0. On this day, β0 is 0.735 and highly significant with a t- 
Table 4.2.2.5. DJIA Trading Volume response to earnings announcements 
 
Panel A. Short-term Abnormal Trading Volume around earnings announcements 
The following dummy variable panel fixed effects regression model is used to test for the presence of 
abnormal trading volume in the event period. 
5
5
ji ji i itiVolume t D   


     
for j =1,30 and t = -90, 5 
Where, 
Volumejt is the natural logarithm of trading volume for stock j at day t. 
 αj captures the variation in trade volume across all the companies in our sample. 
 Di are dummy variables for each trading day in the event window [-5,+5]. 
The coefficient of the eleven dummy variables, βi captures the abnormal trading volume over 
the event window, [-5,+5]. 
 εj is a random disturbance term with a mean of zero and a variance of σ
2
,  
 NORM(2) is the p value for the Jaque-Bera normality test of residuals.  
 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
 13.107 702*** 
 -0.00145 -3.98*** 
β_5 0.102 5.87*** 
β_4 0.063 3.50*** 
β_3 0.075 4.10*** 
β_2 0.156 8.36*** 
β_1 0.244 12.73*** 
β0 0.735 38.07*** 
β1 0.622 31.70*** 
β2 0.287 14.39*** 
β3 0.240 11.70*** 
β4 0.190 9.21*** 
β5 0.179 8.48*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.724 
NORM(2) 1302*** 
(Note: Test with D_10 gives coefficient β_10 =   0.001) 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
(Table 4.2.2.5 continued on following page) 
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(Table 4.2.2.5 continued from preceding page) 
Panel B. Long-term impact of earnings announcements on trading volume 
The sample consists of 30 stocks on DJIA index. Standardised trading volume is computed as daily 
trading volume divided by the firm‟s market value. Standardised trading volumes are computed for pre-
earnings announcement period [-90,-1] and the post-earnings announcement period [0,+90]. The t 
statistic is used to test the null hypothesis which states that the standardised trading volume is 
unchanged in the pre earnings announcement period as compared with the post earnings announcement 
period. 
Variable Daily Trading Volume/Market value 
Mean (Pre-earnings announcements) 5.62 per thousand 
Mean (Post-earning announcements) 6.06 per thousand 
Median (Pre-earnings announcements)  4.16 per thousand 
Median (Post-earnings announcements) 4.66 per thousand 
Mean (Post/Pre Ratio) 1.08 
Median (Post/Pre Ratio) 1.12 
T statistic 2.84*** 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
statistic of 38. The abnormal trading volume decreases from its peak but continues to 
be positive and significant throughout the post event window. αj is significant showing 
that there are changes in trading volumes across the 30 firms in DJIA. The regression 
equation does not pass the Normality test of residuals, which implies that the 
abnormal volume empirical estimates could be due to possible outliers in the data set. 
I use wild bootstrapping test to correct the critical values, and result does not change
34
.  
By adding an addition dummy variable on day -10, we got the trading volume prior to 
earnings announcements on day -10 which is 0.001. This indicates that abnormal 
trading volume increases approximately 700 times greater than trading volume‟s 
change ten days before the earnings announcements, after we control the linear time 
drift in volume over time.  
In the long term Post/Pre ratio of mean (median) of trading volume per market values 
for DJIA is1.08 (1.12), with a t statistic used to compare two means equal to 2.84. 
This significant value suggests that earnings announcements result in a rise in trading 
volume in the long term overall all for DJIA. 
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4.2.2.6 NASDAQ100. Trading Volume around earnings announcements  
The positive and significant sign of dummy variables (includes β_2, β_1, β0, β1, β2, β3, 
β4, β5) confirms that trading volume increases significantly around earnings 
announcements. The above table shows that on day -2, the coefficient of dummy is 
0.013 with a t-statistic of 3.01. The abnormal volume continues to increase and 
reaches its peak right after the day of earnings announcements, day 1. On this day, β1  
Table 4.2.2.6. NASDAQ100 Trading Volume response to earnings announcements 
 
Panel A. Short-term Abnormal Trading Volume around earnings announcements 
The following dummy variable panel fixed effects regression model is used to test for the presence of 
abnormal trading volume in the event period. 
5
5
ji ji i itiVolume t D   


     
for j =1,96 and t = -90, 5 
Where, 
Volumejt is the natural logarithm of trading volume for stock j at day t. 
 αj captures the variation in trade volume across all the companies in our sample. 
 Di are dummy variables for each trading day in the event window [-5,+5]. 
The coefficient of the eleven dummy variables, βi captures the abnormal trading volume over 
the event window, [-5,+5]. 
 εj is a random disturbance term with a mean of zero and a variance of σ
2
,  
 NORM(2) is the p value for the Jaque-Bera normality test of residuals.  
 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
 11.731 649*** 
 -0.00016 -0.49 
β_5 0.013 0.98 
β_4 0.008 0.62 
β_3 0.020 1.40 
β_2 0.043 3.01*** 
β_1 0.188 13.02*** 
β0 0.733 49.78*** 
β1 0.917 61.11*** 
β2 0.385 24.67*** 
β3 0.207 13.10*** 
β4 0.177 10.89*** 
β5 0.145 8.89*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.853 
NORM(2) 2220*** 
(Note: Test with D_10 gives coefficient β_10 =   0.04) 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
(Table 4.2.2.6 continued on following page) 
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(Table 4.2.2.6 continued from preceding page) 
Panel B. Long-term impact of earnings announcements on trading volume 
The sample consists of 96 stocks on NASDAQ100 index with data available. Standardised trading 
volume is computed as daily trading volume divided by the company‟s market value. Standardised 
trading volumes are computed for pre-earnings announcement period [-90,-1] and the post-earnings 
announcement period [0,+90]. The t statistic is used to test the null hypothesis that the standardised 
trading volume is unchanged in the pre earnings announcement period as compared with the post 
earnings announcement period. 
Variable Daily Trading Volume/Market Value 
Mean (Pre-earnings announcements) 14.69 per thousand 
Mean (Post-earning announcements) 15.09 per thousand 
Median (Pre-earnings announcements) 10.50 per thousand 
Median (Post-earnings announcements) 11.29 per thousand 
Mean (Post/Pre Ratio) 1.03 
Median (Post/Pre Ratio) 1.08 
T statistic 1.81* 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
is 0.733 and highly significant with a t-statistic of 61.11. The abnormal trading 
volume decreases from its peak but continues to be positive and significant throughout 
the post event window. αj is significant showing that there are changes in trading 
volumes across the 96 firms in NASDAQ100. The regression equation does not pass 
the Normality test of residuals, implies that the abnormal volume empirical estimates 
could due be to possible outliers in the data set.  Wild bootstrapping test correct the 
critical values, and result does not change
35
.  
Running the same model with an additional dummy on the day -10, I got the trading 
volume prior to earnings announcements on day -10 which is 0.04. This indicates that 
abnormal trading volume increased approximately 18.32 times greater than change in 
trading volume ten days before the earnings announcements, after controlling the 
linear time drift in volume over time.  
In the long term Post/Pre ratio of mean (median) of trading volume per market values 
for NASDAQ100 is1.03 (1.08), with a t statistic used to compare two means equal to 
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1.81. This significant value at 0.1% suggests that earnings announcements result in a 
rise in trading volume in the long term overall all for NASDAQ100. 
4.2.2.7 S&P100. Trading Volume around earnings announcements  
The positive and significant sign of eleven dummy variables confirms that trading 
volume increases significantly around earnings announcements. The above table  
Table 4.2.2.7. S&P100 Trading Volume response to earnings announcements 
 
Panel A. Short-term Abnormal Trading Volume around earnings announcements 
The following dummy variable panel fixed effects regression model is used to test for the presence of 
abnormal trading volume in the event period. 
5
5
ji ji i itiVolume t D   


     
for j =1,100 and t = -90, 5 
Where, 
Volumejt is the natural logarithm of trading volume for stock j at day t. 
 αj captures the variation in trade volume across all the companies in our sample. 
 Di are dummy variables for each trading day in the event window [-5,+5]. 
The coefficient of the eleven dummy variables, βi captures the abnormal trading volume over 
the event window, [-5,+5]. 
 εj is a random disturbance term with a mean of zero and a variance of σ
2
,  
 NORM(2) is the p value for the Jaque-Bera normality test of residuals.  
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
 12.442 770*** 
 -0.00018 -0.58 
β_5 0.068 4.54*** 
β_4 0.064 4.17*** 
β_3 0.052 3.36*** 
β_2 0.093 5.87*** 
β_1 0.219 13.35*** 
β0 0.682 41.67*** 
β1 0.581 34.93*** 
β2 0.305 18.00*** 
β3 0.275 15.91*** 
β4 0.240 13.76*** 
β5 0.214 12.06*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.838 
NORM(2)  3215*** 
(Note: Test with D_10 gives coefficient β  =   0.04) 
* significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
(Table 4.2.2.7 continued on following page) 
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(Table 4.2.2.7 continued from preceding page) 
Panel B. Long-term impact of earnings announcements on trading volume 
The sample consists of 100 stocks on S&P100 index with data available. Standardised trading volume 
is computed as daily trading volume divided by the company‟s market value. Standardised trading 
volumes are computed for pre-earnings announcement period [-90,-1] and the post-earnings 
announcement period [0,+90]. The t statistic is used to test the null hypothesis which sates that the 
standardised trading volume is unchanged in the pre earnings announcement period as compared with 
the post earnings announcement period. 
Variable Standardised Trading Volume 
Mean (Pre-earnings announcements) 7.20 per thousand 
Mean (Post-earning announcements) 8.19 per thousand 
Median (Pre-earnings announcements) 4.93 per thousand 
Median (Post-earnings announcements) 5.79 per thousand 
Mean (Post/Pre Ratio) 1.14 
Median (Post/Pre Ratio) 1.18 
T statistic 8.36*** 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
shows that on day -5, the coefficient of dummy is 0.068 with a t-statistic of 4.54. The 
abnormal volume continues to increase and reaches its peak right on the day of 
earnings announcements itself, day 0. On this day, β0 is 0.682 and highly significant 
with a t-statistic of 41.67. The abnormal trading volume decreases from its peak but 
continues to be positive and significant throughout the post event window. αj is 
significant showing that there are changes in trading volumes across the 100 firms in 
S&P100. The regression equation does not pass the Normality test of residuals, which 
implies that the abnormal volume empirical estimates could be due to possible outliers 
in the data set. This thesis use, wild bootstrapping tests to correct the critical values, 
and result does not change
36
.  
The trading volume prior to earnings announcements on day -10 is 0.04 after adding 
an additional dummy variable on day -10. This indicates that abnormal trading volume 
increases approximately 17.05 times greater than the change in trading volume 
increases ten days before the earnings announcements, after we control the linear time 
drift in volume over time. 
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In the long term Post/Pre ratio of mean (median) of trading volume per market values 
for S&P100 is1.14 (1.18), with a t statistic used to compare two means equal 8.36. 
This significant value suggests that earnings announcements result in a rise in trading 
volume in the long term overall all for S&P100. 
4.2.2.8 CAC40. Trading Volume around earnings announcements  
Table 4.2.2.8. CAC40 Trading Volume response to earnings announcements 
 
Panel A. Short-term Abnormal Trading Volume around earnings announcements 
The following dummy variable panel fixed effects regression model is used to test for the presence of 
abnormal trading volume in the event period. 
5
5
ji ji i itiVolume t D   


     
for j =1,40 and t = -90, 5 
Where, 
Volumejt is the natural logarithm of trading volume for stock j at day t. 
 αj captures the variation in trade volume across all the companies in our sample. 
 Di are dummy variables for each trading day in the event window [-5,+5]. 
The coefficient of the eleven dummy variables, βi captures the abnormal trading volume over 
the event window, [-5,+5]. 
 εj is a random disturbance term with a mean of zero and a variance of σ
2
,  
 NORM(2) is the p value for the Jaque-Bera normality test of residuals.  
 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
 11.33 803*** 
 0.0019 6.68*** 
β_5 0.162 11.27*** 
β_4 0.180 12.27*** 
β_3 0.174 11.71*** 
β_2 0.116 7.68*** 
β_1 0.302 19.59*** 
β0 0.735 46.94*** 
β1 0.531 33.32*** 
β2 0.258 15.91*** 
β3 0.239 14.56*** 
β4 0.312 18.68*** 
β5 0.291 17.14*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.717 
NORM(2) 445*** 
 
(Note: Test with D_10 gives coefficient β_10  =   0.01) 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
(Table 4.2.2.8 continued on following page) 
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(Table 4.2.2.8 continued from preceding page) 
Panel B. Long-term impact of earnings announcements on trading volume 
The sample consists of 40 stocks on CAC40 index. Standardised trading volume is computed as daily 
trading volume divided by the market value of the company. Standardised trading volumes are 
computed for pre-earnings announcement period [-90,-1] and the post-earnings announcement period 
[0,+90]. The t statistic is used to test the null hypothesis which states that the standardised trading 
volume is unchanged in the pre earnings announcement period as compared with the post earnings 
announcement period. 
Variable Daily Trading Volume/Market Value 
Mean (Pre-earnings announcements)  4.75 per thousand 
Mean (Post-earning announcements)  5.45 per thousand 
Median (Pre-earnings announcements) 3.95 per thousand 
Median (Post-earnings announcements) 4.67 per thousand 
Mean (Post/Pre Ratio) 1.15 
Median (Post/Pre Ratio) 1.18 
T statistic 7.17*** 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
The positive and significant sign of eleven dummy variables confirms that trading 
volume increases significantly around earnings announcements. The above table show 
that on day -5, the coefficient of dummy is 0.162 with a t-statistic of 11.27. The 
abnormal volume continues to increase and reaches its peak on the day of earnings 
announcements, event day 0. On this day, β0 is 0.735 and highly significant with a t-
statistic of 46.94. The abnormal trading volume decreases from its peak but continues 
to be positive and significant throughout the post event window. The regression 
equation also does not pass the Normality test of residuals, which implies that the 
abnormal volume empirical estimates are due to possible outliers in the data set. 
Again, wild bootstrapping test helps to correct the critical values, and result does not 
change
37
.  Finally, αj is significant showing that there are changes in trading volumes 
across the 40 firms in the CAC40.  
The trading volume prior to earnings announcements on day -10 is 0.01 after adding 
an additional dummy on day -10. This dummy take value of 1 on day -10, and value of 
0 other days. The coefficient for dummy on day -10 indicates that abnormal trading 
                                                 
37
 See Arghyrou and Gregoriou (2007) for more details about this. 
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volume increase approximately 73 times greater than trading volume increased ten 
days before the earnings announcements, after we control the linear time drift in 
volume over time.  
In the long term Post/Pre ratio of mean (median) of trading volume per market values 
for the CAC40 is1.15 (1.18), with a t statistic used to compare two means equal 7.17. 
This significant value suggests that earnings announcements result in a rise in trading 
volume in the long term overall all for the CAC40. 
4.2.3 Summary. 
In summary, this part of analysis shows that, in the short term within five days before 
the earnings announcement and five days after earnings announcement, there is 
dramatic increase in trading volume for all indices. The impacts of the earnings news 
on trading volume are most profound when the news is released. The abnormal 
volume reaches its peak on the event day 0 in the London Stock Exchange and for the 
DJIA, the S&P100 in the US stock Exchange and the CAC40 in Euronext Paris, on 
day 1 for the NASDAQ100. The trading volumes are many times as high as compared 
to the change on day -10 in the additional test.  See tables from 4.2.2.1 to 4.2.2.8, 
panel A for details. After the announcement date, the news continues to have effects 
on trading volume. Trading volume still increases, however the impact level is less 
strong and gradually decreases day by day. Results also show that, trading volume not 
only increases due to earnings announcement but also increases by time. Besides the 
impact of earnings news, this time factor (linear time trend) will also affect stock 
liquidity, the reason being the speed of selling stocks is also related to volume. 
Generally when the volume increases, the cost of trading will reduce, hence it alone 
makes total bid ask spread decrease or in other word, stock liquidity improves. 
In the long term, when compared the whole post earnings announcement and pre 
earnings announcement periods
38
, this thesis reports there is increase in trading 
volume scaled by market value for all of eight indices. See tables from 4.2.2.1 to 
4.2.2.8, panel B. Using standard t test used to compare two sample mean values, the 
results   suggest that in the long term, trading volume still increases significantly for 
large  and medium stocks   (including FTSE100, FTSE250, DJIA, NASDAQ100, 
S&P100, and CAC40), but not significantly for small stocks (FTSE Small Cap and 
                                                 
38
 Pre-earnings announcement period is defined as period from day -90 to day -1. Post earnings 
announcements period is defined as period from day 0 to day +90. 
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FTSE AIM All Shares). The possible explanation is that when the news is released, 
people trade more, however when the news ceases, traders are more likely to follow 
large stocks, less likely to follow smaller firms. This herding behaviour or 'following 
the trend' has frequently been observed in reality and documented while agents trade 
the securities whose value is uncertain and whose price is efficiently set by a market 
maker. Most agents follow their private information and prices converge to the 
fundamental value
39
.  
4.3. Spread effect of earnings announcement  
4.3.1. Empirical specification 
Conceptualised by Van Horne 1970 and then followed by a number of authors such as 
Beinesh and Gardner 1995, Hedge and McDermott 2003, and Gregoriou and Ioannidis 
(2006) the intuition of Information Cost Liquidity Hypothesis is good information 
creates significant improvement in stock performance. Given that there is a richer 
information environment, this part of the thesis examines whether there is 
increase/decrease in market liquidity in the same manner as stated. 
To analyse the impact of earnings announcement on the short term liquidity of indices, 
I constructed ratios of the three daily average bid-ask spreads over the various 
interaval event windows pre and post earnings announcements. Quoted bid-ask 
spreads is defined as the ask price minus the bid price. Relative bid-ask spreads is 
measured as the ask price minus the bid price divided by the quoted mid price. 
Effective bid-ask spreads is measured as twice the absolute value of the difference 
between the transaction price and the mid price in effect at the time of the trade. I 
compute all three ratios for quote bid-ask spreads, relative bid-ask spreads and 
effective bid-ask spreads because each ratio has its own shortcomings. As discussed 
above, relative bid-ask spreads is not an accurate method to measure the stock 
liquidity as trades often occurs between the quoted ask price and the bid price. 
Another shortcoming was pointed out by Lee and Ready (1991) is that relative spread 
over states the trading cost of a stock for its failures to take in to account the price 
increase tendency after a purchase, and a decrease tendency after a sale. The effective 
spread therefore computed to reduce the shortcoming of the other two measures. 
However, there is still another problem with using relative and effective bid-ask 
                                                 
39
 See BRUNNERMEIER, M.K., 2001; DEVENOW, A. and I. WELCH, 1996; TRUEMAN, B., 1994 
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spreads only. These two measures will face the problem of price increasing around 
earnings announcements as shown in the table 4.3.2.1-4.3.2.3, it does increase mid 
price as well. Thus for a full picture we compute all three measures of bid-ask spreads. 
All spread ratios are computed as the ratio of the average bid-ask spreads of each 
individual stock over the indicated event time period to the average bid-ask spreads 
measure over the 90 day pre earnings announcement. The null hypothesis that the 
mean of the reported ratio is equal to 1 is tested using a standard t statistic. Results are 
reported in table 4.3.2.1 to 4.3.2.3. Effective spread is the best indicator in some cases 
when three ratios show different results for the shortcoming of the other two measures 
mentioned above.  
Generally, the results show that, spread ratios increase significantly around the 
earnings events then gradually decrease for the FTSE100, FTSE Small Cap, FTSE 
AIM All Shares in London Stock Exchange and DJIA, NASDAQ100 and S&P100 in 
the American Stock Exchanges (except two cases: the FTSE250 and the CAC 40). 
This implies that for these indices, stock market liquidity decreases in the short term, 
and then gradually increases when the news ceases. Earnings announcement provides 
more uncertainty to the market. The informed traders trade when there is the earnings 
news; this causes the market makers to increase spreads. In the long term, there are no 
more uninformed traders; that results in the spread going down. However, notice that 
even if the spread goes down in many cases at the end of this period, it is still greater 
than the average of the 90 days prior the event. 
The results also imply that stock liquidity increases but insignificantly for the 
FTSE250 in terms of effective spread. A possible explanation for it is that the FTSE 
250 joined the electronic trading system recently at the end of 2003/2004; this 
increased the stocks liquidity so that the impact on earnings announcement might not 
be clear for this ratio. FTSE100 and the rest of indicies are different in the sense that 
FTSE100 joined electronic trading system in 1997 and reverted back to equilibrium. 
The other indices in my data set had not joined the system yet. 
The special case is CAC40, spread decreases both in the short term and long term 
compared to the average of 90 days before the event in Euronext Paris for CAC40. 
This implies that market liquidity increased after earnings announcements both in the 
short and long term. However, longer the event window period, lower the ratio is. This 
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implies that even though market liquidity increased due to the impacts of 
announcement in the short term, liquidity continues to increase by time in the long 
term.   
As discussed earlier, the CAC40 is a code law accounting system where earnings 
news is conveyed to the markets well in advance of the announcement date. This 
could be a reason why there is less uncertainty about the news and we expect a smaller 
reaction immediately to earnings announcements and less important role of earnings 
news/or there might be another factor that clear out the impact of new news. 
From 4.2, I recall that trading volume increased around earnings announcements for 
all indices. As a consequence, cost of trading decreased when trading volume 
increased as market makers pay cheaper prices. Change in stock liquidity (bid ask 
spread) will reflect this by two effects: the decrease in cost of trading (order 
processing and inventory holding components) caused by the increase in trading 
volume, and the increase in the uncertainty about the news, or in other words, the gap 
between informed and uninformed traders. Since the total effect in the US and the UK 
market is an increase in bid ask spread and in Euronext Paris is a decrease in the bid 
ask spread, the results from this part 4.3 implies that the information asymmetry cost 
component dominates the bid-ask spread in the US and the UK markets. This entirely 
agrees with Gregoriou (2009) study on the FTSE100. Conversely, cost of trading 
dominates bid-ask spreads in Frances CAC40 index.  
In short, for the CAC 40 under code law accounting system, liquidity increases due to 
an immediate impact of earnings announcements, and for the other common law 
stocks, liquidity decreases due to this immediate impact. In both the types of system, 
liquidity increases by time after the earnings announcements. Chapter V will provide 
more evidence on this issue. 
4.3.2 Results and explanations 
4.3.2.1 London Stock Exchange 
The results of the changes in liquidity of London Stock Exchange stocks pre and post 
earnings announcement can be seen in table 4.3.2.1. There is clear evidence from this 
table that spread increases significantly for stocks in London Stock Exchange after the 
earnings announcement. For example, on the actual day of the event, for firms in the 
FTSE100, the aggregate quote spread ratios compared to an average of 90 day pre  
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Table 4.3.2.1- Short-term and long-term effects of earnings announcements on Stock Market 
Liquidity – London Stock Exchange 
Stock market liquidity is measured by the quoted, relative, and effective bid-ask spreads. Quoted bid-
ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price. Relative bid-ask spread is defined as the ask 
price minus the bid price divided by the quoted mid price. Effective bid-ask spread is defined as twice 
the absolute value of the difference between the transaction price and the mid price in effect at the time 
of the trade. All ratios in the table are computed as the ratio of the average bid-ask spreads of each 
individual stock over the indicated event time period to the average bid-ask spreads measure on day -
90. The null hypothesis states that the mean of the reported ratio is equal to 1 is tested using a standard 
t-statistic. 
 Quote Relative Effective 
 Ratio t-statistic Ratio t-statistic Ratio t-statistic 
FTSE100       
[0, 0] 1.36*** 47.08 1.19*** 23.52 1.44*** 49.74 
[-1, 1] 1.31*** 40.19 1.23*** 28.01 1.26*** 29.50 
[-2, 2] 1.19*** 25.06 1.12*** 14.81 1.15*** 17.23 
[-3, 3] 1.15*** 19.61 1.09*** 10.67 1.11*** 12.35 
[-4, 4] 1.12*** 15.49 1.06*** 7.59 1.08*** 8.68 
[-5, 5] 1.09*** 11.42 1.04*** 4.69 1.06*** 7.20 
[0, 10] 1.04*** 5.90 0.98*** -2.25 1.04*** 4.87 
[0, 30] 1.04*** 5.18 0.95*** -5.91 1.03*** 2.84 
[0, 60] 1.01 1.23 0.94*** -7.60 1.00 -0.38 
[0, 90] 1.00 -0.54 0.92*** -9.27 0.99 -1.38 
FTSE250    
[0, 0] 1.10*** 11.70 1.11*** 12.20 1.00 -0.10 
[-1, 1] 1.13*** 14.62 1.12*** 13.51 1.03*** 2.59 
[-2, 2] 1.03*** 3.73 1.04*** 4.77 0.97*** -2.69 
[-3, 3] 1.05*** 6.08 1.04*** 4.30 1.01 0.88 
[-4, 4] 1.05*** 6.23 1.03*** 3.13 1.02 1.74 
[-5, 5] 1.02*** 2.78 1.01 1.33 0.99 -0.97 
[0, 10] 1.00 -0.45 0.97*** -3.02 0.95*** -4.51 
[0, 30] 0.96*** -5.07 0.95*** -6.10 0.92*** -7.17 
[0, 60] 0.98*** -2.41 0.93*** -7.70 0.96*** -3.68 
[0, 90] 0.95*** -6.14 0.90*** -11.57 0.93*** -6.12 
FTSE 
Small Cap 
   
[0, 0] 1.18*** 20.74 1.05*** 10.50 1.14*** 8.80 
[-1, 1] 1.03*** 3.76 1.02*** 3.54 1.04*** 2.66 
[-2, 2] 1.02*** 2.91 1.02*** 3.44 1.07*** 4.63 
[-3, 3] 1.04*** 4.87 1.00 0.49 1.10*** 6.40 
[-4, 4] 1.03*** 3.99 1.00 0.07 1.11*** 7.27 
[-5, 5] 1.01 0.95 1.00 -0.49 1.06*** 4.09 
[0, 10] 0.99 -1.08 0.96*** -8.30 0.96*** -2.56 
[0, 30] 1.01 0.65 0.95*** -11.14 1.01 0.70 
[0, 60] 0.98*** -2.02 0.96*** -8.20 0.96*** -2.37 
[0, 90] 0.98** -1.91 0.97*** -6.15 0.98 -1.41 
(Table 4.3.2.1 continued on following page) 
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(Table 4.3.2.1 continued from preceding page) 
 Quote Relative Effective 
 Ratio t-statistic Ratio t-statistic ratio t-statistic 
FTSE AIM All Shares      
[0, 0] 1.07*** 18.98 0.99*** -3.69 1.40*** 14.59 
[-1, 1] 1.03*** 8.81 1.00*** -3.27 1.05*** 2.02 
[-2, 2] 1.02*** 4.55 1.00*** -3.06 0.90*** -3.73 
[-3, 3] 1.02*** 4.30 0.99*** -3.95 0.88*** -4.42 
[-4, 4] 1.01*** 2.87 1.00*** -3.08 0.86*** -5.32 
[-5, 5] 1.01*** 2.16 0.99*** -3.88 0.81*** -7.00 
[0, 10] 1.00 1.07 0.99*** -5.50 0.72*** -10.29 
[0, 30] 1.01 1.45 1.00*** -2.03 0.78*** -7.95 
[0, 60] 1.00 0.02 1.00 0.33 0.82*** -6.58 
[0, 90] 0.99*** -4.09 1.00 1.66 0.81*** -6.83 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
earnings announcement is 1.36, and thus highly significant. This indicates that the 
mean quoted spread is increased by 36% on that day compared to an average of 90 
days pre event. In the [-5,+5] event window, the mean quoted spread ratio is 1.09, 
increased by 9%, and highly significant, this indicates that spreads are significantly 
increased over the 11 trading day period centred on the event day. For the relative and 
effective spread ratios in the FTSE100, the increases on event day are 19% and 44%, 
and the increases on [-5,5] window periods are 4% and 6% respectively. 
Another important thing to report here is, that the spread ratios between post and pre 
earnings announcement period decreased gradually. As we observed from table 
4.3.2.1, at the beginning, spread ratios between day 0 and average of 90 day pre 
earnings announcement are 1.36, 1.19, and 1.44 for quote, relative and effective bid 
asks respectively. After 30 days post earnings announcement period, spread ratios 
between average of 30 day post event and average of 90 day pre event reduce to 1.04, 
0.95 and 1.03 for quote, relative and effective bid asks respectively. In the long term 
after 90 days post earnings announcement period, the 90 days pre/post earnings 
announcement spread ratios were reduced to 1, 0.92 and 0.99. This led to another 
conclusion; though there is decrease compared to pre earnings announcement period, 
stock liquidity has increased over time. 
For firms in the FTSE250 the aggregate quote spread on day 0 compared to an average 
of quote spread of 90 days pre earnings announcement is 1.10, and is highly 
significant. This indicates that the mean quote spread increased 10% on the event day. 
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In the [-5,+5] event period,  the mean quote spread is 1.02, increased by 2%, and 
highly significant, this indicates that spreads are significantly increased over the 11 
trading day period centred on the event day. For the relative spread ratios in the 
FTSE250, there is an 11% increase on the event day, and 1% increase over [-5,5] 
event period. However for effective spread, the change is not clear, the increase is 
insignificant around day of earnings announcement and only significant on the day 
after. 
Again, another important thing to report here is, that the spread ratios between post 
and pre earnings announcement period decreased over time for quoted and relative 
spread and in almost all event periods of effective spread. This led to another 
conclusion, though there is decrease compared to pre earnings announcement period, 
stock liquidity increased over time. In the long term at the end this ratio was slightly 
lower than 1 for all of the three spread ratios.  
For firms in the FTSE Small Cap, the quote spread ratios when compared between 
aggregate average on day 0 and an average of 90 days pre earnings announcement is 
1.18, and highly significant. This indicates that the mean quote spread increases by 
18% on that day compared to an average of 90 days pre event. In the [-4,+4] event 
window, the mean quote spread is 1.03, increased by 3%, and is highly significant, 
this indicates that spreads have significantly increased over the 9 trading day period 
centred on the event day. The results also show the significant increase in the mean 
relative and effective spreads in short term: 5% and 14% increase on the event day for 
the relative and effective ratios respectively; and 2% over 5 trading day centred on 
event for relative ratio, 6% increase over 11 trading day centred on the event for 
effective ratio.  In the long term, the spread ratios between post and pre earnings 
announcement period also decreased over time, a few cases are not significant for 
quote spread but the rest are highly significant, especially for relative and effective 
spreads.  
Lastly, for firms in FTSE AIM All Shares, the quote spread ratios compared between 
mean quote spread on day 0 to an average quote spreads of 90 day pre earnings 
announcement is 1.07, and is highly significant. This indicates that the mean quote 
spread increase is 7% on that day compared to an average of 90 days pre event. In the 
[-5,+5] event period, the mean quoted spread is 1.01, increase in 1%, and highly 
significant, this indicates that spreads are significantly increased over the 11 trading 
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day period centred on the event day. For the relative spread ratios in the FTSEAIM 
All Shares, the results show a significant decrease over the whole post earnings 
announcement period. For effective spread, results show 40% increase significantly in 
the bid ask spread mean ratio on the announcement day, and 5% increase over the 3 
trading days. After that effective spread mean ration decreased lower than 1. 
Overall in London Stock Exchange, bid ask spreads increase significantly due to the 
impact of earnings announcement. In the long term, bid ask spreads decrease with 
time. In other words, stock market liquidity in London Stock Exchange decreases 
dramatically after the earnings news, and then gradually improves over time. 
4.3.2.2 American Stock Exchanges 
The results of the changes in liquidity of the US stock exchanges pre and post earnings 
announcement can be seen in table 4.3.2.2. There is clear evidence from this table that 
spread increases significantly for stocks in the US markets after the earnings 
announcement. For example, for firms in DJIA the quote spread ratios compared 
between mean quote spread on event day to an average quote spread of 90 day pre 
earnings announcement is 1.72, and is highly significant. This indicates that the mean 
quoted spread increases by 72% on that day compared to an average of 90 days pre 
event. In the [-5,+5] event period , the mean quoted spread ratio is 1.13, increased by 
13%, and is highly significant, which  indicates that spreads are significantly increased 
over the 11 trading day period centred on the event day. For the relative and effective 
spread ratios in the DIJA, the increases on event day are 67% and 76%, and the 
increases on [-5, 5] event periods are 11% and 44% respectively. 
A similar to the London Stock Exchange, another important thing to report here is; the 
spread ratios between post and pre earnings announcement period decrease with time 
in the long term. The ratios between mean spreads on the day 0 and that of average of 
90 days pre earnings announcement are 1.72, 1.67 and 1.76 for quote, relative and 
effective bid ask spread respectively. Mean relative spread ratio between 90 days post 
and pre earnings announcement period reduced to 0.96.  Those for quote and effective 
spreads reduced as well but only clearly (significantly) up to day 10. This led to 
another conclusion, due to impact of earnings announcement, in the short term, stock 
market liquidity decreases compared to pre earnings announcement period. In the long  
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Table 4.3.2.2- Short-term and long-term effects of earnings announcements on Stock Market 
Liquidity – The US markets. 
Stock market liquidity is measured by the quoted, relative, and effective bid-ask spreads. Quoted bid-
ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price. Relative bid-ask spread is defined as the ask 
price minus the bid price divided by the quoted mid price. Effective bid-ask spread is defined as twice 
the absolute value of the difference between the transaction price and the mid price in effect at the time 
of the trade. All ratios in the table are computed as the ratio of the average bid-ask spreads of each 
individual stock over the indicated event time period to the average bid-ask spreads measure on day -
90. The null hypothesis state that the mean of the reported ratio is equal to 1 is tested using a standard t-
statistic. 
 Quote Relative Effective 
 Ratio t-statistic ratio t-statistic ratio t-statistic 
DJIA       
[0, 0] 1.72*** 56.36 1.67*** 57.61 1.76*** 35.74 
[-1, 1] 1.48*** 37.72 1.47*** 40.47 1.88*** 41.47 
[-2, 2] 1.30*** 23.29 1.28*** 24.34 1.56*** 26.38 
[-3, 3] 1.19*** 15.04 1.19*** 16.51 1.50*** 23.74 
[-4, 4] 1.16*** 12.27 1.14*** 11.90 1.42*** 19.90 
[-5, 5] 1.13*** 10.38 1.11*** 9.68 1.44*** 20.69 
[0, 10] 1.05*** 4.27 1.02* 1.85 1.14*** 6.58 
[0, 30] 0.98 -1.46 0.96*** -3.66 1.02 0.73 
[0, 60] 0.97** -1.98 0.95*** -4.69 0.99 -0.62 
[0, 90] 1.01 0.94 0.96*** -3.17 1.03 1.56 
NASDAQ100    
[0, 0] 1.38*** 20.48 1.35*** 21.57 1.57*** 39.42 
[-1, 1] 1.31*** 17.03 1.29*** 18.14 1.43*** 29.41 
[-2, 2] 1.23*** 12.62 1.18*** 11.09 1.24*** 16.58 
[-3, 3] 1.17*** 9.29 1.17*** 10.33 1.19*** 12.78 
[-4, 4] 1.12*** 6.42 1.11*** 7.10 1.13*** 9.02 
[-5, 5] 1.07*** 3.67 1.08*** 4.91 1.08*** 5.47 
[0, 10] 1.09*** 5.00 1.11*** 7.10 1.02 1.34 
[0, 30] 1.10*** 5.45 1.14*** 8.88 0.93*** -4.56 
[0, 60] 1.20*** 10.59 1.23*** 14.07 0.90*** -7.07 
[0, 90] 1.30*** 15.99 1.30*** 18.43 0.90*** -6.78 
S&P100    
[0, 0] 1.81*** 84.34 1.66*** 53.59 1.99*** 57.45 
[-1, 1] 1.50*** 51.76 1.45*** 36.69 1.76*** 44.23 
[-2, 2] 1.29*** 29.69 1.24*** 19.89 1.41*** 23.63 
[-3, 3] 1.22*** 22.64 1.18*** 14.80 1.34*** 20.01 
[-4, 4] 1.16*** 17.12 1.13*** 10.31 1.28*** 16.05 
[-5, 5] 1.13*** 14.03 1.10*** 7.95 1.24*** 13.92 
[0, 10] 1.08*** 7.83 1.18*** 15.05 1.20*** 11.52 
[0, 30] 1.01 1.00 1.04*** 2.99 1.08*** 4.72 
[0, 60] 1.01 1.38 1.01 0.75 1.04*** 2.53 
[0, 90] 1.05 4.88 1.02 1.33 1.07 4.29 
 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
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term stock liquidity increased gradually though the increase does not last long as 
compared to London Stock Exchange. 
For firms in the NASDAQ100, the quote spread ratios compared to an average of 90 
day pre earnings announcement is 1.38, and is highly significant. This indicates that 
the mean quoted spread increase was 38% on that day compared to an average of 90 
days pre the event. In the [-5,+5] event window, the mean quoted spread ratio is 1.07, 
increases 7%, and is highly significant, this indicates that spreads are significantly 
increased over the 11 trading day period centred on the event day. For the relative and 
effective spread ratios in the DIJA, the increases on event day are 35% and 57%, and 
the increase on [-5,5] window periods are 8% and 8% for each. 
As similar to the London Stock Exchange, and the DIJA, another important thing to 
report for NASDAQ100 is, the spread ratios between post and pre earnings 
announcement period decreased with time over the long term. This led to a 
conclusion; though there is decrease compared to pre earnings announcement period, 
stock liquidity has increased over time.  Over the long term at the end the spread ratio 
is slightly lower than 1 for effective spread mean ratio and still higher than 1 for quote 
spread mean ratio. 
For firms in the S&P100 the quote spread ratios compared to an average of 90 days 
pre earnings announcement is 1.81, and highly significant. This indicates that the 
mean quoted spread increased 81% on that day compare to average of 90 days pre 
event. In the [-5,+5] event window, the mean quoted spread ratio is 1.13, increased  by 
13%, and highly significant, this indicates that spreads are significantly increased over 
the 11 trading day period centred on the event day. For the relative and effective 
spread ratios in DIJA, the increase on the event day are 66% and 99%, and the 
increase on the [-5, 5] event window periods are 10% and 24% respectively.  
Similarly as in the above indices in London Stock Exchange, the DJIA and 
NASDAQ100, the spread ratios between post and pre earnings announcement period 
decreased with time over the long term. This led to a conclusion, though there is 
decrease compared to pre earnings announcement period, stock liquidity increases 
over time. Over 90 days spread ratios for this index are still higher than 1, it means 
that stock liquidity level has not recovered its original average level after 90 days.  
4.3.2.3 Euronext Paris  
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Table 4.3.2.3- Short-term and long-term effects of earnings announcements on Stock Market 
Liquidity – Euronext Paris 
Stock market liquidity is measured by the quoted, relative, and effective bid-ask spreads. Quoted bid-
ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price. Relative bid-ask spread is defined as the ask 
price minus the bid price divided by the quoted mid price. Effective bid-ask spread is defined as twice 
the absolute value of the difference between the transaction price and the mid price in effect at the time 
of the trade. All ratios in the table are computed as the ratio of the average bid-ask spreads of each 
individual stock over the indicated event time period to the average bid-ask spreads measure on day -
90. The null hypothesis that the mean of the reported ratio is equal to one is tested using a standard t-
statistic. 
 Quote Relative Effective 
 Ratio t-statistic ratio t-statistic ratio t-statistic 
[0, 0] 0.80*** -10.58 0.84*** -8.88 0.67*** -17.04 
[-1, 1] 0.73*** -14.59 0.85*** -8.70 0.72*** -14.82 
[-2, 2] 0.72*** -14.81 0.78*** -12.21 0.70*** -15.76 
[-3, 3] 0.75*** -13.64 0.80*** -11.27 0.74*** -13.77 
[-4, 4] 0.70*** -16.05 0.76*** -13.79 0.70*** -15.85 
[-5, 5] 0.72*** -15.16 0.77*** -12.89 0.73*** -14.31 
[0, 10] 0.64*** -19.17 0.69*** -17.37 0.66*** -17.69 
[0, 30] 0.61*** -20.74 0.66*** -19.41 0.63*** -19.45 
[0, 60] 0.64*** -19.28 0.66*** -18.93 0.65*** -18.30 
[0, 90] 0.66*** -18.29 0.66*** -19.23 0.66*** -17.59 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
The results of the changes in liquidity of the Euronext Paris stock exchange pre and 
post earnings announcement can be seen in table 4.3.2.3. There is clear evidence from 
this table that the spread decreased significantly for stocks in the CAC40 markets after 
earnings announcement. For example, on the day of the event, for firms in the CAC40 
the quote spread ratios compared to an average of 90 days pre earnings announcement 
is 0.80, and is highly significant. This indicates that the mean quoted spread decreased 
by  20% on that day compare to average of 90 days pre event. In the [-5,+5] event 
window, the mean quoted spread ratio is 0.72, decreased by 28%, and is highly 
significant, this indicates that spreads are significantly decreased over the 11 trading 
day period centred on the event day. For the relative and effective spread ratios in the 
CAC40, the decreases on event day are 16% and 33%, and the decreases on [-5,5] 
event  periods are 23% and 27% respectively. 
Similarly as in the US and the UK markets an important thing to report is, the spread 
ratios between post and pre earnings announcement period decreased with time in the 
long term. This led to the conclusion, though stock liquidity already increased 
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compare to pre earnings announcement period, it increases by time. In the long term in 
the end spread ratios decrease up to 34% significantly. 
4.3.3 Summary 
In summary, this part of research investigates if earnings announcement creates a new 
information environment and how earnings news affects stock liquidity in different 
markets. My expectation is that with an improvement in the information environment, 
the stocks should be traded more and become more liquid. This part of the study 
however, shows that in post earnings announcement period, at first, bid ask spread 
increases (liquidity decrease) in the UK and the US markets. In the meantime, bid ask 
spread decreases (liquidity increase) in the French market. Why does this happen like 
that? As mentioned earlier that bid ask spread can be decomposed in the information 
asymmetry component and cost of trading component (which includes inventory 
holding cost and order processing cost) we can see that earnings news not only affect 
trading volume leading to the reduction in the cost of trading, but also increases the 
information asymmetry component in the bid ask spread. The reason for this is that 
when news is released, not everyone can approach the news in the same way. There 
will be investors who have advantages over other groups of investors. Therefore, 
earnings news once released will create a gap between informed and uninformed 
traders. This gap has usually been referred to as information asymmetry component in 
the bid ask spread. When the earnings news is released, this gap increases and it will 
in turn make the total bid ask spread increase. The uninformed traders can infer the 
extra information the insiders have by observing whatever they buy or cell. 
Now we can see that, the overall impact of earnings news on the bid ask spread will be 
the total of the above two effects. If the increase in information asymmetry component 
is dominant, then the total bid ask spread will increase (stock liquidity decreases). If 
the decrease in cost of trading component is dominant, then the total bid ask spread 
will decrease (stock liquidity increases).  What happened on the London Stock 
Exchange and the US markets suggests that the information asymmetry component 
dominates bid ask spread (stock liquidity) in those two common law countries; what 
happened on the Euronext Paris market suggests that the cost of trading component 
dominated bid ask spread (stock liquidity) in French market. This happened exactly as 
we expected from a code law country where earnings information is released through 
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different channel before the earnings announcement, and so it plays a less dominant 
role. 
Another point of notice in the results is that even though stock liquidity decreases (bid 
ask spread increases) in the common law countries as US and UK, and stock liquidity 
increases (bid ask spread decreases) in the code law country as France for the whole 
studied period of 90 days post earnings announcement, we can see that over time, 
stock liquidity increased (bid ask spread decreased) in all the three countries: the UK 
and the US and French markets. This evidence is seen in the gradual decrease in the 
bid ask spread ratios if we look at the different short term periods in tables from 
4.3.1.1 to 4.3.1.8. The reason for this being, as the time passes the information 
asymmetry in the news has less impact while trading volume still increases due to the 
news and by its own time linear function, leading to the continuous improvement in 
liquidity. This issue will be shown more clearly in the results of the next chapter 
(Chapter V). 
4.4. Conclusion 
Overall, this chapter provides the following conclusions: 
First of all, significant positive (negative) stock price reactions to the good (bad) 
earnings announcements are reported, providing a clear evidence of earnings news‟s 
impact on price after earnings announcement. This is consistent with previous 
literature on the US data and FTSE100, FTSE AIM All Shares and some other studied 
emerging markets. The increases/decreases in price are permanent. After the change 
has taken place, price does not go down or up to the original level as shown 
graphically and statistically. The good news has a longer impact while bad news ends 
quickly, except in the case of the NASDAQ100 where the good news for high tech 
firms seems to have more weight. Similarly as in the common law countries such as 
the US and the UK and in the code law country such as France, though earnings 
information were conveyed to the markets up to one month before the earnings 
announcement date, the reaction is still strongest on the announcement date and 
gradually reduces over subsequent days. 
With respect to the dramatic increase in trading volume after the earnings news, we 
can argue that stock liquidity has changed after the information was conveyed to the 
market, adding to the increase caused by a linear time trend. The impact of the news 
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on trading volume is most profound when the news is released. After the 
announcement date, the news continues to have effects on trading volume. Trading 
volume keeps increasing day after day, however the impact level is less aggressive 
and gradually decreases compared to the announcement day. 
Due to earnings announcement, the information environment is richer and stock will 
be traded more and become more liquid. However, evidence from LSE and from 
NYSE/NASDAQ/CBOE shows that bid ask spread increases/stock liquidity decreases 
after the earnings announcement while evidence from Paris Bourse shows that bid ask 
spread decreases/stock liquidity increases after earnings announcement. 
This leads to another argument that, the part of the stock liquidity increased due to 
trading volume effect has been deducted by the decrease in other component. The 
overall impact in the short term is that the stock liquidity decreased in the UK and the 
US markets, while increased in the French market. Since the trading volume increases, 
it will cause the inventory holding cost and order processing cost components in stock 
liquidity to decrease. Hence, with an overall decrease in liquidity in the US and the 
UK markets, the last component of stock liquidity, information asymmetry cost, must 
dominate in the US and the UK. Meanwhile, an overall increase in the liquidity in the 
French market must be dominated by inventory holding cost and order processing cost 
components (or cost of trading component). The information content in the common 
law countries such as the US, and the UK plays an important role while the 
information content in stock liquidity in France seems to play a less dominant role. 
Again, this happens as we expected due to the differences in the common law 
countries and code law country, earnings announcement provide more uncertainty in 
the common law system than in the code law system, due to the fact that news is 
conveyed to the market since 1 month before the announcement date through different 
channels. However, note be taken that there is still something surprising here, even 
though the news has been leaked before the announcement, we still see the post 
earnings announcement drift after the official announcement dates. 
In the long term, stock liquidity in both common law and code law systems increases 
with time after earnings announcement. This is due to the fact that  the information 
content becomes less impacting and diminishes with time. Meanwhile both factors 
with respect to volume: the linear time trend increase in volume; or the trading volume 
effects caused by earnings news still continues, leading to the continuous 
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improvement in liquidity. In both the cases, it points out that the information 
asymmetry component plays a less role when news is completely conveyed to the 
markets. To have a closer look at the role of information asymmetry component in 
liquidity we will study these issues in Chapter VI. At this point, based on the results 
from this chapter I will incorporate all of the possible factors that could affect stock 
liquidity in a multi-variate analysis model in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
 MULTI-VARIATE ANALYSIS                                                                    
OF THE LONG TERM IMPACT OF EARNINGS 
ANNOUNCEMENT ON STOCK MARKET LIQUIDITY 
 
The empirical results in the previous chapter are uni-variate analysis of earnings 
announcement‟s impact on the stock market liquidity. However, univariate analysis 
may omit other factors related to the earnings announcement.  Gregoriou, Ioannidis 
and Skerratt (2005) reported that bid ask spread increases with returns volatility and 
decreases with stock price and trading volume in the LSE. Atkins and Dyl (1997) also 
reported similar relationships for stock in the NYSE and the NASDAQ. Chapter IV 
has established the relationship between stock liquidity and those possible explanatory 
variables. To control for these possible explanatory factors, in this chapter, I carry out 
a multi-variate analysis of the long-term impacts of earnings announcements on stock 
market liquidity. Part 5.1 describes the methodology and model specification. Part 5.2 
presents diagnostic tests, empirical results and explanations. Part 5.3 gives conclusion 
of the findings. 
5.1. Methodologies 
My empirical analysis also drives from the approach of Hedge and Mc Dermott (2003) 
and Gregoriou (2008) in their studies of the effect of addition to and deletion from an 
index on stock liquidity.  I implemented a test using a log linear panel regression 
model with GMM estimator. Gregoriou et al (2005) report that the bid ask spread 
increase with return volatility and decrease with stock price and trading volume in 
London Stock Exchange. Atkins and Dyl (1997) also report the similar relationship for 
the stock in NYSE and NASDAQ. After control for volatility of stock returns, average 
stock price and trading volume, the model will explores whether the average market 
liquidity of stocks increase after earnings announcements.   
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            (5.1.1) 
Where,  
- i = 1, 2 .... number of stock in each sample index.  
- t = 1,2; where t = 1 corresponds to the pre earnings announcements [-90,-1], 
and t = 2 correspond to the post earnings announcements period, [0,90].  
- itIlliqidity  refers to either the natural logarithm of quoted, relative or effective 
bid-ask spreads for stock i at closing market at time t. 
- lnVolume represents natural logarithm of trading volume for stock i at time t. 
Trading volume is calculated as the product of the average of high prices and 
low prices on the day times the  number of shares traded on the day. 
- lnPrice refers to natural logarithm of daily closing price for stock i at time t. 
- Stdev refers to moving standard deviation of daily returns for stock i with n=5 
data points.  
- The Dummy variable is equal to 1 in the post earnings announcements and 
equal to 0 pre earnings announcements. 
- αj capture the time-invariant unobserved stock specific fixed effect.  
In this model, I employed an intercept dummy variable to discover any change in the 
stock illiquidity due to the event. As reported from previous chapter‟s empirical work, 
trading volume not only responses dramatically due the news, but also increases by 
time during the whole studied period. Therefore, not only trading volume but also an 
interaction term between the dummy and trading volume should be included To 
analyse the impact of earnings announcements on stock liquidity, I am mainly 
concerned with β1, the change in slope of dummy variable and β3, the change in the 
slope of trading volume, and β5, the change in the slope of stock price before and after 
the event.  
Ordinary Least Square does not account for the likely presence of endogeneity 
between the explanatory variables trading volume, stock price and returns volatility. 
The Instrumental Variable estimator can remove problem of endogeneity however, it 
fails to capture cross stock heterogeneity. Generalized Method of Movement panel 
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Estimator established by Arellando and Bond (1991) can overcome the above two 
shortcomings therefore it is used in this analysis. The one to four time period lagged 
dependant variables and regressors are added to the model as instrumental variables. 
5.2 Diagnostic tests and empirical results 
The panel passed most of the diagnostic tests across indices in the samples used in this 
thesis. The fix effect of the panel 𝛼𝑖  is significant with a p value of zero, for all 
indices
40
, it means that the differences in the initial levels of stock liquidity in the 
sample are successfully captured by the panel estimator. The test for first order 
residual serial correlation however, is significant, suggesting that the panel does suffer 
from autocorrelation. The residual of the panel is also not normally distributed, 
signalling that the results presented in the following part might be due to outliers in 
the data. However, the Sargan tests confirm the validity of the instruments in the 
model
41
. 
The estimation outputs using GMM method are presented from table 5.2.1.1 to 
5.2.1.8.  
5.2.1 London Stock Exchange 
5.2.1.1 FTSE 100.  
The constant i for FTSE 100 is significant in al the three bid-ask spreads, which 
means that the differences in the initial levels of liquidity of the stocks are captured by 
GMM estimators.  
After controlling for the impact of trading volume, share prices and volatility, in the 
effective spread model, the significance of intercept dummy coefficient β1 shows that 
the quote and relative bid-ask spreads increase (liquidity decrease) on average by 
0.30% after earnings announcements; the effective spread increases on average 0.38% 
after earnings announcements. β2 indicates that quote and relative bid-ask spreads 
decrease by 0.25%, the effective bid-ask spreads decrease by 0.19% when average 
trading volume increases by 1%. The interaction term β3 is significant in three spread 
models showing that in the long term the decrease in quote, relative and effective bid-
ask spreads due to 1% trading volume change are 0.02%, 0.02%, and 0.03 %  
srespectively. The interaction term β5 is statistically insignificant in three spread  
                                                 
40
 See tables from 5.2.1 to 5.2.8 
41
 See results tables in 5.2.1 to 5.2.8 
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Table 5.2.1.1. FTSE 100.  Multi variate analysis of the long term impact  of earnings 
announcement on stock market liquidity 
The sample consists of 99 FTSE100 firms that have data available for 181 days around earnings 
announcement date in the financial year 2006-2007. A log linear panel fixed effects regression model 
estimated with the use of Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator is used. The panel is used to 
determine whether the average market liquidity of the stock change after earnings announcement after 
controlling for stock prices, trading volume and volatility of stock returns. In addition, 𝛽3 and 𝛽5test if 
the slope coefficients on trading volume and price have changed following earnings announcement. The 
model has following specification: 
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For j=1,2 ….90 and t=1,2; where t=1 corresponds to the pre-earnings announcement of 99 firms on the 
FTSE 100, [0,-90], and t=2 corresponds to the post earnings announcement of 99 firms on the FTSE 
100, [0,+90]. The dependant variable 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  correspondent to either quoted, relative or effective 
bid ask spread for stock j at time period t. Quoted spread is defined as the difference between the ask 
price and the bid price. Relative bid ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price divided 
by the quoted mid-price. Effective bid ask spread is defined as twice as much as the absolute value of 
the difference between the transaction price and the mid price in effect at the time of the trade. 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 , and 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  represent the traded volume in money, closing price and return 
volatility for stock j at time t. The dummy variable 𝐷𝑡  is equal to 1 in the post earnings announcement 
period, and is equal to 0 otherwise. All the variables apart from 𝐷𝑡  are taken in their natural logarithms. 
αj capture the time-invariant unobserved stock specific fixed effects. AR(1) is the first order Lagrange 
Multiplier test performed on the first difference of the residuals is because of the transformations 
involved. Sargan test follow a Chi-squared distribution with r degree of freedom under the null 
hypothesis of valid instruments. NORM(2) is the p-value for the Jaque-Bera normality test. The 
endogenous explanatory variables (all variables apart from 𝐷𝑡) in the panel are GMM instrumented 
setting z≥1.  [.] are p value and (.) are t statistics. 
 
Coefficient Variables Quote Bid-ask 
spreads 
Relative Bid-ask 
spreads 
Effective Bid-ask 
spreads 
Constantj Αi -1.56*** -1.56*** -2.51*** 
β1 Dt 0.30* 0.30* 0.38*** 
β2 lnVolume -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.19*** 
β3 lnVolume*Dt -0.02* -0.02* -0.03*** 
β4 lnPrice 0.83*** -0.17*** 0.79*** 
β5 lnPrice*Dt 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 
β6 Moving StDev 12.56*** 12.56*** 10.39*** 
j  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
AR(1)  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
J statistic  11 35 16 
Sargan test   [0.28] [0.28] [0.56] 
NORM(2)  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Adjusted R2  0.56 0.24 0.53 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
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models showing that the change due to event (associated with intercept dummy) is 
constant effect. 
β4 and β6 are significant for three measures of bid-ask spread, which shows that stock 
liquidity is explained by the price and price volatility. 
The J statistic is simply the Sargan statistic and the instrument rank larger than the 
number of estimated coefficient; I use it to construct the Sargan test of over 
identifying restrictions. Under the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions 
are valid, the Sargan statistic is distributed as a 𝜒2, (𝑝 − 𝑘), where k is the number of 
estimated coefficients and p is the instrument rank. The p-value of 0.28, 0.28 and 0.63 
in this example do not rejects null hypothesis of over-identifying instrumental 
variables, that is the error term is uncorrelated with the instruments.  The R
2
 indicates 
that 56% of the variation in the liquidity is explained by the quote spread model; 24% 
for relative spread model and 53 % for the effective spread model. 
The panel does not pass the test of the residual serial correlation, and the normality 
test. 
5.2.1.2. FTSE250.  
The constant i for the FTSE 250 is significant in all three the bid-ask spreads, which 
means that the difference in the initial levels of liquidity of the stocks is captured by 
the GMM estimators.  
After controlling for the impact of trading volume, share prices and volatility, in the 
effective spread model, the significance of intercept dummy coefficient β1 shows that 
the quote and relative bid-ask spreads increase (liquidity decrease) on average by 
0.53% after earnings announcements and the effective bid-ask spreads increase by 
0.43%. β2 indicates that quote and relative bid-ask spreads decrease 0.48% and 
effective spread decrease 0.38% when trading volume increases by 1%. The 
interaction term β3 is significant showing that the bid-ask spreads due to 1% trading 
volume change are even further decreased by 0.04% for all the models: quote, relative 
and effective bid-ask spread models, due to the impact of earnings announcements. 
The interaction term β5 is statistically insignificant in three spread models showing 
that the change due to event (associated with intercept dummy) is constant effect. 
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Table 5.2.1.2. FTSE 250.  Multi variate analysis of the long term impact of earnings 
announcement on stock market liquidity 
The sample consists of 233 FTSE250 firms that have data available for 181 days around earnings 
announcement date in the financial year 2006-2007. A log linear panel fixed effects regression model 
estimated with the use of Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator is used. The panel is used to 
determine whether the average market liquidity of the stock change after earnings announcement after 
controlling for stock prices, trading volume and volatility of stock returns. In addition, 𝛽3 and 𝛽5  test if 
the slope coefficients on trading volume and price have changed following earnings announcement. The 
model has following specification: 
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For j=1,2 ….90 and t=1,2; where t=1 corresponds to the pre-earnings announcement of 99 firms on the 
FTSE 100, [0,-90], and t=2 corresponds to the post earnings announcement of 99 firms on the FTSE 
100, [0,+90]. The dependant variable 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  correspondent to either quoted, relative or effective 
bid ask spread for stock j at time period t. Quoted spread is defined as the difference between the ask 
price and the bid price. Relative bid ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price divided 
by the quoted mid-price. Effective bid ask spread is defined as twice as much as the absolute value of 
the difference between the transaction price and the mid price in effect at the time of the trade. 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 , and 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  represent the traded volume in money, closing price and return 
volatility for stock j at time t. The dummy variable 𝐷𝑡  is equal to 1 in the post earnings announcement 
period, and is equal to 0 otherwise. All the variables apart from 𝐷𝑡  are taken from their natural 
logarithms. αj captures the time-invariant unobserved stock specific fixed effects. AR(1) is the first 
order Lagrange Multiplier test performed on the first difference of the residuals because of the 
transformations involved. Sargan test follow a Chi-squared distribution with r degree of freedom under 
the null hypothesis of valid instruments. NORM(2) is the p-value for the Jaque-Bera normality test. The 
endogenous explanatory variables (all variables apart from 𝐷𝑡) in the panel are GMM instrumented 
setting z≥1.  [.] are p value and (.) are t statistics. 
Coefficient 
 
Variables 
 
Quote Bid-ask 
spreads 
Relative Bid-ask 
spreads 
Effective Bid-ask 
spreads 
Constantj Αi 1.13*** 1.13*** -0.23** 
β1 Dt 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.43*** 
β2 lnVolume -0.48*** -0.48*** -0.38*** 
β3 lnVolume*Dt -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04** 
β4 LnPrice 0.92*** -0.08*** 0.86*** 
β5 LnPrice*Dt -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 
β6 Moving StDev 12.74*** 12.74*** 12.05*** 
j  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
AR(1)  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
J statistic  56 56 41 
Sargan test  0.24 0.23 0.47 
NORM(2)  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Adjusted R
2
  0.56 0.30 0.31 
 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
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β4 and β6 are significant for three measures of bid-ask spread, which shows that stock 
liquidity is explained by the price and price volatility. 
The Sargan test is insignificant, which means that the error term is uncorrelated with 
the instruments, in the other words, it rejects the possibility of over-identifying 
instrumental variables.  The R
2
 indicates that 56% of the variation in the liquidity is 
explained by the quote bid-ask spreads model, 30% is explained by relative spread 
model and 31% by the effective model. 
However, the panel does not pass the normality test and the test of the first order 
residual serial correlation, propose a non-linear relationship between variables. 
5.2.1.3 FTSE Small Cap.  
The constant i for the FTSE Small Cap is significant in all the three bid-ask spreads, 
which means that the differences in the initial levels of liquidity of the stocks are 
captured by GMM estimators.  
After controlling for the impact of trading volume, share prices and volatility, in the 
effective spread model, the significance of intercept dummy coefficient β1 shows that 
the quote bid-ask spreads increase (liquidity decrease) on average by 0.55%, the 
relative bid-ask spreads increase by 0.54% and the effective bid-ask spreads increase 
by 0.36% the after earnings announcements. β2 indicates that quote and relative bid-
ask spreads decrease by 0.47% and effective bid-ask spreads decrease by 0.23% when 
trading volume increases by 1%. The interaction term β3 is significant,  showing that 
the decrease in bid-ask spreads due to 1% trading volume change caused by the 
impact of earnings announcements are 0.06%, 0.06%; 0.03% for quote spread, relative 
spread and effective spread respectively. Finally, the interaction term β5 is statistically 
insignificant in three spread models showing that the change due to event (associated 
with intercept dummy) is constant effect. 
β4 and β6 are significant for three measures of bid-ask spread, which shows that stock 
liquidity is explained by the price and price volatility. 
The Sargan test is insignificant, rejects the possibility of over-identifying instrumental 
variables, which means that the instruments are valid. 
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Table 5.2.1.3. FTSE Small Cap.  Multi variate analysis of the long term impact of earnings 
announcement on stock market liquidity 
The sample consists of 310 FTSE Small Cap firms that have data available for 181 days around 
earnings announcement date in the financial year 2006-2007. A log linear panel fixed effects regression 
model estimated with the use of Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator is used. The panel is used 
to determine whether the average market liquidity of the stock change after earnings announcement 
after controlling for stock prices, trading volume and volatility of stock returns. In addition, 𝛽3 and  
𝛽5 test if the slope coefficients on trading volume and price have changed following earnings 
announcement. The model has the following specification: 
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For j=1,2 ….90 and t=1,2;  where t=1 corresponds to the pre-earnings announcement of 99 firms on the 
FTSE 100, [0,-90], and t=2 corresponds to the post earnings announcement of 99 firms on the FTSE 
100, [0,+90]. The dependant variable 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  corresponds to either quoted, relative or effective 
bid ask spread for stock j at time period t. Quoted spread is defined as the difference between the ask 
price and the bid price. Relative bid ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price divided 
by the quoted mid-price. Effective bid ask spread is defined as twice as much as the absolute value of 
the difference between the transaction price and the mid price in effect at the time of the trade. 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 , and 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  represent the traded volume in money, closing price and return 
volatility for stock j at time t. The dummy variable 𝐷𝑡  is equal to 1 in the post earnings announcement 
period, and is equal to 0 otherwise. All the variables apart from 𝐷𝑡  are taken in their natural logarithms. 
αj captures the time-invariant unobserved stock specific fixed effects. AR(1) is the first order Lagrange 
Multiplier test performed on the first difference of the residuals because of the transformations 
involves. Sargan test follow a Chi-squared distribution with r degree of freedom under the null 
hypothesis of valid instruments. NORM(2) is the p-value for the Jaque-Bera normality test. The 
endogenous explanatory variables (all variables apart from 𝐷𝑡) in the panel are GMM instrumented 
setting z≥1.  [.] are p value and (.) are t statistics. 
Coefficient 
 
Variables 
 
Quote Bid-ask 
spreads 
Relative Bid-ask 
spreads 
Effective Bid-ask 
spreads 
Constantj Αi 0.76*** 0.73*** -1.33*** 
β1 Dt 0.55** 0.54** 0.36* 
β2 lnVolume -0.47*** -0.47*** -0.23*** 
β3 lnVolume*Dt -0.06* -0.06* -0.03* 
β4 LnPrice 0.94*** -0.06*** 0.75*** 
β5 LnPrice*Dt -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0047 
β6 Moving StDev 15.49*** 15.41*** 13.89*** 
j  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
AR(1)  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
J statistic  24 24 7.55 
Sargan test  0.17 0.17 0.23 
NORM(2)  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Adjusted R2  0.45 0.31 0.31 
 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
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The R
2
 indicates that 45% of the variation in the liquidity is explained by the quote 
model, 37% is explained by relative model, and 31% is explained by the effective 
model. 
However, the panel does not pass the normality test and the test of the first order 
residual serial correlation, proposes a non-linear relationship between variables. 
5.2.1.4 FTSE AIM All shares.  
The constant i for FTSE AIM All Shares is significant in all three measures of bid-
ask spreads, which means that the differences in the initial levels of liquidity of the 
stocks are captured by GMM estimators.  
After controlling for the impact of trading volume, share prices and volatility, in the 
effective spread model, the significance of intercept dummy coefficient β1 shows that 
the effective bid-ask spreads does not change significantly after earnings 
announcements. The quote and relative spread increased (liquidity decrease) by 
0.07%.  The interaction term β3 in effective spread model is insignificant, showing 
that the effective bid-ask spreads are persistent after earnings announcements. The 
interaction term β3 in quoted spread and relative spread models is significant and has 
negative sign, which means that, due to the interaction of 1% increase in trading 
volume, quote and relative spread will decrease (liquidity increase) by -0.01%.  
Finally, the interaction term β5 is statistically insignificant in three spread models 
showing that the change due to event (associated with intercept dummy) is constant 
effect.  
β4 and β6 are significant for three measures of bid-ask spread, which shows that stock 
liquidity is explained by the price and price volatility. 
The Sargan test is insignificant, means that the instruments are valid.  The R
2
 indicates 
that 91% of the variation in the liquidity is explained by the quote model, 81% is 
explained by relative model, and 74% is explained by the effective model. 
The panel does not pass the normality test and the test of the first order residual serial 
correlation, propose a non-linear relationship between variables and outliers in data. 
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Table 5.2.1.4. FTSE AIM All Shares.  Multi variate analysis of the long term impact of earnings 
announcement on stock market liquidity 
The sample consists of 913 FTSE AIM All Shares firms that have data available for 181 days around 
earnings announcement date in the financial year 2006-2007. A log linear panel fixed effects regression 
model estimated with the use of Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator is used. The panel is used 
to determine whether the average market liquidity of the stock changes after earnings announcement 
after controlling for stock prices, trading volume and volatility of stock returns. In addition, 𝛽3  and 
𝛽5 test if the slope coefficients on trading volume have changed following earnings announcement. The 
model has following specification: 
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For j=1, 2 ….90 and t=1, 2; where t=1 corresponds to the pre-earnings announcement of 99 firms on the 
FTSE 100, [0,-90], and t=2 corresponds to the post earnings announcement of 99 firms on the FTSE 
100, [0, +90]. The dependant variable 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  corresponds to either quoted, relative or effective 
bid ask spread for stock j at time period t. Quoted spread is defined as the difference between the ask 
price and the bid price. Relative bid ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price divided 
by the quoted mid-price. Effective bid ask spread is defined as twice as much as the absolute value of 
the difference between the transaction price and the mid price in effect at the time of the trade. 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 ,𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 , and 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  represent the traded volume in money, closing price and return 
volatility for stock j at time t. The dummy variable 𝐷𝑡  is equal to 1 in the post earnings announcement 
period, and is equal to 0 otherwise. All the variables apart from 𝐷𝑡  are taken in their form of natural 
logarithms. αj captures the time-invariant unobserved stock specific fixed effects. AR(1) is the first 
order Lagrange Multiplier test performed on the first difference of the residuals because of the 
transformations involved. Sargan test follow a Chi-squared distribution with r degree of freedom under 
the null hypothesis of valid instruments. NORM(2) is the p-value for the Jaque-Bera normality test. The 
endogenous explanatory variables (all variables apart from 𝐷𝑡) in the panel are GMM instrumented 
setting z≥1.  [.] are p value and (.) are t statistics. 
Coefficient 
 
Variables 
 
Quote Bid-ask 
spreads 
Relative Bid-ask 
spreads 
Effective Bid-ask 
spreads 
Constantj Αi -1.62*** -1.62*** -6.47*** 
β1 Dt 0.07** 0.07*** 0.27 
β2 lnVolume 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.01 
β3 lnVolume*Dt -0.01** -0.01*** -0.03 
β4 LnPrice 0.63*** -0.37*** 1.35*** 
β5 LnPrice*Dt 0.008 0.008 -0.047 
β6 Moving StDev -4.34*** -4.30*** 1.46** 
j  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
AR(1)  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
J statistic  22 21 19 
Sargan  0.27 0.23 0.41 
NORM(2)  0.01 0.01 0.00 
Adjusted R2  0.91 0.81 0.71 
 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
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5.2.2. The US Stock Exchanges 
5.2.2.1. DJIA. 
Table 5.2.2.1. DJIA.  Multi variate analysis of the long term impact of earnings announcement on 
stock market liquidity 
The sample consists of 30 DJIA firms that have data available for 181 days around earnings 
announcement date in the financial year 2006-2007. A log linear panel fixed effects regression model 
estimated with the use of Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator is used. The panel is used to 
determine whether the average market liquidity of the stock change after earnings announcement after 
controlling for stock prices, trading volume and volatility of stock returns. In addition, 𝛽3 and 𝛽5 test if 
the slope coefficients on trading volume and price have changed following earnings announcement. The 
model has following specification: 
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For j=1,2 ….90 and t=1,2; where t=1 corresponds to the pre-earnings announcement of 99 firms on the 
FTSE 100, [0,-90], and t=2 corresponds to the post earnings announcement of 99 firms on the FTSE 
100, [0,+90]. The dependant variable 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  correspondent to either quoted, relative or effective 
bid ask spread for stock j at time period t. Quoted spread is defined as the difference between the ask 
price and the bid price. Relative bid ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price divided 
by the quoted mid-price. Effective bid ask spread is defined as twice as much as the absolute value of 
the difference between the transaction price and the mid price in effect at the time of the trade. 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 , and 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  represents the traded volume in money, closing price and return 
volatility for stock j at time t. The dummy variable 𝐷𝑡  is equal to 1 in the post earnings announcement 
period, and is equal to 0 otherwise. All the variables apart from 𝐷𝑡  are taken from their natural 
logarithms. αj captures the time-invariant unobserved stock specific fixed effects. AR(1) is the first 
order Lagrange Multiplier test performed on the first difference of the residuals because of the 
transformations involved. Sargan test follow a Chi-squared distribution with r degree of freedom under 
the null hypothesis of valid instruments. NORM (2) is the p-value for the Jaque-Bera normality test. 
The endogenous explanatory variables (all variables apart from𝐷𝑡) in the panel are GMM instrumented 
setting z≥1.  [.] are p value and (.) are t statistics. 
Coefficient 
 
Variables 
 
Quote Bid-ask 
spreads 
Relative Bid-ask 
spreads 
Effective Bid-ask 
spreads 
Constantj Αi -3.86*** -3.86*** -8.83*** 
β1 Dt 0.58 0.58** 2.06 
β2 lnVolume -0.17*** -0.17*** 0.36** 
β3 lnVolume*Dt -0.04*** -0.04** -0.15 
β4 LnPrice 0.65*** -0.35*** -0.18 
β5 LnPrice*Dt 0.13 0.13 -0.07 
β6 Moving StDev 6.67*** 6.67*** 10.03 
j  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
AR(1)  [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] 
J statistic  21 21 19 
Sargan test  0.62 0.62 0.38 
NORM(2)  0.01 0.00 0.00 
Adjusted R
2
  0.38 0.26 0.17 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
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The constant i for DJIA is significant in all three bid-ask spreads, which means that 
the differences in the initial levels of liquidity of the stocks are captured by GMM 
estimators.  
After controlling for the impact of trading volume, share prices and volatility, in the 
quote and effective spread model, intercept dummy β1 is insignificant and shows that 
the effective bid-ask spreads are persistent over the long term after earnings 
announcements. However, the quoted and relative bid ask spreads increase (liquidity 
decrease) significantly due to the earnings announcement. The interaction term β3 in 
effective spread model is insignificant showing that the bid-ask spreads does not 
change due to trading volume change after earnings announcements. However, the 
interaction terms β3 for quoted and relative spread model are significant and shows 
that quoted and relative spreads decrease (stock liquidity increase) by 0.04% due to 
the interaction of 1% increase in trading volume. Finally, the interaction term β5 is 
statistically insignificant in three spread models showing that the change due to event 
(associated with intercept dummy) is constant effect. 
β4 and β6 are significant for three measures of bid-ask spread, which shows that stock 
liquidity is explained by the price and price volatility. 
The Sargan test is insignificant, shows the appropriateness of the instrumental 
variables. The R
2
 indicates that 38% of the variation in the liquidity is explained by 
the quote model, 26% is explained by relative model, and 17% is explained by the 
effective model. 
Models might suffer from auto-correlation and outlier in data based on the result of 
first order Lagrange Multiplier test performed on the first difference of the residuals, 
and Jaque-Berra test for normality. 
5.2.2.2 NASDAQ100. 
 The constant i for the NASDAQ100 is significant in all the three bid-ask spreads, 
which means that the differences in the initial levels of liquidity of the stocks are 
captured by GMM estimators.  
After controlling the impact of trading volume, share prices and volatility, the 
significance of β1 shows that the bid-ask spreads increased (liquidity decrease) on an 
average by 0.59%, 0.59%, and 0.74% for quoted spread model, relative spread model 
and effective spread models respectively, after earnings announcements. β2 indicates  
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Table 5.2.2.2. NASDAQ 100.  Multi variate analysis of the long term impact of earnings 
announcement on stock market liquidity 
The sample consists of 96 NASDAQ100 firms that have data available for 181 days around earnings 
announcement date in the financial year 2006-2007. A log linear panel fixed effects regression model 
estimated with the use of Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator is used. The panel is used to 
determine whether the average market liquidity of the stock change after earnings announcement after 
controlling for stock prices, trading volume and volatility of stock returns. In addition, 𝛽3 and 𝛽5 test if 
the slope coefficients on trading volume and price have changed following earnings announcement. The 
model has the following specification: 
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For j=1, 2 ….90 and t=1, 2; where t=1 corresponds to the pre-earnings announcement of 99 firms on the 
FTSE 100, [0,-90], and t=2 corresponds to the post earnings announcement of 99 firms on the FTSE 
100, [0, +90]. The dependant variable 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  correspondent to either quoted, relative or effective 
bid ask spread for stock j at time period t. Quoted spread is defined as the difference between the ask 
price and the bid price. Relative bid ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price divided 
by the quoted mid-price. Effective bid ask spread is defined as twice as much as the absolute value of 
the difference between the transaction price and the mid price in effect at the time of the trade. 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 , and 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  represents the traded volume in money, closing price and return 
volatility for stock j at time t. The dummy variable 𝐷𝑡  is equal to 1 in the post earnings announcement 
period, and is equal to 0 otherwise. All the variables apart from 𝐷𝑡  are taken in their natural logarithms. 
αj captures the time-invariant unobserved stock specific fixed effects. AR(1) is the first order Lagrange 
Multiplier test performed on the first difference of the residuals because of the transformations 
involved. Sargan test follow a Chi-squared distribution with r degree of freedom under the null 
hypothesis of valid instruments. NORM(2) is the p-value for the Jaque-Bera normality test. The 
endogenous explanatory variables (all variables apart from𝐷𝑡) in the panel are GMM instrumented 
setting z≥1.  [.] are p value and (.) are t statistics. 
Coefficient 
 
Variables 
 
Quote Bid-ask 
spreads 
Relative Bid-ask 
spreads 
Effective Bid-ask 
spreads 
Constantj Αi -4.82*** -4.82*** -5.73*** 
β1 Dt 0.59*** 0.59*** 0.74*** 
β2 lnVolume -0.09*** -0.09*** 0.03*** 
β3 lnVolume*Dt -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.07*** 
β4 LnPrice 0.51*** -0.49*** 0.47*** 
β5 LnPrice*Dt 0.045 0.045 0.018 
β6 Moving StDev 3.10*** 3.11*** 6.70*** 
j  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
AR(1)  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
J statistic  15.9 15.9 11.98 
Sargan test  0.42 0.42 0.33 
NORM(2)  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Adjusted R2  0.35 0.35 0.13 
 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
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that bid-ask spreads increases by 0.03% when trading volume increases by 1%. 
Finally the interaction term β3 is significant showing that the decrease in bid-ask 
spreads due to a 1% trading volume change is 0.05%, 0,05% and 0.07% in quote 
spread model, relative spread model, and effective spread model respectively due to 
the long term impact of the earnings announcements. Finally, the interaction term β5 
is statistically insignificant in three spread models showing that the change due to 
event (associated with intercept dummy) is constant effect. 
β4 and β6 are significant for three measures of bid-ask spread, which shows that stock 
liquidity is explained by the price and price volatility. 
The Sargan test rejects null hypothesis of over-identifying instrumental variables 
shows the appropriateness of the instrumental variables.  The R
2
 indicates that 35% of 
the variation in the liquidity is explained by the quoted spread model; 35% is 
explained by the relative spread model, and 13% is explained by an effective spread 
model. 
However, the panel does not pass the normality test and the test of the first order 
residual serial correlation, propose a non-linear relationship between variables. The 
test for normality also does not pass, thus proposes outliers in the data set. 
5.2.2.3. S&P 100.  
The constant i for the S&P100 is significant in all the three bid-ask spreads, meaning 
that the differences in the initial levels of liquidity of the stocks are captured by GMM 
estimators.  
After controlling for the impact of trading volume, share prices and volatility, in the 
three measures of spread model, the significance of intercept dummy coefficient β1 
shows that the quoted bid-ask spreads increased (liquidity decrease) on an average by 
0.09% in quoted and relative spread model and 0.35  in effective spread model after 
earnings announcements. β2 indicates that bid-ask spreads decreased (liquidity 
increase) 0.09%, 0,09%, and 0.40% in quote,  relative and effective spread models 
respectively when trading volume increases by 1%. Finally the interaction term β3 is 
significant in all of the three  spread models showing that the decrease in bid-ask 
spreads (increase in liquidity) due to 1% trading volume change are 0.01%,  0.01%,  
and 0.26% for quoted,  relative, and effective spread model respectively due to the  
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Table 5.2.2.3. S&P 100.  Multi variate analysis of the long term impact of earnings announcement 
on stock market liquidity 
The sample consists of 100 S&P100 firms that have data available for 181 days around earnings 
announcement date in the financial year 2006-2007. A log linear panel fixed effects regression model 
estimated with the use of Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator is used. The panel is used to 
determine whether the average market liquidity of the stock change after earnings announcement after 
controlling for stock prices, trading volume and volatility of stock returns. In addition, 𝛽3 and 𝛽5 test if 
the slope coefficients on trading volume and price have changed following the earnings announcement. 
The model has following specification: 
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For j=1,2 ….90 and t=1, 2; where t=1 corresponds to the pre-earnings announcement of 99 firms on the 
FTSE 100, [0,-90], and t=2 corresponds to the post earnings announcement of 99 firms on the FTSE 
100, [0,+90]. The dependant variable 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  correspondent to either quoted, relative or effective 
bid ask spread for stock j at time period t. Quoted spread is defined as the difference between the ask 
price and the bid price. Relative bid ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price divided 
by the quoted mid-price. Effective bid ask spread is defined as twice as much as the absolute value of 
the difference between the transaction price and the mid price in effect at the time of the trade. 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 , and 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  represent the traded volume in money, closing price and return 
volatility for stock j at time t. The dummy variable 𝐷𝑡  is equal to 1 in the post earnings announcement 
period, and is equal to 0 otherwise. All the variables apart from 𝐷𝑡  are taken in their natural logarithms. 
αj captures the time-invariant unobserved stock specific fixed effects. AR(1) is the first order Lagrange 
Multiplier test performed on the first difference of the residuals because of the transformations 
involved. Sargan test follow a Chi-squared distribution with r degree of freedom under the null 
hypothesis of valid instruments. NORM(2) is the p-value for the Jaque-Bera normality test. The 
endogenous explanatory variables (all variables apart from 𝐷𝑡) in the panel are GMM instrumented 
setting z≥1.  [.] are p value and (.) are t statistics. 
Coefficient 
 
Variables 
 
Quote Bid-ask 
spreads 
Relative Bid-ask 
spreads 
Effective Bid-ask 
spreads 
Constantj Αi -4.75*** -4.75*** -11.96*** 
β1 Dt 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.35*** 
β2 lnVolume -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.40*** 
β3 lnVolume*Dt -0.01 -0.01 -0.26*** 
β4 LnPrice 0.63*** -0.37*** 0.65*** 
β5 LnPrice*Dt 0.055 0.055 -0.006 
β6 Moving StDev -1.74 -1.74 10.92** 
j  [0.00] [0.00] 0.04*** 
AR(1)  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
J statistic  44 44 41 
Sargan test  0.31 0.31 0.49 
NORM(2)  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Adjusted R2  0.27 0.14 0.04 
 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
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impact of earnings announcements. The interaction term β5 is statistically 
insignificant in three spread models showing that the change due to event (associated 
with intercept dummy) is single effect. 
β4 and β6 are significant for three measures of bid-ask spread, which shows that stock 
liquidity is explained by the price and price volatility. 
The Sargan test is insignificant, shows the appropriateness of instrumental variables.  
The R
2
 indicates that 27% of the variation in the liquidity is explained by the quote 
model; 14% of the variation in the liquidity is explained by relative spread model and 
4% by effective spread model. 
However, the panel does not pass the normality test and the test of the first order 
residual serial correlation, propose a non-linear relationship between variables. 
5.2.3. Euronext Paris 
5.2.3.1. CAC40. 
 The constant i for the FTSE Small Cap is significant in all the three bid-ask spreads 
models, which means that the differences in the initial levels of liquidity of the stocks 
are captured by GMM estimators.  
After controlling for the impact of trading volume, share prices and volatility, in the 
three measures of spread models, the significance of β1 shows that the bid-ask spreads 
increase (liquidity decrease) on average by 1.67% after earnings announcements in 
quoted spread model, 1.67% in relative model, and 2.55% in effective spread model. 
β2 indicates that bid-ask spreads decrease (liquidity decrease) by 0.17%% associated 
to 1% trading volume increase  in quoted and relative spread models, and 15% in the 
effective spread model. Finally the interaction term β3 is significant, showing that the 
decrease in bid-ask spreads due to 1% trading volume change are 0.18%, 0.18%, and 
0.25% in the quoted, relative and effective spread models respectively due to the 
impact of earnings announcements. The interaction term β5 is statistically 
insignificant in three spread models showing that the change due to event (associated 
with intercept dummy) is single effect. β4 and β6 are significant for three measures of 
bid-ask spread, which shows that stock liquidity is explained by the price and price 
volatility. 
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Table 5.2.3.1. CAC40.  Multi variate analysis of the long-term impact of earnings announcement 
on stock market liquidity 
The sample consists of 40 CAC40 firms that have data available for 181 days around earnings 
announcement date in the financial year 2006-2007. A log linear panel fixed effects regression model 
estimated with the use of Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator is used. The panel is used to 
determine whether the average market liquidity of the stock change after earnings announcement after 
controlling for stock prices, trading volume and volatility of stock returns. In addition, 𝛽3 and 𝛽5 test if 
the slope coefficients on trading volume and price have changed following earnings announcement. The 
model has following specification: 
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For j=1,2 ….90 and t=1, 2; where t=1 corresponds to the pre-earnings announcement of 99 firms on the 
FTSE 100, [0,-90], and t=2 corresponds to the post earnings announcement of 99 firms on the FTSE 
100, [0,+90]. The dependant variable 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  corresponds to either quoted, relative or effective 
bid ask spread for stock j at time period t. Quoted spread is defined as the difference between the ask 
price and the bid price. Relative bid ask spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price divided 
by the quoted mid-price. Effective bid ask spread is defined as twice as much as the absolute value of 
the difference between the transaction price and the mid price in effect at the time of the trade. 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 , and 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡  represent the traded volume in money, closing price and return 
volatility for stock j at time t. The dummy variable 𝐷𝑡  is equal to 1 in the post earnings announcement 
period, and is equal to 0 otherwise. All the variables apart from 𝐷𝑡  are taken in form of natural 
logarithms. αj captures the time-invariant unobserved stock specific fixed effects. AR(1) is the first 
order Lagrange Multiplier test performed on the first difference of the residuals because of the 
transformations involves. Sargan test follow a Chi-squared distribution with r degree of freedom under 
the null hypothesis of valid instruments. NORM(2) is the p-value for the Jaque-Bera normality test. The 
endogenous explanatory variables (all variables apart from 𝐷𝑡) in the panel are GMM instrumented 
setting z≥1.  [.] are p value and (.) are t statistics. 
Coefficient 
 
Variables 
 
Quote Bid-ask 
spreads 
Relative Bid-ask 
spreads 
Effective Bid-ask 
spreads 
Constantj Αi -4.76*** -4.76*** -5.36*** 
β1 Dt 1.67*** 1.67*** 2.55*** 
β2 lnVolume -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.15*** 
β3 lnVolume*Dt -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.25*** 
β4 LnPrice 0.84*** -0.16*** 0.91*** 
β5 LnPrice*Dt -0.52 -0.52 -0.44 
β6 Moving StDev 7.37** 7.38** -1.51 
j  [0.00] 0.282366 [0.00] 
AR(1)  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
J statistic  36 36 11 
Sargan test  0.19 0.21 0.33 
NORM(2)  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Adjusted R2  0.48 0.26 0.06 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level  
*** Significant at 1% level 
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The Sargan is insignificant, rejects the possibility of over identifying instrument 
variables. The R
2
 indicates that 48% of the variation in stock liquidity is explained by 
the quoted spread model, 26% of the variation in stock liquidity is explained by the 
relative spread model and only 6% of the variation in stock liquidity is explained by 
the effective spread model. The panel does not pass the normality test and the test of 
the first order residual serial correlation, propose a non-linear relationship between 
variables and outlier in data set. 
5.3. Summary 
From the findings we observed that in the long term there are two sided impacts of 
earnings announcement on stock liquidity /bid ask spread. Earnings announcements 
increase bid ask spread (decrease stock liquidity) as we observe from a significant 
positive intercept dummy variable coefficient 𝛽1. Meanwhile the trading volume 
increases due to earnings announcement leading to the decrease in the bid ask spread 
(or improvement in stock liquidity) as we observe from significant negative β3. The 
overall effect will be the total of both the above effects. This finding holds true in both 
a univariate and multivariate analysis, and this also explaines the results in the 
univariate analysis, particularly the results from information cost liquidity hypothesis 
application. In the short term, stock liquidity decreases (bid ask increases) due to 
immediate impacts of earnings announcement. Due to the increase in trading volume 
after earnings announcement, stock liquidity gradually increases (bid ask spread 
decrease) by time. This helps to explain both situations in common law countries such 
as the US and the UK, where the information asymmetry cost component dominates 
bid ask spread and in code law country such as France, where the cost of trading 
(inventory holding and order processing cost components) dominates bid ask spread. 
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CHAPTER VI  
STOCK LIQUIDITY AND POST EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT 
DRIFT: IMPLICATIONS OF BID ASK SPREAD AND 
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY COMPONENT 
This chapter aims to investigate the source of the change in stock liquidity associated 
with post earnings announcement drift. It will examine the effects of total bid ask 
spread and particularly the information asymmetry cost component on the post 
earnings announcements drifts to work out the influence of news seperately. The use 
of Huang and Stoll (1997) bid ask spread decomposition model
42
 allows me to draw 
the information asymmetry components in bid ask spread and move a step further to 
use this information asymmetry component as an explanatory variable to explain the 
variation in Post Earnings Announcement Drifts.  Empirical analysis in the begining 
part of this chapter shows that in most cases there are strong evidences of relationship 
between stock liquidity and PEAD. More importantly, the results from the latter part 
of the chapter show that information asymmetry cost component can explain the 
change in post earnings announcements drifts in most indices over the two countries 
the UK and France. However, there is very weak evidence that information 
asymmetry accounts for the market response in the US. This might be due to the 
measurement of earnings surprise on the event day in the US markets. 
 6.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the literature chapter, PEAD is an empirical finding that earnings drift 
in the direction of the earnings surprises following earnings announcement. The 
phenomenon is documented by Ball and Brown (1968), Foster, Olsen, Shevlin (1984), 
Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990) etc ... There are also many researchers that have 
been trying to explain the reason for PEAD. The causes of PEAD could be categorized 
                                                 
42
  Van Ness et al (2001) conclude that any kind of decomposition model provides similar results. 
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into under reaction explanation (by investors, by analysts, and by bias information 
process by whoever is involved in the process) and misspecification explanation 
(which includes misspecification of market risk –beta, and trading risk). So far bid ask 
spread has not been used or used properly to provide an explanation for the existence 
of the PEAD. The only two papers that directly used bid ask spread in explaining the 
cause of PEAD is Ng et al (2008) and Chordia et al (2009), however, both of these 
papers use  bid ask spread or bid ask spread plus a commission rate  as a direct 
measure of transaction cost instead of stock market liquidity. This thesis uses Ng. et al 
(2008) approach, however it uses bid ask spread as a direct measure of stock liquidity 
and it involves three measures of bid ask spread, which are: quoted spread, relative 
spread and effective spread; this thesis also uses different measures of market 
response, earnings surprise and stock volatility. The unique contribution of this 
research is that it analyses in particular how the information asymmetry cost 
component influence the PEAD. 
My results show that the stock market liquidity can provide a partial explanation for 
the persistence of PEAD. In the latter part, information asymmetry cost component 
which is inferred by using model by Huang and Stoll (1997) show significant effects 
on PEAD for indices from the UK and French markets, but not for the US. 
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follow. The next section describes the 
implication of stock market liquidity on which the market reflects the information in 
earnings announcement. Section 6.3 decomposes bid ask spread using Huang and Stoll 
(1997) decomposition model, to infer the information asymmetry cost component of 
bid ask spread. Section 6.4 presents the research design and the outcome of the tests in 
which it describes the implication of the specific information asymmetry cost 
component on which the market reflects earnings information. 
6.2. Effect of stock market liquidity on earnings announcements drifts 
Following Ng et al (2008) approach, this section describes how changes in stock 
market liquidity can result in the behaviour of stock price after earnings information. 
This chapter used the same data sample as for the whole thesis, which includes 99 
companies from FTSE100; 233 companies from FTSE 250, 310 companies form 
FTSE Small cap and 912 companies from FTSE AIM All Shares; 30 companies form 
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DJIA, 96 companies form NASDAQ100, and 100 companies form S&P100 in 
American Stock Exchanges; and 40 companies from CAC 40 in the Paris Bourse.  
6.2.1 Variables 
6.2.1.1. Measurement of earning surprise. 
As discussed in Chapter II, there are mainly three measures of earnings surprises 
employed in the literatures, which are earning-based, analyst-forecast based and price-
based measures. This study use daily abnormal returns as a measure of earning 
surprises due to the reason that daily return will immediately capture the change in 
price after the news is released. 
𝑈𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
−
𝑃𝐼𝑡 − 𝑃𝐼𝑡−1
𝑃𝐼𝑡−1
                       (6.2.1.1) 
Where, 
𝑈𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡  is earnings surprise or abnormal stock return 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 , calculated as the 
difference between single stock return on day t and market stock return on day 
t. 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡  is stock price at time t 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 is stock price at time t-1 
𝑃𝐼𝑡  is stock index price at time t 
𝑃𝐼𝑡−1 is stock index price at time t-1. 
Earnings surprises at event date will be: 
𝑈𝐸𝑖 ,0 = 𝐴𝑅𝑖,0 =  
𝑃𝑖,0 − 𝑃𝑖,−1
𝑃𝑖,−1
−
𝑃𝐼0 − 𝑃𝐼−1
𝑃𝐼−1
                          (6.2.1.2) 
For the indices that abnormal returns reach its peak on the day 1, the earnings 
surprises at event date is replaced by
43
: 
𝑈𝐸𝑖 ,1 = 𝐴𝑅𝑖 ,1 =  
𝑃𝑖,1 − 𝑃𝑖,−0
𝑃𝑖,0
−
𝑃𝐼1 − 𝑃𝐼0
𝑃𝐼0
                             (6.2.1.3) 
                                                 
43
 In the US markets, many firms announce the final results after the market close on the earnings 
announcement date. This leads to the fact that strongest reaction to occur at the end of the day 1 as 
shown in DJIA,  (table 4.1.2.5)  NASDAQ (table 4.1.2.6) and S&P 100 (4.1.2.7). Meanwhile in London 
Stock Exchange, the news is released in the morning of the announcement date and the strongest 
reaction occurs at the end of event date 0. 
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6.2.1.2. Measures of stock market liquidity 
As mentioned in earlier chapter, I use the three measures of bid ask spread including 
quote bid ask spread, relative bid ask spread and effective bid ask spread as direct 
measures of stock market liquidity. 
Daily trades and quotes from DATASTREAM Advance database are used to calculate 
relative bid ask spread and effective bid ask spread. 
𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒                     (6.2.1.4) 
The relative bid ask spread is calculated as the difference between bid price and ask 
price divided by the mid price. 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 =  
𝑃𝐴 − 𝑃𝐵
𝑃𝐴 + 𝑃𝐵
2
                                       (6.2.1.5) 
The effective bid ask spread is calculated as twice as much as absolute value of the 
difference between trading price and the mid price. 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = 2  𝑃 −
𝑃𝐴 + 𝑃𝐵
2
                          (6.2.1.6) 
As noted in Gregoriou [2008] and many others it is necessary to use more than one 
measure of bid ask spread for several reasons. First of all, large trades are more likely 
to be executed outside the quoted spreads, which make quoted spread and relative 
spread not accurate measures. In addition, relative spread and effective spread take 
into account the mid-price but ignore price movement. In fact, price movement 
leading to mid-price change and the relative and effective spread also change. For this 
reason it is necessary to take into account the quoted spread in the analysis as well. 
6.2.1.3. Other variables 
Stock volatility is proxied by the standard deviation of stock returns during the pre 
earnings announcement period from day -90 to day -21. 
My data sample set includes 8 separate indices. The empirical work has been done for 
each index separately. As firm specific risk can be well diversified and driven away 
within each market index, we gather that there is no crossectional variation in other 
firm specific variables such as firm beta, size, and book-to-market value. Therefore 
these variables are not necessarily added in each regression separately. 
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6.2.2 Model specification 
This part of the research describes the model being used to examine the impact of 
stock illiquidity on the post earnings announcement drift. A panel estimated general 
least square regression model in which the explanatory variables are associated with 
event time was employed. Ng et al (2008) reported a significant relationship between 
price response with stock volatility, transaction cost and earnings surprises. This 
research uses the model that has following characteristics where the regression 
parameters represent elasticities of the change in independent variables and market 
response 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 = 𝐶𝐴𝑅0,𝑘
𝑖
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝐸𝑖 ,0 + 𝛽2  𝑈𝐸𝑖 ,0𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,0 +  𝛽3𝑈𝐸𝑖 ,0𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦−90,−21
𝑖
+  𝜀𝑖                                                                                                (6.2.2.1) 
Where,  
Market response is calculated as cumulative daily abnormal return for stock i 
after earnings announcement up to an interval of k day,  k=10, 20, 30,60,90, 
included event day. 
𝑈𝐸𝑖 ,0, is earnings surprise at event date, i.e. daily abnormal returns on the event 
date, as defined in the above part. 
Illiquidity is either closing quote, relative or effective bid ask spread. 
Volatility is standard deviation of stock returns between day -90 and day -21
44
. 
Though sharing the same approach, there are main differences from this model and Ng 
et al (2008). (i) In this model, the dependent variable to represent price reaction after 
earnings announcement is cumulative abnormal returns in a specific period after 
earnings announcement. (ii) Illiquidity is proxied by either quote, relative or effective 
bid ask spread. (iii) The commission will be excluded in representing the stock 
illiquidity. (iv)Volatility is the standard deviation of stock returns from day -90 to day 
-21, which captures the stock volatility of stock before earnings announcement. 
Finally, (v)  the regression is performed for each index separately, the variation of 
some firm specific variables such as firm beta, firm size, book-to-market value, 
investor sophistication etc are assumed to be constant within one index, thus it is not 
                                                 
44
 70 day pre earnings announcement. 
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necessary to include them in the regression. As mentioned earlier firm specific risk 
can be well diversified and driven away within each market index, we assume that 
there is no crossectional variation in other variables such as firm size, and book-to-
market value, so these variables are not necessarily added in each regression 
separately. 
In this regression we mainly concern with β1 and β2, the main effect of earnings 
surprise and the interaction term between stock liquidity and earnings surprise. 
6.2.3. Results and explanations 
The regression outputs of panel estimated general least squared method are presented 
in table 6.2.3.1 to 6.2.3.8.  The regression is performed in different event window 
length, k=10, 20, 30, 60 and 90. CAR is cumulated between earnings announcement 
date and k days after the announcement. By varying and lengthening the return 
window, the result will capture more change in abnormal returns or price reaction. 
Overall all, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms with lower level of 
liquidity (higher level of illiquidity/bid-ask spread) will have larger level of market 
response, in other words, illiquidity has a positive earnings response coefficient. The 
reason being transaction cost prevents informed traders from acquiring price 
adjustment to earnings news. 
6.2.3.1 FTSE100. 
As expected, the results from table 6.2.3.1 show that the coefficients on the earnings 
surprise main effect are strong and significant and gradually decreases when news 
cease for FTSE100. The coefficients of surprise for k=10, 20, 30, 60, 90 for quote 
model are 0.727, 0.658, 0.454, 0.210, 0.076 respectively; for relative model are 0.679, 
0.600, 0.407,0.102, 0.017 respectively; for effective model are 0.788, 0.737, 0.499, 
0.235, and 0.089 respectively.  
The interactions between earnings surprise and stock liquidity are also positive and 
highly significant over different windows of time. The coefficients for  k=10, 20, 30, 
60, 90 for quote model are 0.044, 0.047, 0.022, 0.049, 0.076 respectively; for relative 
model are 63.61, 82.59, 64.96, 64.57, 96.25 respectively; for effective model are 
0.788, 0.737, 0.499, 0.235, and 0.089 respectively. It can be said that earnings surprise 
response coefficients are higher for the low liquidity stock. This result is very strong 
due to the level of confidence that is higher than 99%.  
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The interaction term between surprise and stock volatility in FTSE100 results also 
states that, stocks that have higher volatility will have higher degree of reaction. 
6.2.3.2 FTSE250.  
As expected, PEAD does exist in table 6.2.3.2, shown by the fact that the coefficients 
on the earnings surprise main effects are strong and highly significant for FTSE250. 
The coefficients of surprise for k=10, 20, 30, 60, 90 for quote model are 1.074, 1.323, 
1.218, 1.080, 0.866 respectively; for relative model are 1.111, 1.371, 1.238; 1.131, 
0.914 respectively; for effective model are 1.130, 1.216, 1.280, 1.163, and 0.931 
respectively.  
In the case of FTSE 250, the interactions between earnings surprise and stock liquidity 
are also positive and mostly significant over different windows of event time. The 
coefficients for  k=10, 20, 30, 60, 90 for quote model are 0.007, 0.012, 0.008, 0.013, 
0.014 respectively and highly signifiant; for relative model are 1.411, 4.579, 0.572, 
4.952, 6.417 respectively, of which four numbers are significant; for effective model 
are 0.0004, 0.004, 0.002, 0.010, and 0.018 respectively, of which most are positive 
and significant. It is can be said that earnings surprise response coefficients are higher 
for the low liquidity stocks. These results are very strong due to the level of 
confidence which is higher than 99%.  
The interaction term between surprise and stock volatility in the FTSE 250 results has 
negative sign and is significant, states that, stocks that have higher volatility will have 
higher degree of reaction. 
6.2.3.3. FTSE Small Cap.  
The coefficients on the earnings surprise main effect are strong and highly significant 
for the FTSE Small Cap. The coefficients of surprise for k=10, 20, 30, 60, 90 for 
quote model are 1.191, 1.305, 1.287, 1.428, 1.483 respectively; for relative model are 
1.123, 1.237, 1.151; 1.114, 1.063 respectively; for effective model are 1.220, 1.346, 
1.336, 1.445, and 1.488 respectively.  
In the case of FTSE Small Cap, the interaction between earnings surprise and stock 
liquidity is positive and highly significant over different windows of time in relative 
spread model, but negative in quote spread and effective spread models. However, it is 
still saying that stock market liquidity plays a role in explaining the variation in 
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PEAD. The difference of sign (positive and negative) could be due to the sign of trade 
(buy or sell). 
The interaction term between surprise and stock volatility in FTSE Small Cap results 
has negative sign and is significant, states that, stocks that have higher volatility will 
have higher reaction degree  
6.2.3.4. FTSE AIM All Shares.  
The coefficients on the earnings surprise main effect are strong and highly significant 
for FTSE AIM All Shares. The coefficients of surprise for k=10, 20, 30,60, 90 for 
quote model are 1.225, 1.291, 1.351, 1.462, 1.498 respectively; for relative model are 
1.288, 1.423, 1.506; 1.615, 1.633 respectively; for effective model are 1.226, 1.297, 
1.366, 1.498, and 1.523 respectively.  
In the case of the FTSE AIM All Shares, the interaction term between earnings 
surprise and stock liquidity is also positive and highly significant over different 
window of time for quote spread model. For relative model the coefficient is negative 
and significant in all windows of event time. For effective spread model, the 
interaction term is negative over a 10day window length, but positive and significant 
in other window lengths 20 days, 30 days, 60 days and 90 days after earnings 
announcement. Similar as above, it can be said that stock market liquidity while 
interacting with earning surprise, it plays a role in explaining the market response. 
The interaction term between surprise and stock volatility in the FTSEAIM All Shares 
results has negative sign and is significant, states that, stocks that have higher 
volatility will have a higher degree of reaction. 
6.2.3.5. DJIA.  
The coefficients on the earnings surprise main effect are strong and highly significant 
for DJIA in 10 days, 20 days and 30 days windows. The coefficients of surprise for 
k=10, 20, 30, for quote model are 1.967, 1.962, 1.369 respectively; in 60days and 90 
days time periods, the surprise main effects are negative, and insignificant. For 
relative model the coefficients of the main surprise effect are positive, 2.024, 1.979, 
and 1.332 for 10 day, 20 day and 30 day time periods respectively; and negative in 
60days and 90 days time period. For effective model, the coefficients of the main 
surprise effect are 2.159, 2.131 and highly significant in 10 and 20 day event window 
periods. After that the main surprise effects are insignificant.  
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The interaction terms between earnings surprise and stock liquidity are different in 
different time periods for the different spread models, however mainly significant. 
Over a 10 day period, the interaction term is insignificant in quote and relative spread 
model, but negative and highly significant in effective model. Over a 20 day period, 
the interaction terms are negative and highly significant for all of the three bid ask 
spread models. Over a 30 day period, the interaction terms are negative and highly 
significant for quote and relative spread models but are not significant in effective 
spread model. The interaction terms are also different in a 60 and 90 days time frame. 
The interaction terms between surprise and stock volatility in DJIA results have a 
negative sign and are significant over a 10, 20 and 30 day periods, but have a positive 
effect in a 60 and 90 days time frame. 
6.2.3.6. NASDAQ100.  
The coefficients on the earnings surprise main effect are strong and highly significant 
for the NASDAQ100. The coefficients of surprise for k=10, 20, 30, 60, 90 for quote 
model are 1.007, 1.248, 1.253, 1.073, 0.248 respectively; for relative model are 0.927, 
1.128, 1.182; 0.976, 0.296 respectively; for effective model are 0.922, 1.134, 1.177, 
0.953, and 0.567 respectively.  
In the case of the NASDAQ100, the interactions between earnings surprise and stock 
liquidity are different over the different event time frames in term of sign, however, 
mainly significant. For example, over a 10 day period, the interaction term is negative 
and highly significant in quote spread and relative spread model, but insignificant in 
effective spread model. Over a 90 day period the interaction terms are significantly 
negative in the quote spread and effective spread models but significantly positive in 
relative spread model. It can be said that stock market liquidity plays a role in the way 
market response to earnings announcement. The change of sign could be due to the 
sign of trade, i.e. buy or sell. 
The interaction term between surprise and stock volatility in NASDAQ100 are 
positive and highly significant over a 10, 60 and 90 day period of time. In other event 
window lengths, these interactions terms are not significant.  
6.2.3.7. S&P100.  
The coefficients on the earnings surprise main effect are strong and highly significant 
for the S&P100. The coefficients of surprise are positive and highly significant for 
142 
 
k=10, 20, 30,60, for all of three bid ask spread models, but insignificant over a 90  
period. 
Almost similar to the cases of the NASDAQ100 and DJIA, is the interaction terms 
between earnings surprise and stock liquidity are negative and significant at the  
beginning over a 10, 20, 30 days time frames. Lately, in the 60 and 90 day periods the 
sign of interaction term changes to positive. The sign change could be due to the sign 
of trade; however, there is evidence that stock market response has a relationship with 
stock market liquidity. 
The interaction term between surprise and stock volatility in S&P 100 results has a 
positive sign in all event window lengths  for all three spread models,  states that 
stocks that have higher volatility will have a higher degree of reaction.  
6.2.3.8. CAC40.  
The coefficients on the earnings surprise main effect are mainly strong and highly 
significant for the CAC40. Over a 10 day time frame, the coefficients are positive and 
significant for all the three bid ask spread models. Over a 20 day period, the surprise 
coefficients are positive and significant for effective spread model and insignificant 
for relative and quote model. All other time frames except for the 90 day period for 
effective model, surprise coefficients are positive and significant. 
The interaction between earnings surprise and stock liquidity are not significant in 10 
day event period for quote and relative spread model, but negative significant in 
effective spread. In general the interaction terms are different for each event window 
length and each spread model but there are more evidence of a relation between stock 
market liquidity and market respone. 
The interaction term between surprise and stock volatility in the CAC40 results has a 
positive sign in all time periods, for all three spread models, and state that stocks that 
have higher volatility will have a higher degree of reaction. 
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Table 6.2.3.1:  FTSE100- Market reaction to earnings surprises
45
 
 
This table presents the results of earnings response coefficient regression to examine the market reaction to earnings news for different event window length for the FTSE 100 index. The dependent variable is 
cumulative abnormal return of each counter period [0,10]; [0,20]; [0,30]; [0,60]; [0,90] after earnings announcement. Surprise is earnings surprise measured as the unexpected earning on the event day 𝑈𝐸𝑖,0 with the 
indices that have the abnormal returns and trading volume reach its peak on day 1, surprise will be earnings surprise measured as unexpected earnings on  day 1, due to many companies releasing information at the 
market close, led to the largest reaction happening  on day 1. All other variables are defined in 6.2.1. 
 
Dependent 
variable 
𝑪𝑨𝑹𝟎,𝒌 
Independent 
variables 
(Earnings) Surprise =𝑈𝐸𝑖,046 
Illiquidity = Either Quote Spread, Relative spread or Effective Spread 
 Volatility 
 
Number of 
cumulated day 
k=10days k=20days k=30days k=60days k=90days 
 QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES 
Intercept 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 
Surprise 0.727*** 0.679*** 0.788*** 0.658*** 0.600*** 0.737*** 0.454*** 0.407*** 0.499*** 0.210*** 0.102** 0.235*** 0.076* 0.017 0.089** 
Surprise*Illiquidity 0.044*** 63.618*** 0.062*** 0.047*** 82.593*** 0.060*** 0.022*** 64.961*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 64.573*** 0.060*** 0.076*** 96.259*** 0.082*** 
Surprise*Volatility 5.477* 3.372 0.420 10.025** 4.527 4.157 23.317*** 17.423*** 17.828*** 36.608*** 38.565*** 36.039*** 41.182*** 39.141*** 42.498*** 
𝑹𝟐 .83 .84 .83 .73 .74 .71 .59 .61 .59 .46 .48 .47 .36 .38 .36 
Number of 
observations47 
1089 1089 1089 2079 2079 2079 3069 3069 3069 6039 6039 6039 9009 9009 9009 
 
 
*, **, *** indicate two tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
                                                 
45
 In this table, QS, RS, ES stand for Quoted Spread, Relative Spread, and Effective Spread 
46
 Or 𝑈𝐸𝑖 ,1 in some indices that provide the strongest reaction on day 1 
47
 Number of observations including event day 
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Table 6.2.3.2:  FTSE250- Market reaction to earnings surprises
48
 
 
This table presents the results of earnings response coefficient regression to examine the market reaction to earnings news for different event window lengths  for firms in the FTSE 250 index. The dependent variable is 
cumulative abnormal return of each counter period [0,10]; [0,20]; [0,30]; [0,60]; [0,90] after earnings announcement. Surprise is earnings surprise measured as unexpected earning on the event day 𝑈𝐸𝑖,0 with the 
indices that have the abnormal returns and trading volume reach its peak on day 1, surprise will be earnings surprise measured as unexpected earnings on day 1, due to many companies releasing information at the 
market close, led to the largest reaction happening on day 1. All other variables are defined in 6.2.1. 
Dependent 
variable 
𝑪𝑨𝑹𝟎,𝒌 
Independent 
variables 
(Earnings) Surprise =𝑈𝐸𝑖,049 
Illiquidity = Either Quote Spread, Relative spread or Effective Spread 
 Volatility 
 
Number of 
cumulated day 
k=10days k=20days k=30days k=60days k=90days 
 QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES 
Intercept 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.01*** 0.010*** 
Surprise 1.074*** 1.111*** 1.130*** 1.323*** 1.371*** 1.216*** 1.218*** 1.238*** 1.280*** 1.080*** 1.131*** 1.163*** 0.866*** 0.914*** 0.931*** 
Surprise*Illiquidity 0.007*** 1.411* -0.0004 0.012*** 4.597*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.572 0.002 0.013*** 4.952*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 6.417*** 0.018*** 
Surprise*Volatility -
8.980*** 
-
10.110*** 
-
9.797*** 
-
23.964*** 
-
26.101*** 
-
14.934*** 
-
16.617*** 
-
15.538*** 
-
18.001*** 
-
14.331*** 
-
15.588*** 
-
16.515*** 
-
4.774*** 
-
7.001*** 
-7.303*** 
𝑹𝟐 .73 .72 .72 .37 .37 .66 .60 .60 .59 .43 .42 .42 .30 .30 .29 
Number of 
observations50 
2563 2563 2563 4893 4893 4893 7233 7233 7233 14213 14213 14213 21203 21203 21203 
 
*, **, *** indicate two tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
                                                 
48
 In this table, QS, RS, ES stand for Quoted Spread, Relative Spread, and Effective Spread 
49
 Or 𝑈𝐸𝑖 ,1 in some indices that provide the strongest reaction on day 1 
50
 Number of observations including event day 
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Table 6.2.3.3:  FTSE Small Cap- Market reaction to earnings surprises
51
 
 
This table presents the results of earnings response coefficient regression to examine the market reaction to earnings news for different event window lengths for firms in the FTSE Small Cap Index. The dependent 
variable is cumulative abnormal return of each counter period [0,10]; [0,20]; [0,30]; [0,60]; [0,90] after earnings announcement. Surprise is earnings surprise measured as unexpected earning on the event day 𝑈𝐸𝑖,0 with 
the indices that have the abnormal returns and trading volume reach its peak on day 1, surprise will be earnings surprise measured as unexpected earnings on  day 1, due to many companies releasing information at the 
market close, led to the largest reaction happening on day 1. All other variables are defined in 6.2.1. 
Dependent 
variable 
𝑪𝑨𝑹𝟎,𝒌 
Independent 
variables 
(Earnings) Surprise =𝑈𝐸𝑖,052 
Illiquidity = Either Quote Spread, Relative spread or Effective Spread 
 Volatility 
 
Number of 
cumulated day 
k=10days k=20days k=30days k=60days k=90days 
 QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES 
Intercept 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
Surprise 1.191*** 1.123*** 1.220*** 1.305*** 1.237*** 1.346*** 1.287*** 1.151*** 1.336*** 1.428*** 1.114*** 1.455*** 1.483*** 1.063*** 1.488*** 
Surprise*Illiquidity    -
0.002*** 
0.484** -
0.005*** 
-
0.001*** 
0.617*** -
0.005*** 
-0.001*** 2.288*** -0.005*** 0.0003 6.226*** -0002*** 0.0004* 7.630*** 0.0002 
Surprise*Volatility -
4.287*** 
-3.146*** -
4.893*** 
-
6.760*** 
-5.807*** -7.454** -5.293*** -3.885*** -6.113*** -6.590*** -4.115*** -7.001*** -8.915*** -5.191*** -8.991*** 
𝑹𝟐 .75 .74 .79 .64 .62 .65 .55 .54 .56 .46 .47 .46 .38 .39 .38 
Number of 
observations53 
3377 3377 3377 6447 6447 6447 9517 9517 9517 18727 18727 18727 27937 27937 27937 
 
 
*, **, *** indicate two tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
                                                 
51
 In this table, QS, RS, ES stand for Quoted Spread, Relative Spread, and Effective Spread 
52
 Or 𝑈𝐸𝑖 ,1 in some indices that provide the strongest reaction on day 1 
53
 Number of observations including event day 
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Table 6.2.3.4:  FTSE AIM All Shares- Market reaction to earnings surprises
54
 
 
This table presents the results of earnings response coefficient regression to examine the market reaction to earnings news for different event window lengths  for firms in the FTSE AIM All Shares index. The 
dependent variable is cumulative abnormal return of each counter period [0,10]; [0,20]; [0,30]; [0,60]; [0,90] after earnings announcement. Surprise is earnings surprise measured as unexpected earning on the event day 
𝑈𝐸𝑖,0 with the indices that have the abnormal returns and trading volume reach its peak on day 1, surprise will be earnings surprise measured as unexpected earnings on day 1, due to many companies releasing 
information at the market close, led to the largest reaction happening on day 1. All other variables are defined in 6.2.1. 
Dependent 
variable 
𝑪𝑨𝑹𝟎,𝒌 
Independent 
variables 
(Earnings) Surprise =𝑈𝐸𝑖,055 
Illiquidity = Either Quote Spread, Relative spread or Effective Spread 
 Volatility 
 
Number of 
cumulated day 
k=10days k=20days k=30days k=60days k=90days 
 QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES 
Intercept 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.0162*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 
Surprise 1.225*** 1.288*** 1.226*** 1.291*** 1.423*** 1.297 1.351*** 1.506*** 1.366*** 1.462*** 1.615*** 1.498*** 1.498*** 1.633*** 1.523*** 
Surprise*Illiquidity 0.0003** -0.665*** -0.0001 0.002*** -1.127*** 0.001 0.004*** -1.133*** 0.003*** 0.008*** -1.076*** 0.008*** 0.006*** -0.944*** 0.007*** 
Surprise*Volatility -
4.110*** 
-3.088*** -
4.133*** 
-
5.172*** 
-4.683*** -5.198 -6.632*** -6.352*** -6.693*** -8.930*** -8.702*** -9.211*** -9.412*** -8.933*** -9.540*** 
𝑹𝟐 .86 .86 .86 .73 .72 .74 .68 .64 .67 .47 .47 .46 .38 .40 .47 
Number of 
observations56 
9922 9922 9922 18942 18942 18942 27962 27962 27962 55022 55022 55022 82082 82082 82082 
 
*, **, *** indicate two tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
                                                 
54
 In this table, QS, RS, ES stand for Quoted Spread, Relative Spread, and Effective Spread 
55
 Or 𝑈𝐸𝑖 ,1 in some indices that provide the strongest reaction on day 1 
56
 Number of observations including event day 
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Table 6.2.3.5: DJIA- Market reaction to earnings surprises
57
 
 
This table presents the results of earnings response coefficient regression to examine the market reaction to earnings news for different time frames for firms in the DJIA index. The dependent variable is cumulative 
abnormal return of each counter period [0,10]; [0,20]; [0,30]; [0,60]; [0,90]  after earnings announcement. Surprise is earnings surprise measured as unexpected earning on the event day 𝑈𝐸𝑖,0 with the indices that have 
the abnormal returns and trading volume reach its peak on day 1, surprise will be earnings surprise measured as unexpected earnings on day 1, due to many companies releasing  information at the market close, led to 
the largest reaction happening on day 1. All other variables are defined in 6.2.1. 
Dependent 
variable 
𝑪𝑨𝑹𝟎,𝒌 
Independent 
variables 
(Earnings) Surprise =𝑈𝐸𝑖,058 
Illiquidity = Either Quote Spread, Relative spread or Effective Spread 
 Volatility 
 
Number of 
cumulated day 
k=10days k=20days k=30days k=60days k=90days 
 QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES 
Intercept -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -
0.002*** 
-0.001*** -0.002 0.0004 0.001 -0.0003 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
Surprise 1.967*** 2.024*** 2.159*** 1.962*** 1.979*** 2.131*** 1.369*** 1.332*** 1.582 -0.062 -0.180 0.271 -0.695*** -0.799*** -0.284 
Surprise*Illiquidity -0.802 -68.340 -1.727** -1.713*** -
126.039*** 
-2.760*** -
1.302*** 
-
88.428*** 
-2.443 0.344 49.832* -0.695 1.356*** 113.746*** 0.250 
Surprise*Volatility -
73.438*** 
-
76.758*** 
-
87.504*** 
-
68.556*** 
-70.086*** -
83.502*** 
-13.753 -
11.098*** 
-
30.610 
103.713*** 112.164*** 81.908*** 134.873*** 142.914*** 109.7*** 
𝑹𝟐 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.59 0.58 0.67 0.42 0.40 0.49 0.25 0.23 0.28 
Number of 
observations59 
330 330 330 630 630 630 930 930 930 1830 1830 1830 2730 2730 2730 
 
*, **, *** indicate two tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
                                                 
57
 In this table, QS, RS, ES stand for Quoted Spread, Relative Spread, and Effective Spread 
58
 Or 𝑈𝐸𝑖 ,1 in some indices that provide the strongest reaction on day 1 
59
 Number of observations including event day 
   
148 
 
Table 6.2.3.6: NASDAQ100- Market reaction to earnings surprises
60
 
 
This table presents the results of earnings response coefficient regression to examine the market reaction to earnings news for different event window lengths for firms in the NASDAQ100 index. The dependent 
variable is cumulative abnormal return of each counter period [0,10]; [0,20]; [0,30]; [0,60]; [0,90] after earnings announcement. Surprise is earnings surprise measured as unexpected earning on the event day 𝑈𝐸𝑖,0 with 
the indices that have the abnormal returns and trading volume reach its peak on day 1, surprise will be earnings surprise measured as unexpected earnings on  day 1, due to many companies releasing information at the 
market close, led to the largest reaction happening on day 1. All other variables are defined in 6.2.1. 
Dependent 
variable 
𝑪𝑨𝑹𝟎,𝒌 
Independent 
variables 
(Earnings) Surprise =𝑈𝐸𝑖,061 
Illiquidity = Either Quote Spread, Relative spread or Effective Spread 
 Volatility 
 
Number of 
cumulated day 
k=10days k=20days k=30days k=60days k=90days 
 QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES 
Intercept 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002 -0.0004 -0.002** -0.002** -
0.001*** 
-0.003*** -
0.003*** 
-0.005*** -
0.006*** 
-0.007*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.007*** 
Surprise 1.007*** 0.927*** 2.00.922 1.248*** 1.128*** 1.134*** 1.253*** 1.182*** 1.177*** 1.073*** 0.976*** 0.953*** 0.248*** 0.296*** 0.567*** 
Surprise*Illiquidity -
3.438*** 
-
109.907*** 
0.785 -
4.622*** 
-
57.712*** 
0.498** 5.131*** -
177.319*** 
0.987*** -6.667*** -
69.912** 
-2.897*** -2.750*** 120.238*** -3.854*** 
Surprise*Volatility 8.937*** 10.859*** 5.219 -1.896 0.463 -3.718 0.38 -0.525 -
8.392*** 
10.663*** 9.479*** 25.296*** 46.010*** 36.981*** 47.402*** 
𝑹𝟐 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.71 0.68 0.68 0.66 0.59 0.61 0.45 0.44 0.48 0.25 0.27 0.31 
Number of 
observations62 
1056 1056 1056 2016 2016 2016 2796 2976 2976 5856 0.44 5856 8736 8736 8736 
 
*, **, *** indicate two tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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 In this table, QS, RS, ES stand for Quoted Spread, Relative Spread, and Effective Spread 
61
 Or 𝑈𝐸𝑖 ,1 in some indices that provide the strongest reaction on day 1 
62
 Number of observations including event day 
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Table 6.2.3.7:  S&P100- Market reaction to earnings surprises
63
 
 
This table presents the results of earnings response coefficient regression to examine the market reaction to earnings news for different event time frames for firms in the S&P100 index. The dependent variable is 
cumulative abnormal return of each counter period [0,10]; [0,20]; [0,30]; [0,60]; [0,90] after earnings announcement. Surprise is earnings surprise measured as unexpected earning on the event day 𝑈𝐸𝑖,0 with the 
indices that have the abnormal returns and trading volume reach its peak on day 1, surprise will be earnings surprise measured as unexpected earnings on day 1, due to many companies releasing information at the 
market close, led to the largest reaction happening on day 1. All other variables are defined in 6.2.1. 
Dependent 
variable 
𝑪𝑨𝑹𝟎,𝒌 
Independent 
variables 
(Earnings) Surprise =𝑈𝐸𝑖,064 
Illiquidity = Either Quote Spread, Relative spread or Effective Spread 
 Volatility 
 
Number of 
cumulated day 
k=10days k=20days k=30days k=60days k=90days 
 QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES 
Intercept 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
Surprise 0.837*** 0.815*** 0.827*** 0.924*** 0.889*** 0.906*** 0.797*** 0.753*** 0.781*** 0.185*** 0.175*** 0.194 -0.077 -0.067 -0.073 
Surprise*Illiquidity -1.318*** -
52.159*** 
-1.632*** -
1.048*** 
-
42.127*** 
-
1.195*** 
-0.575*** -16.878** -0.598*** 1.777*** 104.498*** 2.398 1.552*** 80.805*** 2.264*** 
Surprise*Volatility 18.318*** 17.750*** 18.048*** 8.715*** 9.197*** 8.742*** 16.037*** 17.298*** 16.263*** 44.850*** 43.168*** 43.772 58.539*** 56.024*** 57.304*** 
𝑹𝟐 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.56 .55 0.55 .48 .48 .47 .37 .44 .41 .22 .21 .23 
Number of 
observations65 
1089 1089 1089 2079 2079 2079 3069 3069 3069 6039 6039 6039 9009 9009 9009 
 
 
*, **, *** indicate two tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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 In this table, QS, RS, ES stand for Quoted Spread, Relative Spread, and Effective Spread 
64
 Or 𝑈𝐸𝑖 ,1 in some indices that provide the strongest reaction on day 1 
65
 Number of observations including event day 
   
150 
 
 
 
Table 6.2.3.8:  CAC40- Market reaction to earnings surprises
66
 
 
This table presents the results of earnings response coefficient regression to examine the market reaction to earnings news for different event time frames  or firms in the CAC40 index in the Euronext Paris. The 
dependent variable is cumulative abnormal return of each counter period [0,10]; [0,20]; [0,30]; [0,60]; [0,90] after earnings announcement. Surprise is earnings surprise measured as unexpected earning on the event day 
𝑈𝐸𝑖,0 with the indices that have the abnormal returns and trading volume reach its peak on day 1, surprise will be earnings surprise measured as unexpected earnings on day 1, due to many companies releasing 
information at the market close, led to the largest reaction happening on day 1. All other variables are defined in 6.2.1. 
Dependent 
variable 
𝑪𝑨𝑹𝟎,𝒌 
Independent 
variables 
(Earnings) Surprise =𝑈𝐸𝑖,067 
Illiquidity = Either Quote Spread, Relative spread or Effective Spread 
 Volatility 
 
Number of 
cumulated day 
k=10days k=20days k=30days k=60days k=90days 
 QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES QS RS ES 
Intercept 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
Surprise 0.557*** 0.578*** 1.018*** 0.106 0.129 0.527*** 0.330*** 0.311*** 0.545*** 0.321*** 0.345*** 0.352*** 0.149* 0.156* 0.109 
Surprise*Illiquidity -2.101 28.790 -
5.867*** 
3.049*** 122.803*** -3.874*** 4.157*** 170.204*** -1.481* 2.563*** -
326.485*** 
0.791 0.229 -
521.349*** 
1.149* 
Surprise*Volatility 43.351*** 29.907*** 21.579** 54.801*** 58.297*** 46.713*** 36.019*** 42.706*** 37.946*** 53.636*** 77.850*** 59.657*** 62.376*** 91.262*** 63.146*** 
𝑹𝟐 0.78 0.76  0.70 0.70 0.64 0.56 0.56 0.54 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.29 0.32 0.29 
Number of 
observations68 
440 440 440 840 840 840 1240 1240 1240 2440 2440 2440 3460 3460 3460 
 
*, **, *** indicate two tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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 In this table, QS, RS, ES stand for Quoted Spread, Relative Spread, and Effective Spread 
67
 Or 𝑈𝐸𝑖 ,1 in some indices that provide the strongest reaction on day 1 
68
 Number of observations including event day 
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6.3. Does information asymmetry account for changes in post earnings 
announcements drifts? 
6.3.1. Bid ask spread decomposition and Information asymmetry component  
This part of the chapter VI aims at decomposing the bid ask spread into trading cost 
and information asymmetry components.  As discussed previously in chapter II, it is 
usually considered that the spread helps to cover three different costs: The order 
processing cost, which includes any cost associated with order execution; the 
inventory holding cost, which includes any cost bearning the inventory risk; and 
finally the information asymmetry cost or adverse selection cost, which includes any 
cost bearning the risk of inferior information compared to other parties. Over the last 
several decades, there are two important models by Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) and 
Huang and Stoll (1997) which have been largely used in empirical studies for various 
purposes.  
Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) model has the following characteristics: 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑖 ,𝑡 =  𝜑𝑖(𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡−1 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡              (6.3.1.1) 
Where, 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑖 ,𝑡  denotes a change from previous quote (prior to a transaction), 
 𝑀𝑖 ,𝑡  is the quoted spread midpoint at time t for firm i, and  
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡−1 is the transaction price prior to the quoted spread at time t for firm i 
𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡 is an error term. 
According to Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995), coefficient 𝜑𝑖 is the estimates of the 
percentage of the effective spread attribute to informed trading for firm i. so firm i‟s 
adverse selection spread is 𝜑𝑖 times the firm‟s average effective spread. 
The second popular model, Huang and Stoll (1997), partitions the total effective 
spread into informed trading, order processing and inventory holding cost 
components. The model has the following characteristics: 
∆𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑖𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑄𝐴,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖 ,𝑡                       (6.3.1.2) 
In this model, Huang and Stoll (1997) denote 
 ∆PRICEi,t for a change from the previous retained trade 
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Qit  equals 1 if the trade at time t was a sale, and equals -1 if the trade at time t 
was a buy. Trades at prices higher than the prevailing quote midpoint are 
defined as market maker sells (Qit = 1) and trades at prices below the 
prevailing quote midpoint as market maker buys(Qit = −1) .  
In this model, trades at mid point are excluded. The QA,t−1 is the aggregate 
indicator for buy and sell, which is equal to 1, -1, or 0 if the sum of Qi,t−1 
across all sample stocks is positive, negative or zero accordingly to capture 
market wide pressure on market makers inventory levels. 
The estimate of β1,i  is one half the estimated effective spread, and the 
estimated adverse selection component is equal to 2(β2,i+β1,i). 
𝑒𝑖,𝑡  is the error term. 
Van Ness et al (2001) suggest that any kind of spread decomposition model provides 
similar results. In fact I had decomposed the bid ask spread by the above two models 
and the results proved the similars. In this study I present the outcomes based on the 
Huang and Stoll (1997) decomposition model, which directly infers the adverse 
information component. The results of decomposition are presented in the following 
table 6.3.1.1 to 6.3.1.3. 
Table 6.3.1.1 presents that the information asymmetry component in bid ask spread 
decreases over time in the UK equity market for large stock index such as the 
FTSE100 and FTSE 250. In the FTSE 100, the information asymmetry components 
for time frames: k=10 , 20, 30, 60 and 90 days are 2.562, 2.554, 2.516, 1.768, 1.858, 
1.554
69
 respectively. In the FTSE 250, the information asymmetry component for time 
frames of: 10, 20, 30, 60, and 90 days are 1.012, 0.832, 0.790, 0.674, 0.678, 0.694 
respectively . For the smaller indices like the FTSE Small Cap and FTSEAIM All 
Shares the information asymmetry component does not change much. 
In the US equity market, table 6.3.1.2 shows that the information asymmetry 
component in bid ask spread also seems to decrease over time, however, it is not as 
clear as in the UK. Initially in a 10 day time frame, the information asymmetry 
components are not as large as they are in a 20 days period. After a 20 days period, the 
                                                 
69
 In percentage 
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information component decreased for all the three indices DJIA, NASDAQ100, and  
S&P100. 
Table 6.3.1.1.   Spread decomposition base on Huang and Stoll model – UK equity market 
This table presents the results of coefficient regression from the Huang and Stoll (1997) model to decompose bid ask spread in 
different window period after earnings announcement for indices in the London Stock Exchange.  The model has the following 
specification:  ∆PRICEi,t = β1iQit + β2iQi,t−1 + β3QA,t−1 + ei,t Where the dependent variable ∆PRICEi,t is the daily closing price 
change. Qit  equal 1 (-1) if the trade at time t was a sell (buy). Trades at price above the prevailing quote midpoint as market 
maker sells (Qit = 1) and trades at prices below the prevailing quote midpoint as market maker buys (Qit = −1) . In this model 
trades at mid point are excluded. The QA,t−1 is the aggregate indicator for buy and sell, which equal 1, -1, or 0 if the sum of Qi,t−1 
across all sample stocks is positive, negative or zero accordingly to capture market-wide pressure on market makers inventory 
levels. The estimate of β1,   coefficient coefficient is one-half of the estimated effective spread. According to Huang and Stoll 
(1997), the estimated adverse selection component equal 2(𝛽1 + 𝛽2). HS information asymmetry cost components are reported in 
percentage. 
Period after earnings announcement 10 days 20 days 30days 60days 90 days (180 
days)70 
FTSE100       
𝛽1 1.826*** 
[0.00] 
1.661*** 
[0.00] 
1.636*** 
[0.00] 
1.328*** 
[0.00] 
1.291*** 
[0.00] 
1.008*** 
[0.00] 
𝛽2 -0.545*** 
[0.00] 
-0.384** 
[0.03] 
-0.378** 
[0.02] 
-0.444*** 
[0.00] 
-0.362*** 
[0.00] 
-0.231*** 
[0.00] 
HS information asymmetry component 2.562 2.554 2.516 1.768 1.858 1.554 
Number of obs. (unbalanced panel) 851 1571 2233 4378 6536 13067 
FTSE 250       
𝛽1 0.863*** 
[0.00] 
0.807*** 
[0.00] 
0.796*** 
[0.00] 
0.697*** 
[0.00] 
0.690*** 
[0.00] 
0.662*** 
[0.00] 
𝛽2 -0.357*** 
[0.00] 
-0.391*** 
[0.00] 
-0.401*** 
[0.00] 
-0.360*** 
[0.00] 
-0.351*** 
[0.00] 
-0.315*** 
[0.00] 
HS information asymmetry component 1.012 0.832 0.790 0.674 0.678 0.694 
Number of obs. (unbalanced panel) 2230 4153 5907 11539 17461 34460 
FSTE Small Cap       
𝛽1 0.417*** 
[0.00] 
0.422*** 
[0.00] 
0.383*** 
[0.00] 
0.397*** 
[0.00] 
0.346*** 
[0.00] 
0.323*** 
[0.00] 
𝛽2 -0.307*** 
[0.00] 
-0.295*** 
[0.00] 
-0.243*** 
[0.00] 
-0.255*** 
[0.00] 
-0.228*** 
[0.00] 
-0.214*** 
[0.00] 
HS information asymmetry component 0.220 0.252 0.280 0.284 0.236 0.218 
Number of obs. (unbalanced panel) 2377 4455 6493 12799 19341 37129 
FTSE AIM All Shares       
𝛽1 0.261*** 
[0.00] 
0.206*** 
[0.00] 
0.177*** 
[0.00] 
0.107*** 
[0.00] 
0.095*** 
[0.00] 
0.050*** 
[0.00] 
𝛽2 -0.260*** 
[0.00] 
-0.180*** 
[0.00] 
-0.171*** 
[0.00] 
-0.105*** 
[0.00] 
-0.094*** 
[0.00] 
-0.050*** 
[0.00] 
HS information asymmetry component 0.002 0.052 0.012 0.004 0.002 0.0004 
Number of obs. (unbalanced panel) 1371 2745 4141 8483 12797 24414 
*, **, *** indicate two tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6.3.1.2.   Spread decomposition base on Huang and Stoll model – US equity market 
This table presents the results of coefficient regression from the Huang and Stoll (1997) model to decompose bid ask spread in 
different tine frames after earnings announcement for three indices DJIA, NASDAQ100 and S&P100  in the US equity markets.  
The model has following specification: ∆PRICEi,t = β1iQit + β2iQi,t−1 + β3QA,t−1 + ei,t Where, The dependent variable∆PRICEi,t 
is daily closing price change. Qit  equal 1 (-1) if the trade at time t was a sell (buy). Trades at the price above the prevailing quote 
midpoint as market maker sells (Qit = 1) and trades at prices below the prevailing quote midpoint as market maker buys (Qit =
−1) . In this model, trades at the mid point are excluded. The QA,t−1 is the aggregate indicator for buy and sell, which equal 1, -1, 
or 0 if the sum of Qi,t−1 across all sample stocks is positive, negative or zero accordingly to capture market-wide pressure on the 
market makers inventory levels. The estimate of β1,   coefficient is one-half of the estimated effective spread. According to Huang 
and Stoll (1997), the estimated adverse selection component is equal 2(𝛽1 + 𝛽2). HS information asymmetry cost components are 
reported in percentage. 
Period after earnings announcement 10 days 20 days 30 days 60 days 90 days (180 days)71 
DJIA       
𝛽1 0.027 
[0.30] 
0.028 
[0.21] 
0.030 
[0.16] 
0.019 
[0.18] 
0.008 
[0.51] 
0.024*** 
[0.00] 
𝛽2 0.009 
[0.49] 
0.014 
[0.31] 
0.011 
[0.49] 
-0.003 
[0.81] 
-0.017* 
[0.07] 
-0.022*** 
[0.00] 
HS information asymmetry component 0.072 0.084 0.082 0.032 0.018 0.004 
Number of obs. (unbalanced panel) 254 465 687 1338 2022 3760 
NASDAQ 100       
𝛽1 0.062*** 
[0.00] 
0.048*** 
[0.00] 
0.050*** 
[0.00] 
0.029*** 
[0.00] 
0.026*** 
[0.00] 
0.020*** 
[0.00] 
𝛽2 -0.014* 
[0.08] 
0.004 
[0.56] 
0.003 
[0.61] 
0.004 
[0.36] 
-0.002 
[0.54] 
-0.004 
[0.24] 
HS information asymmetry component 0.096 0.104 0.106 0.066 0.048 0.032 
Number of obs. (unbalanced panel) 923 1574 2583 5110 7672 13899 
S&P100       
𝛽1 0.035** 
[0.02] 
0.027** 
[0.02] 
0.038*** 
[0.00] 
0.031*** 
[0.00] 
0.028*** 
[0.00] 
0.033*** 
[0.00] 
𝛽2 -0.006 
[0.58] 
0.006 
[0.45] 
0.009 
[0.24] 
-0.002 
[0.80] 
-0.015*** 
[0.01] 
-0.022*** 
[0.00] 
HS information asymmetry component 0.058 0.066 0.094 0.058 0.026 0.022 
Number of obs. (unbalanced panel) 866 1587 2348 4598 6966 12808 
 
*, **, *** indicate two tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
In the French equity market the HS information asymmetry component also decreases 
over time. In a 10 , 20, 30 60 and 90 day window time frames, information asymmetry 
components are 0.118; 0.128; 0.064, 0.076, 0.052, 0.026 respectively . Overall we 
have also noticed that the information asymmetry component is quite small in the case 
of FTSE Small Cap, FTSE AIM All Shares, US market, and the CAC 40. 
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Table 6.3.1.3.   Spread decomposition base on Huang and Stoll model – French equity market 
This table presents the results of coefficient regression from the Huang and Stoll (1997) model to decompose bid ask spread in 
different time frames after earnings announcement for the CAC40 in the Euronext Paris. The model has the following 
specification: ∆PRICEi,t = β1iQit + β2iQi,t−1 + β3QA,t−1 + ei,t Where the dependent variable∆PRICEi,t is the daily closing price 
change. Qit  equal 1 (-1) if the trade at time t was a sell (buy). Trades at price above the prevailing quote midpoint as market 
maker sells (Qit = 1) and trades at prices below the prevailing quote midpoint as market maker buys (Qit = −1) . In this model, 
trade at mid point are excluded. The QA,t−1 is the aggregate indicator for buy and sell, which is equal 1, -1, or 0 if the sum of 
Qi,t−1 across all sample stocks is positive, negative or zero accordingly to captured  market-wide pressure on market makers 
inventory levels. The estimate of β1,   coefficient is one-half of the estimated effective spread. According to Huang and Stoll 
(1997), the estimated adverse selection component is equal 2(𝛽1 + 𝛽2). HS information asymmetry cost components are reported 
in percentage. 
Period after earnings announcement 10 days 20 days 30 days 60 days 90 days (180 days)72 
CAC 40       
𝛽1 0.094*** 
[0.00] 
0.083*** 
[0.00] 
0.069*** 
[0.00] 
0.068*** 
[0.00] 
0.058*** 
[0.00] 
0.050*** 
[0.00] 
𝛽2 -0.035* 
[0.07] 
-0.019 
[0.28] 
-0.037** 
[0.01] 
-0.030*** 
[0.00] 
-0.032*** 
[0.00] 
-0.024*** 
[0.00] 
HS information asymmetry component 0.118% 0.128% 0.064% 0.076% 0.052% 0.026% 
Number of obs. (unbalance panel) 401 773 1111 2131 3268 6484 
 
*, **, *** indicate two tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
6.3.2. Does information asymmetry explain post earnings  announcements drifts?  
As discussed in chapter II, over the four decades literature documented that stock 
prices drift after the earnings news, and the size of earnings surprises are directly 
related to the size of drift. Ng et al (2008) reported that size of PEAD is related to size 
of earnings surprise, stock volatility and transaction cost.. The initial part of this 
chapter 6. 2. 3 following Ng et al (2008) approach presents that there are strong 
evidences of the relationship between price drift and earnings surprises, stock 
liquidity, and stock volatility. To explore the role of information asymmetry cost 
component in bid ask spread, in this section I perform another panel estimated general 
least squared regression as follows: 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒 = 𝐶𝐴𝑅0,𝑘
𝑖                                                               (6.3.2.1)  
= 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑈𝐸𝑖 ,0+ 𝛽2𝑈𝐸𝑖,0𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖,𝑘 + 𝛽3𝑈𝐸𝑖 ,0𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦−90,−21
𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
Where, 
                                                 
72
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Market response is cumulative abnormal return of stock i from event day 0 to 
day k. 
𝑈𝐸𝑖 ,0 is earnings surprise on the event day 0. 
News is the average adverse selection or information asymmetry component of 
stock i‟s effective bid ask spread, from event day to day k, calculated based on 
Huang and Stoll (1997) model, presented in tables shown in above section 
6.3.1. It is calculated as the percentage of effective spread time effective 
spread
73
. 
Volatility is the standard deviation of stock i during 70 days pre-earnings 
announcement, from day -90 to day -21. 
𝜀𝑖  is error term. 
 Results are presented from table 6.3.2.1 to table 6.3.2.8. 
This model uses panel estimated general least squared method. Its characteristics are 
almost similar as the model 6.2.2.1, except the two facts that i) Illiquidity variable was 
replaced by news; which is the information asymmetry component of the bid ask 
spread inferred from section 6. 3.1 and  ii) news are allowed to vary over time instead 
of taking them as at the time of the event; i.e. news are associated with variation in 
event window length. By allowing news lengthening the post event window we 
capture more changes in the earnings related news. We are mainly concern with 
𝛽1, the coefficient on the earngings surprise main effect, and 𝛽2 , the interaction term 
between earnings surprise and news. The equation 6.3.2.1 can also be rewritten as: 
                           𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒 = 𝐶𝐴𝑅0,𝑘
𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
′ 𝑈𝐸0,𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖             6.3.2.2  
In which            𝛽1
′ = 𝛽1 +  𝛽2𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖,𝑘 + 𝛽3𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦−90,−21
𝑖                   (6.3.2.3) 
To evaluate the impact of news on the PEAD, we are mainly concerned with 𝛽2 the 
coefficient of the interaction between earnings surprise and news. 
The results are presented from table 6.3.2.1 to 6.3.2.8. Overall, the results for the UK 
and French equity markets are consistent with hypothesis that firms with higher 
information asymmetry costs have higher market response. The interaction between 
information variable and earnings surprises are significant in the UK and French, 
                                                 
73
 All results are qualitative unchanged when using the percentage of the effective spread due to adverse 
selection rather than multiplying this variable by effective spread. 
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however there are mixed results between positive and negative in the US markets, 
showing that the impact of information asymmetry component in this market is 
unclear. This might be due to the bias in the earnings measurement method or unkown 
market conditions. As mentioned before, at least we do not have specific time of 
earnings release for firms in the US. The weak results from the US stock markets 
could be a function of a measurement error in the unexpected earnings/earnings 
surprise. 
As expected, earnings surprise main effects are positive and significant in the UK; 
however earnings surprise main effects are not clear in France. The main effects of 
earnings surprise in the US are strong for NASDAQ100 and S&P 100 but not quite 
strong for DJIA in the US.  
 
Table 6.3.2.1 FTSE100 Market response to earnings announcement and information asymmetry cost. 
This table presents the results of earnings response coefficient regression to examine the market reaction to earnings news for 
different time frames. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal return of each counter period [0, 10]; [0, 20]; [0, 30]; [0, 
60]; [0, 90] after the earnings announcement. Surprise is earnings surprise measured as unexpected earning on the event day 𝑈𝐸𝑖,0 
with the indices that have the abnormal returns and trading volume reach its peak on day 1 surprise will be earnings surprise 
measured as unexpected earnings on  day 1, due to many companies releasing information at the market close, led to the largest 
reaction happening on day 1.News is the information asymmetry component in the bid ask spread infer from Huang and Stoll 
(1997) spread decomposition model, Volatility is standard deviation of stock return pre-earnings announcement during the period 
[-90,-20]. This panel fixed effect regression uses General Least Square method. 
Window Period after earnings 
announcement 
10days 20days 30days 60days 90days 
Constant 0.0004 
[0.42] 
0.003*** 
[0.00] 
0.005*** 
[0.00] 
0.012*** 
[0.00] 
0.017*** 
[0.00] 
𝑼𝑬𝟎 0.740*** 
[0.00] 
0.738*** 
[0.00] 
0.562*** 
[0.00] 
0.115** 
[0.02] 
-0.147*** 
[0.00] 
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 ∗ 𝑵𝒆𝒘𝒔 0.021*** 
[0.00] 
0.035*** 
[0.00] 
0.040*** 
[0.00] 
0.053*** 
[0.00] 
0.071*** 
[0.00] 
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 ∗ 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 17.750*** 
[0.00] 
13.643*** 
[0.00] 
21.533*** 
[0.00] 
50.442*** 
[0.00] 
67.449*** 
[0.00] 
𝑹𝟐 0.89 0.76 0.63 0.48 0.33 
Number of Observation 1072 2039 2969 5809 8689 
 
*, **, *** indicate two tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
In table 6.3.2.1,  the interaction term between earnings surprise and news is positive 
and significant, showing that the variation in news interact with earning surprise can 
explain the change in stock reaction after earnings announcement. Other variable 
coefficients such as that of earnings surprise and the interactions term between 
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earnings surprise and stock volatility are positive and significant in different event 
window lengths. The main effect of earning surprise in FTSE100 is small compared to 
other indices. As expected, main effect of earnings surprise reduces over time. 
In table 6.3.2.2, the interaction terms between earnings surprise and news are 
positively significant, showing that the variation in news interact with earning surprise 
can explaine the change in stock reaction after earnings announcement. Other 
variables, earnings surprise main effect coefficient is positive and significant in 
different event window lengths until the end of period of 90 days post earnings 
announcement.  The interaction terms between earnings surprise and stock volatility 
are negative and significant.  Earnings surprise main effects are larger than in the case 
of FTSE100. 
 
Table 6.3.2.2 FTSE 250 Market response to earnings announcement and information asymmetry cost. 
This table presents the results of earnings response coefficient regression to examine the market reaction to earnings news for 
different event time frames. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal return of each counter period [0, 10]; [0, 20]; [0, 30]; 
[0, 60]; [0, 90] after earnings announcement. Surprise is earnings surprise measured as unexpected earning on the event day 𝑈𝐸𝑖,0 
with the indices that have the abnormal returns and trading volume reach its peak on day 1 surprise will be earnings surprise 
measured as unexpected earnings on  day 1, due to many companies releasing information at the market close, led to the largest 
reaction happening on day 1.News is the information asymmetry component in the bid ask spread infer from Huang and Stoll 
(1997) spread decomposition model, Volatility is standard deviation of stock return pre-earnings announcement during the period 
[-90,-20]. This panel fixed effect regression uses General Least Square method. 
 
Window Period after earnings 
announcement 
10days 20days 30days 60days 90days 
Constant 0.004*** 
[0.00] 
0.005*** 
[0.00] 
0.005*** 
[0.00] 
0.007*** 
[0.00] 
0.008*** 
[0.00] 
𝑼𝑬𝟎 1.280*** 
[0.00] 
1.392*** 
[0.00] 
1.442*** 
[0.00] 
1.395*** 
[0.00] 
1.199*** 
[0.00] 
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 ∗ 𝑵𝒆𝒘𝒔 0.005*** 
[0.00] 
0.005*** 
[0.00] 
0.006*** 
[0.00] 
0.012*** 
[0.00] 
0.009*** 
[0.00] 
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 ∗ 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 -
14.670*** 
[0.00] 
-
19.191*** 
[0.00] 
-
21.523*** 
[0.00] 
-
21.669*** 
[0.00] 
- 
12.617*** 
[0.00] 
𝑹𝟐 0.76 0.71 0.64 0.51 0.36 
Number of Observation 2528 4782 6893 13589 20430 
 
*, **, *** indicate two tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
In table 6.3.2.3, the interaction terms between earnings surprise and news are negative 
and significant, showing that the variation in news when interacts with earnings 
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surprise can explain the change in stock reaction after earnings announcement. 
Earnings surprise main effects and interaction with volatility is significant in different 
event window lengths. Earnings surprise main effects are larger compared to 
FTSE100 and FTSE250. 
Table 6.3.2.3FTSE Small Cap - Market response to earnings announcement and information asymmetry 
cost.   
This table presents the results of earnings response coefficient regression to examine the market reaction to earnings news for 
different window periods. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal return of each counter period [0, 10]; [0, 20]; [0, 30]; 
[0, 60]; [0, 90] after earnings announcement. Surprise is earnings surprise measured as unexpected earning on the event day 𝑈𝐸𝑖,0 
with the indices that have the abnormal returns and trading volume reach it peak on day 1 surprise will be earnings surprise 
measured as unexpected earnings on the day 1, due to many companies releasing information at the market close, led to the 
largest reaction happen on day 1.News is the information asymmetry component in the bid ask spread infer from Huang and Stoll  
(1997) spread decomposition model, Volatility is standard deviation of stock return pre-earnings announcement during the period 
[-90,-20]. This panel fixed effect regression uses General Least Square method. 
Window Period after earnings 
announcement 
10days 20days 30days 60days 90days 
Constant 0.003*** 
[0.00] 
0.003*** 
[0.00] 
0.004*** 
[0.00] 
0.003*** 
[0.00] 
0.002*** 
[0.00] 
𝑼𝑬𝟎 1.268*** 
[0.00] 
1.414*** 
[0.00] 
1.434*** 
[0.00] 
1.590*** 
[0.00] 
1.656*** 
[0.00] 
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 ∗ 𝑵𝒆𝒘𝒔 -0.002*** 
[0.00] 
-0.003*** 
[0.00] 
-0.004*** 
[0.00] 
-0.004*** 
[0.00] 
-0.004*** 
[0.00] 
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 ∗ 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 -5.224*** 
[0.00] 
-8.885*** 
[0.00] 
-8.418*** 
[0.00] 
-10.336*** 
[0.00] 
-12.424*** 
[0.00] 
𝑹𝟐 0.75 0.64 0.56 0.47 0.39 
Number of Observation 3299 6267 9128 17985 27019 
 
*, **, *** Indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
The interaction terms between earnings surprise and news in the table 6.3.2.4 are 
positive and significant in this table 6.3.2.4, showing that the variation in news 
interacts with earnings surprise can be explained by the change in stock reaction after 
earnings announcement. The earnings surprise main effects are also higher than that of 
FTSE100, positive and significant over different window lengths. The interactions 
between earnings surprises and volatility are negative and significant. 
In table 6.3.2.5, the interaction terms between earnings surprise and news are negative 
and significant over a 10 day window period, and positive and significant over a 60-
day period; however over a  20, 30 and 90 day period, the interaction terms 
coefficients are insignificant. The results are mixed, providing that the variation in 
news do not explain for the market response after earnings announcement. Earnings  
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Table 6.3.2.4 FTSE AIM All Shares - Market response to earnings announcement and information 
asymmetry cost. 
This table presents the results of earnings response coefficient regression to examine the market reaction to earnings news for 
different window periods. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal return of each counter period [0, 10]; [0, 20]; [0, 30]; 
[0, 60]; [0, 90] after earnings announcement. Surprise is earnings surprise measured as unexpected earning on the event day 𝑈𝐸𝑖,0 
with the indices that have the abnormal returns and trading volume reach its peak on day 1 surprise will be earnings surprise 
measured as unexpected earnings on day 1, due to many companies releasing information at the market close, led to the largest 
reaction happening on day 1.News is the information asymmetry component in the bid ask spread infer from Huang and Stoll 
(1997) spread decomposition model, Volatility is standard deviation of stock return pre-earnings announcement during the period 
[-90,-20]. This panel fixed effect regression uses General Least Square method. 
Window Period after EA 10days 20days 30days 60days 90days 
Constant 0.002*** 
[0.00] 
0.003*** 
[0.00] 
0.006*** 
[0.00] 
0.012*** 
[0.00] 
0.017*** 
[0.00] 
𝑼𝑬𝟎 1.229*** 
[0.00] 
1.297*** 
[0.00] 
1.361*** 
[0.00] 
1.475*** 
[0.00] 
1.510*** 
[0.00] 
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 ∗ 𝑵𝒆𝒘𝒔 0.001** 
[0.04 
0.006** 
[0.03] 
0.012*** 
[0.00] 
0.017*** 
[0.00] 
0.014*** 
[0.00] 
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 ∗ 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 -4.124*** 
[0.00] 
-5.177*** 
[0.00] 
-6.361*** 
[0.00] 
-8.461*** 
[0.00] 
-9.008*** 
[0.00] 
𝑹𝟐 0.85 0.73 0.66 0.48 0.40 
Number of Observation 9656 18275 26915 53113 79474 
*, **, *** Indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Table 6.3.2.5 DJIA 
This table presents the results of earnings response coefficient regression to examine the market reaction to earnings news for 
different window periods. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal return of each counter period [0, 10]; [0, 20]; [0, 30]; 
[0, 60]; [0, 90] after earnings announcement. Surprise is earnings surprise measured as unexpected earning on the event day 𝑈𝐸𝑖,0 
with the indices that have the abnormal returns and trading volume reach its peak on day 1 surprise will be earnings surprise 
measured as unexpected earnings on  day 1, due to many companies releasing information at the market close, led to the largest 
reaction happen on day 1.News is the information asymmetry component in the bid ask spread infer from Huang and Stoll (1997) 
spread decomposition model, Volatility is standard deviation of stock return pre-earnings announcement during the period [-90,-
20]. This panel fixed effect regression uses General Least Square method. 
Window Period after EA 10days 20days 30days 60days 90days 
Constant 0.0001 
0.76 
-0.002*** 
0.00 
-0.001 
0.15 
0.001 
0.19 
0.004*** 
0.00 
𝑼𝑬𝟎 1.273*** 
[0.00] 
1.006*** 
0.00 
0.500*** 
0.00 
-0.490*** 
0.00 
-0.751*** 
0.00 
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 ∗ 𝑵𝒆𝒘𝒔 -0.195* 
0.07 
0.201 
0.63 
0.447 
0.34 
1.067* 
0.09 
-0.666 
0.43 
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 ∗ 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 -5.460 
0.49 
13.895 
0.15 
65.409*** 
0.00 
156.465*** 
0.00 
166.255*** 
0.00 
𝑹𝟐 0.83 0.70 0.62 0.47 0.28 
Number of Observation 326 610 901 1769 2643 
 
*, **, *** Indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
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news main effect and interaction between earnings news and volatility also have mix 
results. This could be due to the bias in the earnings surprise measurement in the US 
markets.The results provide no evidence that information asymentry cost component 
can explain the PEAD in this sub set of sample. 
As presented in table 6.3.2.6, main effect of earnings surprises are positive and 
significant, however, the interaction terms between news and earning surprise in this 
regression output are not significant for most  event window periods,  providing no 
evidence that information asymmetry cost component can explain the variation in 
market response after earnings announcement. The interaction terms between earnings 
surprise and volatility also have mixed reults. We found no evidence that information 
asymmetry cost component can explain the PEAD in NASDAQ100. Again, the errors 
in earnings supprises measurement have not been taken into account. 
 
Table 6.3.2.6 NASDAQ100 
This table presents the results of earnings response coefficient regression to examine the market reaction to earnings news for 
different window periods. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal return of each counter period [0, 10]; [0, 20]; [0, 30]; 
[0, 60]; [0, 90] after earnings announcement. Surprise is earnings surprise measured as unexpected earning on the event day 𝑈𝐸𝑖,0 
with the indices that have the abnormal returns and trading volume reach its peak on day 1 surprise will be earnings surprise 
measured as unexpected earnings on  day 1, due to many companies releasing information at the market close, led to the largest 
reaction happening on day 1.News is the information asymmetry component in the bid ask spread infer from Huang and Stoll 
(1997) spread decomposition model, Volatility is standard deviation of stock return pre-earnings announcement during the period 
[-90,-20]. This panel fixed effect regression uses General Least Square method. 
Window Period after earnings 
announcement 
10days 20days 30days 60days 90days 
Constant 0.001 
0.16 
-0.002*** 
0.01 
-0.002*** 
0.00 
-0.006*** 
0.00 
-0.007*** 
0.00 
𝑼𝑬𝟎 1.073*** 
0.00 
1.254*** 
0.00 
1.299*** 
0.00 
1.159*** 
0.00 
0.519*** 
0.00 
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 ∗ 𝑵𝒆𝒘𝒔 -0.234 
0.39 
-0.248 
0.33 
-0.099 
0.71 
0.206 
0.34 
1.275*** 
0.00 
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 ∗ 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 5.793*** 
0.00 
-3.064* 
0.09 
-6.183*** 
0.00 
1.956 
0.33 
29.652*** 
0.00 
𝑹𝟐 0.81 0.70 0.62 0.46 0.25 
Number of Observation 1029 1953 2878 5669 8454 
 
*, **, *** Indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
 
Table 6.3.2.7 shows that main effects of earnings surprise are positive and significant; 
the interactions between earnings surprise and volatility are also positive and 
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significant; however, the coefficient of interaction terms between news and earning 
surprise are insignificant, providing that the interaction between information 
asymmetry cost component and earnings surprise cannot explain the variation in the 
market response to earnings announcement. 
 
Table 6.3.2.7 S&P100 
This table presents the results of earnings response coefficient regression to examine the market reaction to earnings news for 
different window periods. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal return of each counter period [0, 10]; [0, 20]; [0, 30]; 
[0, 60]; [0, 90] after earnings announcement. Surprise is earnings surprise measured as unexpected earning on the event day 𝑈𝐸𝑖,0 
with the indices that have the abnormal returns and trading volume reach its peak on day 1 surprise will be earnings surprise 
measured as unexpected earnings on day 1, due to many companies releasing information at the market close, led to the largest 
reaction happening on day 1.News is the information asymmetry component in the bid ask spread infer from Huang and Stoll 
(1997) spread decomposition model, Volatility is standard deviation of stock return pre-earnings announcement during the period 
[-90,-20]. This panel fixed effect regression uses General Least Square method. 
Window Period after earnings 
announcement 
10days 20days 30days 60days 90days 
Constant 0.002*** 
0.00 
0.004*** 
0.00 
0.007*** 
0.00 
0.011*** 
0.00 
0.016*** 
0.00 
𝑼𝑬𝟎 0.825*** 
0.00 
0.797*** 
0.00 
0.764*** 
0.00 
0.569*** 
0.00 
0.155** 
0.02 
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 ∗ 𝑵𝒆𝒘𝒔 0.022 
0.46 
0.093 
0.29 
1.44 
0.13 
0.362 
0.16 
0.159 
0.40 
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 ∗ 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 21.658*** 
0.00 
18.653*** 
0.00 
22.141*** 
0.00 
32.961*** 
0.00 
56.360*** 
0.00 
𝑹𝟐 0.74 0.64 0.56 0.37 0.21 
Number of Observation 1078 2020 2989 5894 8799 
 
*, **, *** Indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
 
Table 6.3.2.8 shows a significant positive relationship between the interaction term 
and dependent variable, providing that the variation between information asymmetry 
components could provide explanation to the variation in the market response to 
earnings news. However, the single effects of earnings surprise are not clear in 20-day 
and 90-day window lengths. The situation in the French suit to the fact that France is a 
code law accounting system, where earnings news are released to the markets through 
different channel before the official earnings announcement. The uncertainty therefore 
has been digested in a longer time and since pre-earnings announcemet period. As 
mentioned in chapter III in data selection process, the event day for French market is 
defined not by the date of the official earnings announcement but the day of the first 
unofficial release of even partial news regarding the earnings of a firm. The possibility 
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of partitially implies that the different reaction of the French market to the arrival of 
earnings news compared to the US and the UK markets may be a statistical artefact 
caused by the definition of event date. In the other words it might be possible that if 
the French market received full information on the event day it might well react in the 
same way as the UK and the US market. This implies not only for the cumulative 
abnormal returns behaviour in chapter 4.2.2.8 but also shown in this part. 
The interaction between earnings surprise and volatility in French are positive and 
significant. 
 
Table 6.3.2.8 CAC40 
This table presents the results of earnings response coefficient regression to examine the market reaction to earnings news for 
different window periods. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal return of each counter period [0, 10]; [0, 20]; [0, 30]; 
[0, 60]; [0, 90] after earnings announcement. Surprise is earnings surprise measured as unexpected earning on the event day 𝑈𝐸𝑖,0 
with the indices that have the abnormal returns and trading volume reach its peak on day 1 surprise will be earnings surprise 
measured as unexpected earnings on day 1, due to many companies releasing information at the market close, led to the largest 
reaction happening on day 1.News is the information asymmetry component in the bid ask spread infer from Huang and Stoll 
(1997) spread decomposition model, Volatility is standard deviation of stock return pre-earnings announcement during the period 
[-90,-20]. This panel fixed effect regression uses General Least Square method. 
Window Period after earnings 
announcement 
10days 20days 30days 60days 90days 
Constant 0.001*** 
0.00 
0.004*** 
0.00 
0.005*** 
0.00 
0.005*** 
0.00 
0.005*** 
0.00 
𝑼𝑬𝟎 0.333*** 
0.02 
0.078 
0.41 
0.331*** 
0.00 
-0.713*** 
0.00 
-0.642 
0.00 
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 ∗ 𝑵𝒆𝒘𝒔 -1.392** 
0.02 
0.489** 
0.04 
1.749*** 
0.00 
1.564*** 
0.00 
0.930*** 
0.00 
𝑼𝑬𝒊,𝟎 ∗ 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 62.634*** 
0.00 
75.348*** 
0.00 
58.788*** 
0.00 
156.534*** 
0.00 
143.671*** 
0.00 
𝑹𝟐 0.78 0.71 0.58 0.52 0.38 
Number of Observation 440 835 1207 2333 3526 
 
*, **, *** Indicate two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter explores the role of information asymmetry cost component in the cause 
of price drift. This chapter has employed three main regressions. The first regression is 
a cross-sectional regression to examine how the market responds to the earnings news. 
First of all, the cumulative abnormal returns are regressed on the earnings surprise at 
the event time, and the interaction between earnings surprise at event time and stock 
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liquidity at the event time. Regression output shows that earnings surprise main effects 
are positive and highly significant in the whole period of 90 days in London Stock 
Exchange, Paris Bourse, and the NASDAQ100. Earnings surprise main effects are 
also positive and highly significant in the US market during a period of up to 30 days. 
After 60days the reactions are insignificant or become negative in the end. The 
interaction terms between earnings surprise and stock liquidity are positive and highly 
significant for two large stock indices in the London Stock Exchange FTSE100 and 
FTSE 250. This interaction is unclear and mixed for the other two small and illiquid 
indices FTSE Small Cap and FTSE AIM All Shares and the US and French Equity 
markets. The following regression based on Huang and Stoll (1997) effective spread 
decomposition model. Huang and Stoll (1997) model directly infer information 
asymmetry cost component (and cost of trading component) in effective spread, that 
decreased in percentage over time in FTSE100 and FTSE 250,  and more or less kept 
at the same percentage for other indices. In an attempt to establish the relationship 
between information asymmetry component and market response, the final regression 
is a panel fixed effect regression, based on the first regression approach. This 
regression allows information component to vary by time. This regression examines 
whether the information component in liquidity play a role in explaining the PEAD. 
The results from this regression reveal that information asymmetry cost component in 
the bid ask spread account for post earnings announcement drift in all the four indices 
in London Stock Exchange and for the CAC40 in French market. However, there is 
very less statistical evidence that information asymmetry cost component have 
relationship with post earnings announcement drift in the US market. This problem 
might be due to the earnings surprise measurement on the event as already stated 
above, that there are a number of firms which announce earnings results at the 
beginning of the market open, and the remainder release earnings information after 
market close. The reaction (earnings surprises variable) at the event time therefore is 
difficult to calculate accurately. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 CONCLUSSIONS AND REMARKS 
 
Post Earnings Announcement Drift is an anomaly that is robust with a longest history 
in behavioural finance. Over the last four decades, there have been many attempts to 
solve the question what causes the PEAD, however, the main reason for it remains 
hidden in literature. Given the importance of a phenomenon that drives the investors‟ 
behaviours on their way to exploit benefits through PEAD, in this thesis I have 
addressed the three issues: 
1) to evaluate the impacts of earnings news and the effects this has on stock 
liquidity   
2) Answer the question: Can stock liquidity explain the Post Earnings 
Announcement Drift? i.e. PEAD. 
3) Further to the above question particularly within the relationship between 
PEAD and stock liquidity, what is the role of information asymmetry cost?  In 
other words what is the difference in behaviour demonstrated by informed and 
uninformed traders around the new earnings news? 
Given the nature of data set that I collected
74
, some shortcomings of other measures of 
stock liquidity that were presented in the chapter covering literature (Chapter II),  and 
some of the advantages of bid ask spread, which were also presented in Chapter II, 
this thesis mainly uses three measures of bid ask spread to proxy for stock liquidity
75
. 
However, this thesis also spent the initial part of empirical analysis in Chapter IV to 
explore the liquidity effects through examining the price response and trading volume 
                                                 
74
 Data samples were already split into different indices, with similar firms‟ characteristics. There is no 
need to control for those factors such as firm size or book to market values etc.. See Chapter III- Data 
Selection and Methodology. 
75
 Quote bid ask spread, relative bid ask spread, and effective bid ask spread, as defined in Chapter III. 
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impacts in order to provide the different dimensions analysis of the change in stock 
liquidity around the news. 
The days of earnings announcement were collected with great care, in this study. The 
data sample of this thesis covers 1821 firms listed in different indices from London 
Stock Exchange, (including main and alternative investment markets), NASDAQ, 
CBOE, S&P and the Euronext Paris.  Data samples were collected according to each 
individual index group with similar characteristics, i.e. factors such as firm size, book 
to market values … are all considered the same in each index when performing 
analysis. This assumes that there are no cross-sectional variations across firms within 
one index. 
 Within the framework of this thesis, not only the highly liquid but also less liquid and 
illiquid stocks in the London Stock Exchange are being covered. Moreover, this thesis 
makes a comparison between common law accounting countries (US, and UK) and 
code law accounting country (France). With different characteristics of the two types 
of accounting systems, earnings news should play different roles, the reason being that 
in the common law system earnings news is released at the announcement date whilst 
in the code law system, earnings news is conveyed to the market up to 3-4 weeks in 
advance of the  earnings announcement through various  channels. However, it is 
interesting that in this thesis I have observed almost the same types of reactions on the 
event in both systems: The strongest reaction happened on event day [0] and then 
gradually reduced over time even in the code law country as France. The differences 
are: firstly, there is evidence of pre-earnings announcement drift in the code law 
system; secondly, in the code law system the cost of trading component dominates the 
bid ask spread/stock illiquidity while in the common law system the information 
asymmetry component dominates the bid ask spread/stock illiquidity. 
This thesis has also observed that when the news is released, investors react by trading 
more with both liquid and illiquid stocks, however, when the news ceases, investors 
tend to follow the larger stock and few investors follow small/ illiquid stocks. 
Chapter IV which was based on univariate analysis explores the impact of earnings 
announcement on stock liquidity in different short term and long term scenarios. The 
analysis is conducted over a period of 90 days prior to actual earnings announcement 
and 90 days after earnings announcement date, based on a sample of 1555 ordinary 
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common stocks from 4 indices in the London Stock Exchange, 226 stocks from three 
main indices in the United States, and 40 major stocks from Euronext Paris that have 
data available on DATASTREAM ADVANCE. Three separate methodologies were 
employed in this chapter: the market adjusted model of stock returns following 
traditional event study, the trading volume effect analysis using the approach of Hedge 
and Mc DerMott (2003) and Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2006); and finally the 
application of Information Cost Liquidity Hypothesis established by Van Horne 
(1970), subsequently followed by a number of authors such as Beinesh and Gardner 
1995, Hedge and McDermott 2003, and Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2006).  
The empirical results in Chapter IV which begin with traditional market adjusted 
model show that there are strong reactions of stock prices after earnings 
announcement over all in the three countries and respective markets, that employ the 
usage of  either the  common law system (UK and US), where earnings information is 
released on the announcement date, or  the code law system as in France where 
earnings information is leaked through various channels before the official 
announcement date. The results from this particular part of analysis show that,  a code 
law system such as in  France, the pre-earnings announcement reaction is very clear. 
This happened as we would expect, when the earnings news is conveyed to the 
markets.  In the common law systems such as the US and UK, we do see some 
evidences of pre-earnings announcement reaction, however this happens very close to 
the announcement date, as shown in figures from 4.1.1.1- 4.1.1.8. 
Beside this, the strongest reaction happened in both systems (the US, UK and France) 
on the event day (0) or day (1) in some cases in the US. Note that in the US there are a 
number of companies that release earnings news in the morning before market open 
and a number of companies release earnings news in the afternoon after market close. 
Due to this fact, there is noise in the results between day 0 and day 1. 
The level of reaction was still very strong in the short term window, however it 
reduced over time. Over  the long-term period, we could see that good news reaction 
lasts much longer and bad news ceases more quickly for most indices except 
NASDAQ 100.  For example in the London Stock Exchange, good news for FTSE 
100, FTSE 250, FTSE Small cap and FTSE AIM All Shares all react up to the whole 
studied period of 90 days; in the US, DJIA up to 50 days, S&P100 up to the studied 
period of 90 days. As for bad news, in London Stock Exchange, FTSE 100 react up to 
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10 days, FTSE 250, FTSE small cap react within 5 days after earnings announcement, 
FTSE AIM All Shares react after 20 days; in the US, DJIA reacts within 5 days, S&P 
bad news reacts up to 10 days. The two cases that are different are the NASDAQ 100 
and CAC 40. NASDAQ100 has a good news reaction lasting up to  20 days only 
whilst  bad news reaction lasts up to 80 days. In France, the CAC 40 good news  
reacts  up to 30 days and  bad news reaction within 40 days. 
The increases/decreases in price following earnings announcement are permanent. 
After the change has taken place, price does not go back down or up from the original 
levels  as shown graphically and statistically. 
Overall, there tends to be a greater willingness  to discuss and promote a brighter 
future  for the good news by firms, and it makes the  price continue to  drift up in the 
long term. Meanwhile on the psychological side, markets/investors tend to cease  their 
reactions more quickly  with  bad or negative news except  in the case for  the  
NASDAQ . The fact that the NASDAQ contains 100 high tech firms could be an 
answer, more weight for the bad news than for  good news,   leads to longer reactions. 
In case of CAC 40 in France due to the   fact that information is released and digested 
before the release date  it is surprising that stocks still react very strongly  on the 
earnings announcement day than  before. 
The analysis of the trading volume effect which was the second part of univariate 
analysis in chapter IV, partly confirmed another dimension of stock liquidity that is 
affected by earnings announcement. On the one hand, trading volume has a constant 
change and a slope coefficient change after earnings news is released. And on the 
other hand trading volume has a positive time trend. Both of these lead to the result 
that stocks being traded more frequently/easily following the earnings news.  
In particular, the empirical analysis of this part shows that, in the short term within 
five days before the earnings announcement and five days after earnings 
announcement, there is a dramatic increase in trading volume for all indices. The 
impacts of the earnings news on trading volumes are most profound when the news is 
formerly released. The abnormal volume reaches its peak on the event day 0 in the 
London Stock Exchange and for DJIA, S&P100 in the US stock Exchange and 
CAC40 in Euronext Paris, on day 1 for NASDAQ100. The trading volumes are many 
times higher  as compared to the change on day -10 in the additional test.  See tables 
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from 4.2.2.1 to 4.2.2.8, panel A for details. After the announcement date, the news 
continues to have an effect on trading volume. Trading volumes still increase; 
however the impact level is less aggressive and gradually decreases day by day. 
Results also show that, trading volume not only increases due to earnings 
announcement but also increases over time. Beside the impact of earnings news, this 
time factor (linear time trend) will also affect stock liquidity due to the speed of 
selling stocks is also indicated by volume. Generally when the volume increases, the 
cost of trading will reduce, hence it alone makes total bid ask spread decrease or in 
other words, stock liquidity improves. 
In the long term, when compared to the whole post earnings announcement and pre 
earnings announcement periods
76
, this thesis reports the increase in trading volume 
scaled by market value for all of the eight indices. See tables from 4.2.2.1 to 4.2.2.8, 
panel B. Using standard t test used to compare two sample mean values, the results   
suggest  in the long term, trading volume still increases significantly for large  and 
medium stocks   (including FTSE100, FTSE250, DJIA, NASDAQ100, S&P100, AND 
CAC40), but not significantly for small stocks (FTSE Small Cap and FTSE AIM All 
Shares). The possible explanation is that when the news is released, people tend to 
trade more, however when the news ceases, traders are more likely to follow large 
stocks, less likely to follow small firms. 
There is a common issue for above two parts. Evidence shows that both the price and 
trading volume reactions are very large and profound close to the event date, and 
gradually reduced over time.  
Finally, the last part of univariate analysis in chapter IV shows  that in the common 
law system such as the US and UK, stock liquidity will decrease due to the immediate 
impact of earnings announcement; however in the long term stock liquidity gradually 
improves over time due to the increase in trading volume effect. In the code law 
system as employed in France, evidence from the CAC 40 index clearly shows that the 
immediate impact on stock liquidity is opposite to that of the common law system.  In 
the long term for the CAC 40, stock liquidly will follow the same trend as in the US 
and  UK, continue to improve. However, the immediate decrease in stock liquidity in 
the UK and US after earnings announcement suggest that the information asymmetry 
                                                 
76
 Pre-earnings announcement period is defined as period from day -90 to day -1. Post earnings 
announcements period is defined as period from day 0 to day +90. 
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component dominates liquidity (bid ask spread) in the these two countries, meanwhile 
the immediate improvements to stock liquidity of the CAC 40 suggests that the cost of 
trading component (order processing and the inventory holding cost) dominates the 
bid ask spread in the French market. 
In order to reach above conclusion, last part of chapter IV investigates if earnings 
announcement creates a new information environment and how earnings news affects 
stock liquidity in different markets. My expectation is for an improvement in the 
information environment; stocks should be traded more and become more liquid. This 
part of study however, shows that in post earnings announcement period, at first, bid 
ask spread increased (liquidity decreased) in the UK and the US markets. In the 
meantime, bid ask spread at first decreases (liquidity increased) in the French market. 
Why does this happen? As stated earlier that the bid ask spread can be decomposed in 
the information asymmetry component and cost of trading component, we can see that  
earnings news not only affects trading volume but also leads to the reduction in the 
cost of trading and increases the information asymmetry component in the bid ask 
spread. The reason for this is being that when the news is released, not every one can 
gain and digest the news in the same way. There will be investors who have 
advantages over other groups. Therefore, earnings news once released will create the 
gap between informed and uninformed traders. This gap is  referred as information 
asymmetry component in the bid ask spread. When earnings news is released, this gap 
increases and it will make the total bid ask spread to increase.  
Now we can see that, the overall impact of earnings news on the bid ask spread will be 
the total of the above two effects. If the increase in information asymmetry component  
is the leading factor, then the total bid ask spread will increase (stock liquidity 
decreases). However, if the decrease in cost of trading component is the leading 
factor, then the total bid ask spread will decrease (stock liquidity increases).  And 
what happened on the London Stock Exchange and the US markets suggests that the 
information asymmetry component dominates bid ask spread (stock liquidity) in these 
two common law system based countries; what happened on the Euronext Paris 
market suggests that the cost of trading component dominated bid ask spread (stock 
liquidity) in the French market. This happened exactly as what was  expected from a 
code law system country where earnings information is released through different 
channels  before the earnings announcement date, and thus  plays a less dominant role. 
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Another point to be noted from the results, even though stock liquidity decreases (bid 
ask spread increase) in the common law systems  as employed  by the US and UK, 
and stock liquidity increase (bid ask spread decrease) in the code law  as in  France for 
the studied  period of 90 days post earnings announcement, what we can see is that 
over time, stock liquidity increased (bid ask spread decreases) in all the three markets 
the UK and the US and French. This evidence is shown in the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
gradual decrease in the bid ask spread ratios  if we look at the different short window 
periods in tables from 4.3.1.1 to 4.3.1.8. This is explained by the reason that over time 
the information asymmetry in the news has less impact while trading volume has still 
increased due to the news and by its own time linear function, leading to the 
continuous improvement in liquidity. This issue was strongly supported  by the results 
of Chapter V. 
Chapter V performs a multivariate analysis of stock liquidity in the long term after 
earnings announcement. This multivariate analysis continues to prove and confirm the 
results in Chapter IV.  In general, earnings announcements provide two directions of 
impact on stock liquidity. A part of stock liquidity will decrease immediately, proved 
by positive sign of intercept dummy variables in the multivariate regression
77
, and is 
suggested that due to the information asymmetry increase during the announcement 
period (which are analysed in Chapter VI). The other part of stock liquidity will 
improve as the trading volume increases after earnings announcement. This is shown 
in the negative slope dummy coefficient of the interaction term between dummy 
variable and trading volume
78
. This conclusion is proven in most of the indices, except 
for a few cases in effective spread models where the sign of coefficient is 
insignificant. 
From what we observed, in the long term there are two side impacts of earnings 
announcement on stock liquidity /bid ask spread. Earnings announcements increase 
bid ask spread (decrease stock liquidity) as we observed from significant positive 
intercept dummy variable coefficient 𝛽1. Meanwhile at the same time, trading volume 
increases due to earnings announcement leading to the decrease in the bid ask spread 
                                                 
77
  The regression is with stock illiquidity (natural logarithm of bid ask spread) as dependent variable, 
hence the positive sign of intercept dummy means that there is an increase in stock illiquidity or a 
decrease in stock liquidity due to the event.  
78
 The regression is with stock illiquidity (natural logarithm of bid ask spread) as dependent variable, 
hence the negative sign of slop coefficient of interact term means that there is a negative ship in the 
function of stock illiquidity or a positive ship in the function of stock liquidity. 
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(or improvement in stock liquidity) as we observed from the significant negative β3. 
The overall effect will be the total of both the above effects. This finding holds true in 
both univariate and multivariate analysis, and this also explains the results in the 
univariate analysis, particularly the results from information cost liquidity hypothesis 
application. In the short term, stock liquidity decreases (bid ask increases) due to 
immediate impacts of earnings announcement. Due to the increase in trading volume 
after earnings announcement, stock liquidity gradually increases (bid ask spread 
decreases) over time. This helps to explain both the situations that in common law 
system as  the US and the UK, where the information asymmetry cost component 
dominates bid ask spread, and in the  code law system   as France, where the cost of 
trading (inventory holding and order processing cost components) dominates bid ask 
spread. 
Lastly, chapter VI explores the role of information asymmetry cost component in the 
causes of price drift. This chapter employed three main regressions. The first 
regression is a cross-sectional regression to examine how the market responds to the 
earnings news. First of all, the cumulative abnormal returns are regressed on the (i) 
earnings surprise, (ii) the interaction between earnings surprise and stock liquidity, 
and (iii) the interaction between earnings surprise and stock volatility at the time of 
the event. Regression output shows that earnings surprise main effects are positive and 
highly significant in the whole period of 90 day in London Stock Exchange and Paris 
Bourse, and NASDAQ100. The main effects of earnings surprise are also positive and 
highly significant in the US market during period of up to 30 days. After 60days the 
reactions are insignificant or become negative in the end. The interaction period 
between earnings surprise and stock liquidity is positive and highly significant for the 
two large stock indices in the London Stock Exchange FTSE100 and FTSE 250. This 
interaction is unclear and mixed for the other two smaller and illiquid stock FTSE 
Small Cap and FTSE AIM All Shares and the US and French Equity markets. 
 The following regression is based on Huang and Stoll (1997) effective spread 
decomposition model. Huang and Stoll (1997) model directly infer information 
asymmetry cost component (and cost of trading component) in effective spread, which 
decreased in percentage by time in the FTSE100 and FTSE 250 and more or less 
remained at the same percentage level for other indices. In an attempt to establish a 
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relationship between information asymmetry component and market response, the 
final regression is a panel fixed effect regression, based on the first regression 
approach. This regression allows information component to vary over time. This 
regression examines whether the information component in liquidity plays a role in 
explaining the PEAD. The results from this regression revealed that information 
asymmetry cost component in the bid ask spread partially account for post earnings 
announcement drift in all four indices in the London Stock Exchange and for the 
CAC40 in France. However, there is very little statistical evidence that information 
asymmetry cost component has a relationship with post earnings announcement drift 
in the US market. This problem might be due to the earnings surprise measurement of 
the event as already stated in the previous pages, that there are a number of firms 
announcing earnings results at the beginning of the market open, and the rest  release 
earnings information after market has closed. The reaction occurs at the time of the 
event therefore is difficult to calculate correctly. 
In the end, I conclude from this thesis that, although some cases do  not apply 
however there is very strong evidence to show the association between earnings 
announcement and stock liquidity. The PEAD phenomenon therefore can be explained 
by the change in stock liquidity, the London Stock Exchange and French equity 
markets prove that the information component in stock liquidity can account for the 
change in post earnings announcement drift. The evidence from US market does not 
prove that conclusively but this may be due to the problem of measurement of 
earnings surprise. 
Limitation and potentials for future research study 
The objective of this research was to explore and demonstrate the relationship 
between the bid ask spread and PEAD, particularly the information asymmetry 
component in the bid ask spread and the PEAD. The conclusion drawn above is upon 
a number of certain assumptions. Hence, the following limitations are apparent and 
are recommened for further research: 
 Statistical models of returns are derived purely from statistical assumptions 
about the behavior of returns -i.e., multivariate normality. Following the main 
stream in the literature, I have tested normality distribution of the cumulative 
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abnormal returns to come to the conclusion that PEAD does exist, however in 
reality, normality might be incorrect, the distribution could be an other type of 
distribution such as chi-squared or bell shape etc..   
 The earnings surprise measurement might not be accurate as demonstrated in 
chapter VI. This may be due to some unforeseen bias and assumptions made 
for earnings surprise. In addition, the specific time for earnings news release 
on the day in the US and French markets are not captured but may have a 
bearing and by virtue the results may be biased because of this fact. A further 
study would be recommended for specific release time and intraday data. 
 From the Markets model, market adjusted model or CAPM/APT literature; we 
know that what drives expected stock returns is not exactly clear. Using 
cumulative abnormal return based on any of those models to proxy for PEAD 
may not be accurate over the long term as over the long period of time the bias 
will leave an accumulative effect. In long horizon studies, the specification of 
expected returns makes a huge difference, because small errors are cumulated. 
There is still no easy way out of this problem. 
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